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ABSTRACT
The Thesis investigates the determinants and patterns of specialisation and 
international trade in the manufacturing sectors of countries that are similar in 
terms of their technology, relative factor endowments and preferences.
Chapter 1 shows that differences in country size alone can be a basis for inter­
industry trade in manufactures. I present a general equilibrium model in which 
each country has two imperfectly competitive industries which can differ in three 
respects: relative factor intensities, level of transport costs and demand 
elasticities. With positive trade costs and increasing returns to scale, each firm 
prefers to locate in the larger country due to the ’market access’ effect. But the 
increase in demand for factors in the large country induces a ’production cost’ 
effect - a rise in the wage in the large country relative to the small country to 
offset the locational advantage of the large country. The tension between the 
market access effect and production cost effect determines which industry will 
concentrate in which country and the pattern of inter-industry trade.
Chapter 2 investigates circumstance in which technological leapfrogging between 
regions will occur. Input-output linkages between firms in imperfectly 
competitive industries create forces for agglomeration of industries in particular 
locations. A new technology, incompatible with the old, will not benefit from 
these linkages, so will typically be established in locations with little existing 
industry and consequently lower factor prices.
Chapters 3 studies specialisation patterns in the European Union between 1968 
and 1990. It investigates whether specialisation has increased in the European 
Union countries and analyses whether these patterns are consistent with three
3
different strands of trade theories: the classical Heckscher-Ohlin theory, the 
’new’ trade theories based on increasing returns to scale, and the ’economic 
geography’ theories based on vertical linkages between industries. I find that 
there is evidence of increasing specialisation in the European Union countries and 
there is some support for all three strands of trade theories.
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INTRODUCTION
Nearly half of world trade takes place between industrialised countries, with a 
significant proportion in manufactures. The purpose of the Thesis is to 
investigate the determinants and patterns of specialisation and international trade 
in the manufacturing sectors of countries that are similar in terms of their 
technologies, factor endowments and preferences.
Classical trade theory sees little basis for trade between similar economies - it 
postulates that countries trade to take advantage of their differences. The basic 
idea, which dates back to Ricardo in 1817, is that each country has a comparative 
advantage in producing different goods - some goods can be produced more 
cheaply in different countries - and this gives rise to profitable opportunities for 
trade. According to the Ricardo theory, each country will specialise1 and export 
the goods in which it has a comparative advantage arising from differences in 
technologies. The theory does not explain why countries have access to different 
technologies, it is assumed that they do. In contrast, comparative advantage 
arises from different relative factor endowments in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. 
So capital abundant countries specialise in and export capital intensive goods and 
labour abundant countries specialise in and export labour intensive goods.
Classical trade theory has contributed a great deal in explaining inter-industry 
trade between dissimilar countries. However its inability to explain international 
trade flows between similar countries motivated a search for a new framework.
1 When I refer to specialisation this does not necessarily imply complete 
specialisation.
A ’new trade theory’ developed which explains why identical countries engage in 
intra-industry trade - two way trade within the same industry. Krugman (1979) 
uses a simplified Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz model of product differentiation to show 
that identical countries may trade to take advantage of scale economies. When 
countries move from autarky to free trade the number of varieties of goods in 
each country falls, enabling firms to slide down their average cost curves. So 
there are gains from trade due to lower unit cost of production and consumers 
have access to more varieties through trade. In Ethier (1979, 1982) intra-industry 
trade in intermediate goods can take place between identical countries with scale 
economies arising from an increased division of the production process into a 
large number of distinct operations. Brander and Krugman (1983) show that 
efforts of oligopolistic firms to raid each others markets will lead to intra-industry 
trade in homogenous goods between identical countries.
The ’new economic geography’ literature, building on the new trade theory, 
shows that inter-industry trade can take place between countries which only differ 
in size. Krugman (1991a) formalises ideas dating back to Myrdal (1957) and 
Hirschman (1958) to analyse the circumstances under which a manufacturing 
sector will agglomerate in a limited number of locations. The ideas relate to what 
Myrdal (1957) called ’circular causation’ which is created by what Hirschman 
(1958) called ’backward linkages’. In a two region, two sector general 
equilibrium model where manufactures are subject to increasing returns to scale 
and the other sector is perfectly competitive with constant returns to scale, each 
manufacturing good will only be produced at one location to save on fixed costs. 
With other things equal, the preferred site will be the one with large demand to 
minimise on transport costs, and demand will be large where the manufacturing 
sector is located since demand also comes from the manufacturing sector. With
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labour mobile between the two regions, this ’backward linkage’ is reinforced by 
a ’forward linkage’ arising from workers preferring to live in a location where 
manufacturing is concentrated because goods are less expensive there. For some 
parameter values, all the manufacturing sector will agglomerate in one region, 
exporting manufactured goods and importing goods from the perfectly competitive 
sector.
In a further development in the new economic geography literature, Krugman and 
Venables (1995) and Venables (1996a) show that agglomeration of manufacturing 
industries may arise due to vertical linkages between two imperfectly competitive 
industries, so circular causation can arise without labour mobility between 
regions. A large number of downstream firms attract a large number of upstream 
firms due to ’demand linkages’, and the more upstream firms in the one location 
the lower the cost of inputs to downstream firms providing a feedback effect 
which is referred to as a ’cost’ linkage. The feedback effect may come from 
downstream firms having access to a bigger variety of differentiated inputs, as in 
Krugman and Venables (1995) and Venables (1996a) or as a result of more 
intense competition, arising from a higher number of upstream firms in the one 
location, reducing the price of upstream goods as in Venables (1996b). So the 
agglomeration forces in the new economic geography literature arise from 
pecuniary externalities.
These three strands of trade theory can be seen as complementary explanations 
of world trade flows: the Classical trade theories explain inter-industry trade 
between dissimilar countries; the new trade theories explain intra-industry trade 
between similar countries; and the new economic geography theories explain 
inter-industry trade between similar countries. But what is the basis of inter­
industry trade within the manufacturing sector between similar countries? Why 
do certain manufacturing industries agglomerate in one location and other 
manufacturing industries in other locations? This question is closely related to 
Marshall’s (1890) concept of industry localisation. Marshall explained that 
industries localise due to external economies: with several firms agglomerated 
in one location the probability of unemployment and the probability of labour 
shortages is lower due to the pooled market for workers with industry specific 
skills; localised industries can support the production of non-tradeable specialised 
inputs; and informational spillovers are more likely when firms are located in the 
one location. (See Hoover (1948)).
Chapter 1 addresses whether differences in country size can generate inter­
industry trade within the manufacturing sector between two countries which are 
identical in technologies, relative factor endowments and tastes; and it determines 
the relationship between the size of the country and the goods it produces and 
trades. It builds on a model by Krugman (1980) where he demonstrates two 
results. The first result states that if countries are identical in all respects except 
for size, with other things equal, the large country will have a higher wage. 
Firms prefer to locate in only one location to save on transport costs and if 
production costs were the same in each country firms would prefer to locate 
where demand is the largest to save on transport costs. To maintain labour 
market equilibrium, the smaller country must offset its locational disadvantage by 
offering a wage differential. The second result states that each country will be 
a net exporter of goods it has the relatively larger domestic market - the ’home 
market’ effect. Both countries are of equal size with two imperfectly competitive 
industries and consumers in each country are assumed to have different 
preferences. So each industry will concentrate in the country which has the
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highest demand for its products and the country becomes a net exporter of goods 
from that industry. Jones (1970) also considered how different consumer tastes 
affect the pattern of trade.
In Chapter 1 ,1 abandon the assumption of different consumer tastes that is present 
in Krugman (1980) and allow the two manufacturing industries to differ in three 
respects: in terms of relative factor intensities, the level of trade costs and demand 
elasticities. I present a general equilibrium model with two countries which are 
endowed with identical relative endowments of capital and labour, but different 
in absolute levels, have the same technology in two imperfectly competitive 
industries, and whose consumers have identical tastes. The forces present in 
Krugman (1980) and also in Krugman and Venables (1990) and Krugman (1991a) 
are critical in my model. There is a ’market access’ effect which attracts firms 
to the large market - Krugman’s (1980) home market effect; and a ’production 
cost’ effect which attracts firms to the small market due to the lower wage there. 
The tension between the market access effect and the production cost effect 
determine the pattern of specialisation and inter-industry trade. And the relative 
strength of these two forces depends on how the two industries differ.
When industries differ with respect to factor intensities, the large country is a net 
exporter of capital intensive goods and the small country is a net exporter of 
labour intensive goods, with capital flowing from the small country to the large 
country. See Markusen (1983) for an analysis of a variety of cases where factor 
movements and commodity trade are complements. When industries differ with 
respect to transport cost or demand elasticities, there are no capital movements. 
Even though the endowments of capital to labour remain the same there is inter­
industry trade between the two countries with the large country a net exporter of
high transport cost goods and the small country a net exporter of low transport 
cost goods. When industries differ with respect to demand elasticities the large 
country has positive net exports of high elasticity goods when integration levels 
are close to autarky or free trade levels; and it is a net importer of high elasticity 
goods at intermediate levels of integration.
Chapter 2 analyses the circumstances under which a leading industrial region loses 
its dominant position to a lagging region, after there has been some major 
technological breakthrough. Suppose that a vertically linked industry is 
agglomerated in the one region due to the demand and cost linkages formalised 
in the economic geography literature. Then a new technology becomes available 
which is superior to and incompatible with the old technology. Will the new 
technology be adopted in the region which already has the vertically linked 
industries operating with the old technology or in the region that has none of these 
industries? I show that the new technology is most likely to be adopted in the 
lagging region where the wages are lower. The new technology does not benefit 
from the agglomeration of firms in the leading region since the two technologies 
are assumed to be incompatible. This creates the possibility for technological 
leapfrogging. We also see that the two technologies may co-exist or the new 
technology may lead to the disappearance of the industries operating with the old 
technology. There are multiple equilibria arising from pecuniary externalities. 
If firms were able to co-ordinate their actions, then the firms in the leading region 
would immediately adopt the new technology.
Other papers have also addressed the issue of technological leapfrogging. Brezis, 
Krugman and Tsiddon’s (1993) explanation of technological leapfrogging among 
countries is based on non-pecuniary externalities. They assume that production
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is subject to external learning effects which are specific to each country and that 
when there is a major technological breakthrough, it yields a higher productivity 
than the old technology given the same amount of experience. So for the leading 
country which has extensive experience with the old technology and hence a 
higher wage, the new technology is initially inferior to the old. In contrast, the 
lagging country, which has little experience with the old technology and hence a 
lower wage, can use its wage advantage to adopt the new technology. Over time, 
the lagging country gains more experience with the new technology and takes 
over as the leading country.
The ideas in Chapter 2 are similar in spirit to the idea of the ’big push’ dating 
back to Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and more recently developed in Murphy, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989). (See Matsuyama (1995) for a survey of these and 
related papers). In Murphy et al (1989) the big push is associated with multiple 
equilibria arising from pecuniary externalities generated by imperfect competition 
with large fixed costs. The multiplicity of equilibria is interpreted as a switch 
from cottage production to industrial equilibria. In Venables (1996b), multiplicity 
of equilibria arise from pecuniary externalities due to imperfectly competitive 
vertically linked industries. And the big push is associated with a switch from a 
low level of output to a high level of output, with a study of how trade policy can 
trigger the industrialisation. Similarly, in Chapter 2 the multiplicity of equilibria 
arise from the type of pecuniary externalities present in Venables (1996b) but the 
question addressed is related to the adoption of new technology. Furthermore, 
it investigates circumstances where the new and old technologies can co-exist.
The industrial organisation literature has also contributed to the issue of 
technological leapfrogging, however the focus has been on leapfrogging between
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firms rather than countries. Tirole (1988), Gilbert and Newberry (1982) and 
Reinganum (1983) consider leapfrogging between single agents. In Tirole (1988), 
even though there are no externalities present, it is shown that an existing 
monopolist has less incentive to innovate than a rival since it would be replacing 
itself. However, Gilbert and Newberry (1982) show that a monopolist is still 
likely to innovate ahead of rivals in a world of perfect certainty. And Reinganum 
(1983) shows that in a world of uncertainty a monopolist is unlikely to innovate 
ahead of potential rivals. The industrial organisation literature has also analysed 
the circumstances under which a new and superior technology, incompatible with 
the old, will be adopted. This literature is closer in spirit to Chapter 2 as it 
analyses cases where a new system will take over an old system. In the presence 
of network externalities, Arthur (1994), Church and Gandal (1993), David (1985), 
Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1986), and Katz and Shapiro (1986) show that the 
market can be locked to an inferior choice of technology.
Chapter 3 provides an empirical analyses of specialisation patterns in the 
manufacturing sector of European Union (EU) countries. It addresses two 
questions: Has specialisation increased in EU countries?; and, are specialisation 
patterns consistent with any of the three strands of trade theories? According to 
all three strands of trade theories, reducing trade costs should lead to an increase 
in the degree of specialisation. Since trade costs have been falling between 
member countries of the EU, starting in 1957 which was the beginning of its 
formation, we would expect that industries should become more geographically 
concentrated. Analysing whether specialisation has increased is one way to 
ascertain whether expected gains from trade have been realised. These gains arise 
from allocating production according to comparative advantage and thereby 
achieving a more efficient allocation, by enabling firms to expand production to
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exploit economies of scale, and from the pecuniary externalities which arise from 
vertically linked industries locating close to each other.
Empirical studies on specialisation patterns in Europe have produced conflicting 
results. Studies by Aquino (1978) and Sapir (1996) suggest that specialisation in 
Europe has remained constant or fallen over the period 1951 to 1992. Aquino 
(1978) used the standard deviation of the Balassa index on the exports of 25 
manufacturing industries from 26 countries, which included 10 EU countries, and 
found that over the period 1951 to 1974 the extent of inter-industry specialisation 
in manufacturing was limited and declined over time. Sapir (1996), using the 
Herfindahl index on exports of 100 manufacturing industries from 4 EU countries 
over the period 1977 to 1992, found that specialisation remained low and 
moderately constant except in France which increased its level of specialisation 
since 1986.
Other studies suggest that there is some evidence of increasing specialisation in 
EU countries. Hine (1990), using the Finger-Kreinin measure on production of 
29 manufacturing industries, found that inter-industry specialisation increased for 
all European countries in his sample, except for Ireland, over the period 1970 to 
1984. Greenaway and Hine (1991), also using the Finger-Kreinin index on 
production of 28 manufacturing industries in 21 OECD countries, found that for 
the period 1970 to 1980 only 3 out of 11 EU countries in his sample increased 
their specialisation whereas between 1980 to 1985 all of the 11 EU countries 
increased their level of specialisation. Helg et al (1995), using the Gini on the 
production shares of each industry in total manufacturing, where manufactures are 
divided into 8 sub-divisions, in 12 EU countries for the period 1975 to 1985, 
found that specialisation increased in 8 out of the 12 countries.
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The mixed results produced by the empirical literature could be due to the 
different variable adopted, the level of aggregation or the differences in the 
measures of specialisation. These empirical studies have raised a number of 
measurement issues. In particular, which data sources should we use, national 
or trade data?; which level of aggregation?; and how should we measure 
specialisation? In Chapter 3, I discuss these measurement issues and I propose 
a new index of specialisation which overcomes some of the problems inherent in 
existing measures.
I utilise production data to construct indices of country specialisation for each EU 
country and geographical concentration for each manufacturing industry, and then 
see how these indices evolve over time. The movements in the country 
specialisation indices provide a picture of whether countries have become more 
different from each other in their industrial structures. The geographical 
concentration indices provide a picture of whether particular industries have 
become more geographically concentrated. I show that there is some evidence of 
increasing specialisation in the EU countries and increasing geographical 
concentration over the period 1976 to 1990. Brulhart and Tortensson (1996), in 
a study of 18 industries in 11 EU countries, also find evidence of increasing 
geographical concentration between 1980 and 1990.
Similar issues have been taken up with respect to geographical concentration of 
industries in the United States. Ellison and Glaeser (1994) propose a ’dartboard 
approach’ to measuring geographic concentration of industries. They compare the 
actual level of geographical concentration to one that would occur if firms were 
to choose their locations by throwing darts at a map. This avoids the problem of 
industries showing high levels of concentration just because they only have a few
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plants in operation. This problem of ’random agglomeration’ does not appear in 
my data set since all industries have positive outputs in all categories over the 
whole sample so I do not follow Ellison and Glaeser’s (1994) approach. 
Krugman (1991b) uses the Gini to measure geographical concentration of 
industries in the United States. He compares the distribution of employment in 
a particular industry to that of overall manufacturing. I also use the Gini, as well 
as the other measures proposed in the empirical studies of EU countries, and 
discuss the relative merits of the different measures.
The geographical concentration indices are useful for studying the characteristics 
of the industries which have become more concentrated thereby enabling us to 
determine whether the specialisation patterns are consistent with any of the three 
stands of trade theories. I show that there is some support for the new trade 
theories based on scale economies and the new economic geography theories 
based on vertically linked industries, but only weak support for the Classical 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory which predicts that each country will specialise in 
industries which are intensive in the factors which it is abundantly endowed.
Kim (1996) presents a similar study of the determinants of geographical 
concentration in the United States using the Gini. He finds support for the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory and the new trade theories but does not test for the new 
economic geography theory. The support the study claims for the Heckscher- 
Ohlin theory is questionable. The explanatory variable used in Kim (1996) to test 
for the Heckscher-Ohlin theory is a measure of raw material intensity and is 
defined as the cost of raw materials divided by value added. But the Heckscher- 
Ohlin theory does not claim that resource intensive industries will be more 
geographically concentrated than other factor intensive industries. Instead, it
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predicts that countries will specialise in industries which are intensive in the 
factors which they are relatively abundant. Taking this into account, I construct 
a variable which is the deviation of factor intensities from the mean. Those 
industries which differ a lot from the mean should be the most geographically 
concentrated if specialisation is as predicted by the Heckscher-Ohlin theory. 
However it is not surprising that I only find weak support for the Heckscher- 
Ohlin theory since the European countries in my sample are very similar in terms 
of their relative factor endowments. See Learner and Levinsohn (1995) for a 
review of studies which test the Heckscher-Ohlin theory.
2 Learner and Levinsohn (1995) argue that a full test of the Heckscher-Ohlin 
theory should include measures of factor endowments. We do not follow this 
approach as the main focus is to analyse which industries are the most 
geographically concentrated.
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CHAPTER 1
INTER-INDUSTRY TRADE IN MANUFACTURES: 
DOES COUNTRY SIZE MATTER?
Nearly half of world trade takes place between industrialised countries, with a 
significant proportion in manufactures. Many of these countries are similar in 
terms of their relative factor endowments, technologies and tastes. What is the 
basis of this trade? Classical trade theory sees little basis for trade between 
similar countries - it postulates that countries trade to take advantage of their 
differences. The ’new trade theory’ literature shows that scale economies, 
product differentiation and imperfect competition can generate intra-industry trade 
between identical countries. (See, for examples, Brander and Krugman (1983), 
Ethier (1979, 1982) and Krugman (1979)). The ’new economic geography’ 
literature shows that inter-industry trade can take place between countries which 
are identical or only differ in size. (See Krugman (1991a), Krugman and 
Venables (1995) and Venables (1996b)). So the new trade theories offer an 
explanation of two-way trade between identical countries and the new economic 
geography theories offer an explanation of why there is inter-industry trade 
between identical countries where manufactures are exchanged for goods from 
another sector. But what is the basis of inter-industry trade within the 
manufacturing sector between similar countries?
The purpose of this Chapter is to analyse whether country size alone can be a 
basis of inter-industry trade within the manufacturing sector and to determine the 
relationship between the size of a country and the characteristics of the goods it 
produces and trades. Even though industrialised countries may be similar in
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terms of factor endowments, technologies and tastes, they certainly differ in size. 
To focus on the role of size, I assume that the countries are the same in every 
other respect.
The model I present builds on Krugman (1980), where he demonstrates two 
results. The first result states that if countries are identical in all respects except 
size, with other things equal, the large country will have a higher wage. Firms 
prefer to locate in only one location to save on transport costs and if production 
costs were the same in each country firms would prefer to locate where demand 
is the largest to save on transport costs. To maintain labour market equilibrium, 
the smaller country must offset its locational disadvantage by offering a wage 
differential. The second result states that each country will be a net exporter of 
goods it has the relatively larger domestic market - the ’home market’ effect. He 
assumes that both countries are of equal size with two imperfectly competitive 
industries and consumers in each country have different tastes. So each industry 
will concentrate in the country which has the highest demand for its products and 
the country becomes a net exporter of goods from that industry. Inter-industry 
trade within the manufacturing sector is driven by differences in consumer tastes. 
(Jones (1970) also considers how different consumer tastes affect the pattern of 
trade).
I abandon Krugman’s (1980) assumption of different consumer tastes and allow 
the two imperfectly competitive industries to be different. The industries may 
differ in terms of relative factor intensities, the level of trade costs and demand 
elasticities. I present a general equilibrium model in which there are two 
countries which are endowed with identical capital to labour ratios, but different 
in absolute levels, have the same technology in two imperfectly competitive 
industries, and whose consumers have identical tastes. The model has positive
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trade costs, perfect capital mobility and labour mobile only within each country.1 
The forces present in Krugman (1980) and also in Krugman and Venables (1990) 
and Krugman (1991a) are critical in my model. There is a ’market access’ effect 
which attracts firms to the large market - Krugman’s (1980) home market effect; 
and a ’production cost’ effect which attracts firms to the small market due to the 
lower wage there. The pattern of specialisation and trade is determined by the 
tension between these two effects. And the relative strength of these two forces 
depends on how the two industries differ.
When industries differ with respect to factor intensities, the large country is a net 
exporter of capital intensive goods and the small country is a net exporter of 
labour intensive goods, with capital flowing from the small country to the large 
country. In Markusen (1983) factor movements and commodity trade are also 
complements. When industries differ with respect to transport cost or demand 
elasticities, there are no capital movements. Even though the endowments of 
capital to labour remain the same there is inter-industry trade between the two 
countries with the large country a net exporter of high transport cost goods and 
the small country a net exporter of low transport cost goods. When industries 
differ with respect to demand elasticities the large country has positive net exports 
of high elasticity goods when integration levels are close to autarky or free trade 
levels; and it is a net importer of high elasticity goods at intermediate levels of 
integration.
1 This is intended as a broad characterisation of the situation within the 
expanding European Union, or between the US and Canada. Note that in most 
industrialised countries labour mobility is subject to tight restrictions; within the 
European Union, even though labour is allowed to move, in practice, labour is 
prone to be culturally tied to its origins. In contrast, capital mobility is 
predominant among industrialised countries.
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This Chapter is organised as follows. Section 1 sets out the formal model. 
Section 2 solves for the equilibrium of the model. Section 3 determines the 
production and trade patterns for each country. Section 4 concludes. All the 
proofs are contained in Appendix 1 of this Chapter and the parameter values of 
the simulations are in Appendix 2 of this Chapter.
1. THE MODEL
The model is based on Krugman (1980). It is a general equilibrium model with 
two countries, two imperfectly competitive industries employing two factors of 
production. The two countries, which we refer to as home and foreign, are 
identical in every respect except in size, with the home country larger than the 
foreign country. More specifically, the home country is endowed with more of 
both factors of production compared to the foreign country. I assume that neither 
country has a comparative advantage in producing goods: both countries are 
endowed with equal capital to labour ratios; they have access to the same 
technology; and consumers in each country have identical homothetic preferences.
We model two industries in the manufacturing sector which employ labour, L, 
and capital, K, in fixed proportions.2 Capital is perfectly mobile between the 
countries whereas labour can only move within the same country. Each firm can 
choose to locate in either country and it draws on the labour and capital available 
in the country in which it locates, so firms move independently of capital. The 
two imperfectly competitive industries are labelled by subscripts 1 and 2. The 
market structure is one of Chamberlinian monopolistic competition. There are
2 The fixed proportions assumption makes it possible to solve the model 
analytically; this would not be possible with an alternative technology. Using 
numerical simulations, we found that the flavour of the results is maintained even 
with a Cobb-Douglas technology.
22
many firms in both industries, each employing increasing returns to scale 
technology and producing differentiated goods. The two industries can differ in 
three respects: relative factor intensities, level of transport costs and elasticity of 
demand.
We specify the equations of the model for the home country and note that the 
same equations hold for the foreign country. (A superscript * denotes a foreign 
variable).
Define income, Y, as:
Y=wL+rK r=r'=l (1)
where w is the price of labour; r is the price of capital which is equal in the two 
countries by our assumption of perfect mobility and used as the numeraire. 
Assume that capital income is consumed where it is initially endowed.3 Relative 
factor endowments are equal, k = K /L = K 7 L \ to abstract from comparative 
advantage considerations. Hence:
Y=(k+w)L ; Y'-(k+w')L" <2)
The aggregate utility function, U, for the representative consumer is Cobb- 
Douglas, with exponents a and 1-a.
3 Allowing capital income to move with capital does not change the direction 
of trade but it does complicate the analysis. The effects of relaxing this 
assumption are discussed in section 3.
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u=c?cl° (3)
where Q  denotes aggregate consumption of industry 1 goods produced in both 
countries and C2 denotes aggregate consumption of industry 2 goods produced in 
both countries. One can think of Q  and C2 as quantity indices or sub-utility 
functions, which are defined below. Assume that preferences are separable, that 
is the marginal rate of substitution between any pair of industry 1 goods does not 
depend on C2 and the marginal rate of substitution between any pair of industry 
2 goods does not depend on Q ; and the sub-utility functions are homothetic. 
These assumptions ensure that the use of two stage budgeting when solving the 
consumers’ utility maximisation problem is efficient. We assume that consumers 
have Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, hence there is a taste for variety. The quantity 
index for industry 1 is:
c,=
n ql~* «* ®i-1
f e u '  +E(mv/x ) ~
. i j
qi-i (4)
where nj is the number of firms producing industry 1 goods, located in the home 
country; and n^ is the number of firms producing industry 1 goods, located in the 
foreign country. cn is consumption in the home country of industry 1 good i 
produced in the home country and (m^/r) is the amount consumed in the home 
country of industry 1 good j produced in the foreign country. The trade costs4 
are modelled as Samuelsonian iceberg transportation costs with tx >  1. In order 
to deliver one unit of any good from one country to another, tx units must be
4 The trade costs are intended to reflect the cost of shipping, frontier 
formalities or government restrictions. Alternatively, they could be reinterpreted 
as tariffs.
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shipped as only a fraction 1 h x arrives, while 1-(1 /Tj) melts in transit. If r ^ l  
there is free trade in industry 1 goods and if Tj =  oo there is no trade in industry 
1 goods. Jj is the elasticity of substitution between any pair of differentiated 
goods in industry 1. With 1 < ol < oo, the sub-utility function is concave hence 
all consumers want to consume some of each variety.
Dual to industry l ’s quantity index, the price index, Plf is:
where pn is the producer price set by firm i in industry 1 of the home country and 
Pij* is the producer price set by firm j in industry 1 of the foreign country.
Now consider the production technology. The technology of firms in both 
industries exhibits increasing returns to scale. We assume that the economies of 
scale are relatively small so that the number of varieties is large enough to make 
oligopolistic interactions negligible. This means that the pricing policy of each 
firm has almost no effect on the marginal utility of income. The production 
function for each variety i in industry 1 is:
where a  represents the fixed cost5 of production, giving rise to increasing returns
5 Having industry specific fixed costs does not add anything to the analysis. 
A different fixed cost changes the scale of production but does not influence the 
direction of net trade. Hence, for simplicity a  is the same for both industries.
(5)
a +pXlj=min(—
Yi 8 ,
(6)
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to scale, (3 is marginal cost and XH is the quantity of industry 1 goods produced 
by firm i in the home country. All firms in the industry share the same fixed 
proportions technology. The right hand side of equation (6) represents the 
composite demand for factors by firm i in industry 1. To increase production of 
Xn by one unit, firm i must use an additional (3y{ units of labour and (35x units of 
capital irrespective of input prices, since the elasticity of substitution between the 
two factors is zero.
The cost function for each firm in industry 1, bn(.), dual to the production 
function is:
*ii(w>1>x n)=(YiH'+81)(a+pXli) (7)
Profit for each firm in industry 1, 11 ,^ is total revenue less total costs: 
n i i = P A r ( Y i W + 5 i ) ( a + P ^ )  <8 >
We assume there is free entry and exit. With a large number of symmetric firms 
in each industry profits for each firm will be zero.
By changing the subscripts in equations (4) to (8) from 1 to 2, we have a 
description of industry 2. Industry 2 can differ from industry 1 in three respects 
and we will consider each case separately when we determine the production and 
trade patterns of the two countries. For concreteness we assume that industry 1 
is relatively more labour intensive, yj/Sj >  y2/<52; transport costs are higher in 
industry 1, Tj >  r2; and elasticity of demand faced by firms in industry 1 is 
higher, >  a2.
We assume factor markets are perfectly competitive and factors fully employed.
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2 . EQUILIBRIUM OF THE MODEL
Having set out the definitions and the assumptions of the model, we can begin to 
solve for equilibrium. We do this in four stages. First, we solve the 
representative consumer’s utility maximisation problem. Second, we solve the ith 
firm’s profit maximisation problem in both industries to derive the producer 
prices. Using the free entry and exit condition, we derive the number of units 
each firm must produce to cover fixed cost. Third, we determine factor market 
clearing conditions and product market clearing in each industry. Finally, with 
some substitutions, we derive the equilibrium conditions which simultaneously 
solve for income, wages, and the number of firms in each industry for both 
countries.
First, consider the representative consumer’s behaviour. Since the Cobb-Douglas 
preferences, U, are separable and the sub-utility functions, Cj and C2, are 
homothetic, we can derive demand functions using two stage budgeting. In stage 
one, the consumer can allocate expenditure between the two groups of goods 
without knowledge of individual prices of each good; all that is required are the 
price indices. Maximisation of the Cobb-Douglas utility function (equation (3)) 
subject to the budget constraint (equation (2)) allocates expenditure between the 
two industries as follows:
P f i ^ a Y  (9)
P2C2= (l-a )Y  (10)
In stage 2, the consumer maximises the sub-utility function (equation (4)) subject 
to the budget constraint (equation (9)) to derive demand functions for each 
industry 1 good produced in the home country and the foreign country.
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c . r P u ' P ^ ' a Y (11)
1 - 0 , * - o .  ct, - 1
ml/=Tl (Pi p \ aT> (12)
The demand functions for industry 2 goods are derived in the same way, by 
maximising the sub-utility function C2 subject to the budget constraint (equation 
(10)).
Second, consider firm i’s behaviour in industry 1. Each firm i chooses a variety 
and its pricing so as to maximise profits, taking as given the variety choice and 
pricing strategy of the other firms in the industry. Production of each variety will 
only be undertaken by one firm since a potential entrant can always do better by 
introducing a new product variety than by sharing in the production of an existing 
product type.6
Maximising profits with respect to quantity gives the usual marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost condition.
an ,, ( o.
dXu
- = °  -  pu=(r
v0 ! - 1
(13)
Price is a constant mark-up over marginal cost. Given identical technology, all 
firms in the industry set the same price therefore we can drop the i subscript. 
The price of labour, w, is the same for all firms located in the home country
6 Even though a firm would be indifferent between mimicking an existing 
variety produced abroad and producing a completely new variety in autarky, since 
it is costless to differentiate a product all firms will produce distinct varieties 
when we allow trade.
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since labour is mobile between industries within the same country. However, the 
price of labour in the home country need not be equal to the price of labour in the 
foreign country, w*, since labour is internationally immobile.
Imposing the free entry and exit condition, by setting profits equal to zero, 
determines the quantity of output required to just cover fixed cost.
n u=0 -  x i r
“ ( o r 1) (14)
Again, this is the same for all firms in the industry so we drop the subscript i. 
Output is fixed and independent of price and the number of firms. This is a 
direct consequence of the Dixit-Stiglitz preferences. A constant elasticity of 
substitution leads to constant mark-up pricing hence each firm requires a fixed 
amount of production to cover fixed costs. The higher is the fixed cost, a , the 
higher is the amount of output required; the lower is the elasticity of demand, a, 
the higher is the mark-up on price therefore the smaller is the amount of output 
required; and the higher is the marginal cost, /3, the higher is the price and 
therefore the lower is the amount of output required. The price and output level 
for industry 2 goods can be derived in the same way.
Third, consider equilibrium in each market. Factor market equilibrium requires 
that the sum of demands for each factor equals the supply of that factor.
ni(“ +PXj) y t +n2(<x+p X J y 2=L (15)
By Walras law, we don’t need to specify the equilibrium condition in the world 
capital market.
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Product market equilibrium requires that demand equals supply for each good in 
both industries.
X r ci+m ' i= l,2 . (16)
We can reduce the model to four equations for each country which simultaneously 
solve for Y, Y \ w, w \ nl5 n / ,  n2, n2*. By substituting equations (14) and the 
symmetric equation for industry 2 into (15), we can rewrite the labour market 
clearing condition as:
n1a o 1f 1+n2a o 2y2=L (17)
Substituting equations (5), (11), (12), (13) and (14) into (16), for i = l ,  we have 
the equilibrium zero profit condition (or equilibrium product market condition) for 
industry 1 firms:
^ ^ =^ (YlW+8|)’0l<[" l(Yl'V+8l)1" ' +" 1’(YlW' +8l)1' 0'T' lfli(18) 
°‘[ni(Yiw+6i)1 "’‘■'l <’1+»i*(y1w*+8i)1-<’,]-1or>
Similarly, by substituting symmetric equations for firms in industry 2 into 
equation (16),for i= 2 , we have the equilibrium zero profit condition for industry 
2 firms:
«(<*2-l) (02- ,S 
P P°:
Equations (2), (17), (18) and (19) together with equations for the foreign country 
provide all the information we require to analyze the effect of integration on the 
production and trade patterns of each country.
3. PRODUCTION AND NET TRADE PATTERNS
I will begin the analysis by determining the relative production patterns of the two 
countries in autarky, r =  oo, and then compare this to the production patterns 
when we allow trade, oo < 7  <  1. We define the relative production patterns 
in the home country and the foreign country respectively as:
Since the quantity supplied by each firm in each industry is constant, independent 
of price, the number of firms and the degree of integration, r, this problem 
reduces to finding the relative number of firms in each country as a function of 
transport costs.
From the relative production patterns it is easy to deduce the direction of net 
trade. With Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, consumers demand all varieties so 
countries engage in intra-industry trade when r  is less than infinity. If the relative 
number of firms in the home country, nj/n2, is greater than the relative number
»,X, «iX* (20)
n2X2 ’ Bj'Xj
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of firms in the foreign country, nj7n2\  then the home country has positive net 
exports of industry 1 goods and negative net exports of industry 2 goods. Net 
exports in each industry are defined as total exports less total imports. Hence, 
the home country’s net exports are:
njntJ-njnij , 7=1,2. @1)
where qm^ is the amount of industry j goods the consumers in the foreign 
country demand which is greater than the amount they consume since some goods 
melt in transit.
3 (a) Autarky and free trade
Note that none of the three industry characteristics which we allow to vary has 
an influence on equilibrium either in autarky or free trade.
Proposition 1: In autarky, the relative number of firms in the small country 
is equal to the relative number of firms in the large country, and factor 
prices are equal across the countries. In free trade, the relative number of 
firms in each country is indeterminate and factor prices are equal across the 
countries.
More formally,
(a) if 7 = oo, then w7w = 1 , n^/%* = n ^ ;  and
(b) if t = 1 , then w 7 w = l, nj7n2* and nj/n2 are indeterminate.
Under autarky, each country is completely separate and the home country is just 
a scale expansion of the foreign country. Even though firms enjoy economies of 
scale, each firm in each industry produces the same amount of output in
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equilibrium, so if the home country is twice as large as the foreign country, it 
will have twice as many firms in both industries. To see that the first part of 
proposition 1 is true, let us double all the quantities in one country at unchanged 
prices and check that this is an equilibrium. From the labour market clearing 
condition, equation (17), it is clear that labour demand is homogenous of degree 
one in the number of firms; capital demand is also homogenous of degree one in 
the number of firms. If the quantities of labour and capital are doubled, from 
equation (2) we see that income also doubles. Since consumers’ preferences are 
assumed to be Cobb-Douglas, the share of expenditure on each industry’s goods 
is constant. In the product market equilibrium conditions, equations (18) and 
(19), if we set r =  oo; substitute in for income from equation (2); and double the 
quantities of capital, labour and the number of firms, we see the wage is 
unchanged. Recall that the price of capital is the numeraire set equal to 1 and 
note that the wage is the nominal wage in terms of the numeraire and not the real 
wage so that with equal factor prices, capital has no incentive to move in autarky 
even though it is mobile.7
The result under free trade follows from the factor price equalisation theorem. 
Since both countries have identical technologies, free trade in goods will ensure 
that the prices of goods in the two countries are equal. The price of capital is set 
in the world capital market whereas the price of labour is set internally. Since 
the price of goods is a function of the wage and rent (see equation (13)), if prices 
are equal it follows that wages must also be equal. With free trade, one can think 
of the two countries being like one big country, hence the location of firms is 
immaterial.
7 Note that the utility of each consumer in the large country is higher than 
in the small country since utility is increasing in the number of product varieties. 
Equilibrium is not affected by these utility differences since labour is immobile 
across countries.
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3 (b) Partial Integration
Integration of the two countries leads to a divergence in production patterns so 
countries can attain a degree of specialisation. The driving force of the diverging 
industrial structures is the tension between the market access effect and the 
production cost effect. Let us examine each effect more closely.
First, consider the market access effect. Compared to the distribution of firms 
in autarky more firms will want to locate in the large country when we allow 
trade, fo r  a ll  oo <  7 < 1 , if factor prices are equal across the two countries, 
w*=w and r*=r. To cover fixed costs, each firm must produce a given amount 
of output through domestic sales and exports. Reducing transport costs from the 
autarky level, 7 = 0 0 , to some finite level, r  >  1, has two effects at the initial 
w*=w. (i) The ’import competition’ effect: a fall in r  reduces the price index 
due to the extra firms competing for demand. (See equation (5)). This leads to 
a fall in domestic demand for domestically produced goods in each country. (See 
equation (11)). The price index falls by more in the small country than in the 
large country since firms in the small country are exposed to more import 
competition compared to firms in the large country, (ii) The ’export growth’ 
effect: a fall in 7 leads to an increase in exports to each country. The absolute 
demand for goods produced abroad increases more in the large country than in 
the small country. (See equation (12)). As a result firms in the small country 
gain more in export sales than firms in the large country since they have access 
to a relatively larger market. However it is the import competition effect which 
dominates since sales in the domestic market are more significant than exports for 
any positive level of transport costs. Firms in the small market find that the gain 
in exports does not offset the sales lost in the domestic market so that the amount 
of output they can sell is insufficient to cover fixed costs and this leads to the exit 
of some firms. The reverse is true in the large country, so there is entry. The
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net effect is that, compared to the autarky distribution of firms, more firms would 
locate in the large country if factor prices were equal. 8
Now, consider the production cost effect. If firms were to relocate from the 
small country to the large country, the demand for factors in the large country 
would increase. An increase in the demand for capital in the large country results 
in capital flowing from the small country to the large country since capital is 
freely mobile between the two countries. In contrast, an increase in the demand 
for labour in the large country pushes up wages in the large country relative to 
the small country since labour is not mobile between the two countries, that is 
w7w falls. Relative wages must adjust to maintain labour market equilibrium. 
This is what I refer to as the production cost effect.
A lower w*/w offsets the locational advantage of the large country. The relative 
strengths of the market access effect and the production cost effect will depend 
on how the two industries differ. We allow the two industries to differ in three
v
respects: relative factor intensities, level of transport costs and demand 
elasticities. We consider each case in turn.
(i) Different relative factor intensities
Suppose that industry 1 is more labour intensive than industry 2, but the same in 
all other respects. To produce one unit of output, industry 1 requires relatively 
more labour than industry 2. If the two countries are partially integrated, which 
country will be relatively more specialised in the production of the labour 
intensive goods; which country will be a net exporter of labour intensive goods;
8 Setting w 7 w = l in equation (A2) in Appendix 1, we find that 
d ^ /n ^ /d r  >  0 , evaluated at r->oo.
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and in which direction will capital flow?
Proposition 2: For intermediate values of transport costs, the small country 
is relatively more specialised in the production of labour intensive goods, and 
the large country is relatively more specialised in the production of capital 
intensive goods. Hence, the small country is a net exporter of labour 
intensive goods and the large country is a net exporter of capital intensive 
goods.
More formally, when L 7 L = \<  1 and a1=a2= 0, 7 1= t 2 = t ,  y l/8l >  7 2/5 2, 
if 1 <  7  <  oo, then w*/w< 1 and nj7n2* >  n /n j.
Corollary 1
For intermediate values of transport costs, the large country is a net importer 
of capital.
The proof of proposition 2 is in two steps. First, I show that the wage in the 
large country is higher than in the small country for all intermediate levels of 
integration, 1 <  r <  oo. If wages were equal, more of both industries’ firms would 
locate in the large country compared to the autarky distribution of firms. (See 
equations (A5) and (A6 )). But this is not possible if factor market equilibrium is 
to hold. The wage in the small country must be lower than in the large country 
to attract firms back to the small country. In the second step, we suppose that it 
is possible to have industry specific wages. What will these wages be to maintain 
the autarky distribution of firms? I show that the relative wage in the labour 
intensive industry, w^/Wj, is greater than in the capital intensive industry, w27w2. 
(See equations (A9) and (A 10)). But in equilibrium, the wage in each industry 
within a country must be equal since labour is mobile between industries within 
each country. The equilibrium wage ratio will lie somewhere in between the two
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industry specific wage ratios. Since the equilibrium wage is less than w^/wj, 
more industry 1 firms will locate in the small country compared to the autarky 
distribution; and by applying the same argument to industry 2 , we establish that 
more capital intensive firms will locate in the large country. To prove the 
corollary, I show that the demand for capital in the large country is greater than 
its initial endowment and the demand for capital in the small country is less than 
its initial endowment. (See equations (A ll) and (A 12)).
Let us turn to the intuition behind the result. Reducing transport costs from the 
autarky level, 7 = 0 0 , to some finite level, t >  1 , induces more firms to relocate 
to the large country, at the initial factor prices. To maintain factor market 
equilibrium, capital flows from the small to the large country and w7w falls, so 
the wage to rental ratio in the large country is higher than in the small country. 
Labour intensive firms are more attracted to the country with the low wage to 
rental ratio whereas capital intensive firms are more attracted to the country with 
the high wage to rental ratio. When industries only differ with respect to factor 
intensities, the force of the market access effect, attracting firms to the large 
country, is the same for firms from each industry as saving on transport costs is 
equally important for all firms. In contrast, the production cost effect makes the 
small country relatively more attractive to the labour intensive firms. 
Consequently, relatively more industry 1 firms locate in the small country and 
relatively more industry 2  firms locate in the large country, compared to the 
distribution of firms under autarky.
Determining the countries’ trade patterns is straightforward now that we know the 
production pattern of each country. Since the large country produces relatively 
more capital intensive goods, it becomes a net exporter of capital intensive goods; 
and the small country, which produces relatively more labour intensive goods, 
becomes a net exporter of labour intensive goods. As industry 2 firms require
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relatively more capital to produce a unit of output compared to industry 1 firms, 
in equilibrium the large country ends up with more capital than it was initially 
endowed with. So, capital flows from the small country to the large country.
To see whether specialisation increases with the degree of integration we turn to 
numerical simulations of the model, which are graphed in Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4. 
Figure 1 suggests a U shaped relationship between relative wages and transport 
costs (Venables and Krugman (1990) is the first paper to show this U shaped 
relationship); Figure 2 indicates a monotonic relationship between the relative 
number of firms in each country and transport costs. For the particular parameter 
values specified, at integration levels close to the free trade level, as t->1 , the 
foreign country is completely specialised in the production of labour intensive 
goods so n2*=0. The higher the degree of integration, the higher the degree of 
specialisation. Whether there is complete specialisation depends on parameter 
values, in particular on the difference in factor intensities and the size of the 
countries. Figure 3 graphs the home country’s net exports as a function of 
transport costs, indicating that net exports are increasing in the degree of 
integration and Figure 4 shows that capital flows are also increasing in the degree 
of integration.
When transport costs fall from the autarky level the wage gap between the two 
countries increases due to the market access effect. This provides industry 2 
firms with a relatively greater incentive to locate in the large country and industry 
1 firms to locate in the small country. After some critical level of transport costs 
the market access effect starts to become less important relative to production cost 
considerations. Hence the wage gap starts to close. w*/w starts to increase but 
is still less than 1. With low levels of transport costs industry 1 firms require a 
smaller wage differential to be attracted to the small country and similarly for 
industry 2  firms to be attracted to the large country.
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Simulating the model for firms with a Cobb-Douglas technology suggests a 
similar pattern of production and trade as for firms with a Leontief technology. 
The intuition is the same for firms with either technology. The market access 
effect attracts more firms to the large country compared to the autarky 
distribution, pushing up the wage to rental ratio in the large country. A firm with 
Cobb-Douglas technology can substitute capital for labour, therefore the increase 
in demand for labour in the large country is not as high as it would be if firms 
had fixed proportions technology. So the wage gap between the two countries is 
not as high. If firms had Cobb-Douglas technology the wage relativity function 
would lie above that in Figure 1, with the end points equal at w 7 w = l. But the 
incentive for a capital intensive firm to locate in the large country and substitute 
capital for labour is stronger than for a labour intensive firm since it faces a 
higher technical rate of substitution of capital for labour. So, the large country 
would still be relatively more specialised in the production of capital intensive 
goods and have positive net exports of capital intensive goods.
It is instructive to see how the results depend on the assumptions about capital. 
How would the results be affected if capital income moved with capital? The 
incentive for firms to locate in the large country would be even greater than if 
capital income were consumed where it was endowed. The market access and 
production cost effects work in the same way as before. The difference here is 
that as more firms locate in the large country, the large country becomes even 
larger since the capital income in the large country is increasing. This makes the 
market access effect even stronger so the wage relativity must be higher to attract 
firms to the small country to maintain labour market equilibrium.
What happens if capital is immobile between countries? Now an increase in 
demand for factors in the large country pushes up the price of labour and capital. 
With equal levels of transport costs and demand elasticities, the market access
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effect is equally powerful in both industries. In equilibrium, the wage to rental 
ratios in both countries are equal and the distribution of firms is the same as 
under autarky so there is no specialisation and no inter-industry trade.
It is interesting to compare the pattern of production and trade arising in this 
model with that in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. The standard assumptions in the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model are: the endowments of capital to labour in each country 
are unequal; factors can only move within a country; goods are freely traded; and 
firms are perfectly competitive. According to the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, the 
country that is initially endowed with the higher capital to labour ratio will 
specialise and export the good which is capital intensive. I initially endow each 
country with equal capital to labour ratios and after allowing trade, the large 
country ends up with a higher capital to labour ratio than the small country. Then 
the pattern of trade is consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem but in this 
paper the comparative advantage arises endogenously rather than being assumed. 
If we add trade costs on goods and allow capital to be freely mobile in the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model, to match the assumptions of my model, allowing trade 
results in capital flowing to equalise capital to labour ratios and there would be 
no trade in goods.
(ii) Different levels of transport costs
Now consider the case where the two industries are identical except that the level 
of transport costs are higher for industry 1 goods than for industry 2  goods, 
7"i >  t 2. Imagine, for instance, that industry 1 goods are bulkier to transport. 
Which country will be relatively more specialised in the production of ’high* 
transport cost goods?
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Proposition 3: For intermediate values of transport costs, the small country 
is relatively more specialised in the production of ’low’ transport cost goods, 
and the large country is relatively more specialised in the production of ’high’ 
transport cost goods. Hence, the small country is a net exporter of ’low’ 
transport cost goods and the large country is a net exporter of ’high’ 
transport cost goods.
More formally, when L7L=X <1 and 7 1 /6 1 = 7 2 /6 2 , ox= o2= o, and Tj >  r2, 
if 1 <  Tj <  0 0 , and 1 <  r2 <  0 0 , then w */w <l and nj7n2* <  n / ^ .
To prove proposition 3, I show that the wage relativity required to maintain the 
autarky distribution of firms is higher in the Tow’ transport cost industry than in 
the ’high* transport cost industry, w27w2 > w 17w 1, for 1 <  7  <  0 0 . (See 
equations (A13), (A14) and (A15)). The equilibrium wage ratio will lie 
somewhere in between. Since the equilibrium wage ratio is less than w27w2, 
more industry 2  firms will locate in the foreign country compared to the autarky 
distribution of firms; and by applying the same argument to industry 1 , we 
establish that more ’high’ transport cost firms will locate in the large country.
Again, there is a tension between the market access effect, attracting firms to the 
large country, and the production cost effect, attracting firms to the small country. 
But now it is the market access effect which plays the dominant role in 
determining the distribution of firms. Clearly, the incentive to locate in the large 
country to minimise transport costs is stronger for the ’high’ transport cost firms 
than for the ’low’ transport cost firms. But the incentive to locate in the small 
country to take advantage of the lower wage is the same for firms from each 
industry since relative factor intensities are identical for all firms. So the large 
country is a net exporter of ’high’ transport cost goods. Since firms have the 
same relative factor intensities there are no capital flows, so capital to labour
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ratios remain equal in the two countries for all levels of integration.
The numerical simulations of this case reveal that relative wages follow a similar 
U shaped pattern to that depicted in Figure 1; integration results in an 
increasingly diverging industrial structure and the relationship between the relative 
number of firms and transport costs is monotonic as in Figure 2 but in this 
example specialisation is not complete; and net exports are also monotonic in 
transport costs as in Figure 3.
A more interesting pattern of production and trade emerges when we allow the 
industries to differ with respect to more than one characteristic. Suppose that 
industry 1 is more labour intensive and is subject to higher trade costs than 
industry 2. This could represent a situation where a labour intensive industry, 
which has a strong union, resists trade liberalisation. The pattern of specialisation 
is graphed in Figure 5. At low levels of integration, when exports make up a 
small share of total sales, it is the production cost effect which dominates: the 
large country is relatively more specialised in capital intensive, low transport cost 
goods. After some critical t  when the countries reach a high degree of 
integration, since exports make up a more significant share of total sales, the 
market access effect dominates: the large country is relatively more specialised 
in labour intensive, high transport cost goods. In this example, the large country 
is a net importer of capital at low levels of integration and a net exporter of 
capital at high levels of integration.
If capital were immobile and if the two industries differed in terms of factor 
intensities and transport costs integration would still lead to some specialisation 
and net trade. Suppose that both industries had access to a Cobb-Douglas 
technology, to avoid problems of market clearing associated with Leontief 
technology, then the large country will specialise in the production of high
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transport goods irrespective of whether the industry is labour or capital intensive 
since the market access effect is stronger for high transport cost. So if industry
1 is labour intensive and subject to higher transport costs than industry 2 , the 
large country would specialise and be a net exporter of labour intensive goods 
even though the endowment of capital to labour ratios is identical in both 
countries, and the wage to rental ratio is higher in the large country compared to 
the small country.
(iii) Different demand elasticities
Finally, consider the case where the two industries are identical in all respects 
except that industry 1 firms are subject to a higher demand elasticity than industry
2  firms, (Jj >  o2. If two countries are partially integrated, which country will be 
relatively more specialised in the production of the ’low* elasticity goods?
Proposition 4: At integration levels close to free trade and autarky, the small 
country is relatively more specialised in the production of ’low’ elasticity 
goods, and the large country is relatively more specialised in the production 
of ’high’ elasticity goods. Hence the small country is a net exporter of ’low’ 
elasticity goods and the large country is a net exporter of ’high’ elasticity 
goods.
More formally, when L 7 L = \c 1  and t 1 = t 2 = t ,  y\l& \= y2l$2t 0 i > 0 2 » 
if t-»oo or t->1 , then w 7w < 1 , n*In2 < nj/n2.
Conjecture 1
If industries differ only with respect to demand elasticities, for some range 
of intermediate levels of integration, the small country produces relatively 
more ’high’ elasticity goods compared to the large country.
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To prove proposition 4 , 1 show that the wage relativity required to maintain the 
autarky distribution of firms is higher in the Tow’ elasticity industry than in the 
’high’ elasticity industry, w27w2 > w 17w 1, for r-*oo and r-»l. (See equations 
(A16), (A17) and (A18)). The equilibrium wage ratio will lie somewhere in 
between. Since the equilibrium wage ratio is less than w27w2 more industry 2 
firms will locate in the foreign country compared to the autarky distribution of 
firms; and by applying the same argument to industry 1 , we establish that more 
’high’ elasticity firms will locate in the large country. Numerical simulations 
indicate the pattern is reversed for intermediate levels of integration.
Whether the market access effect or production cost effect dominates in 
determining the distribution of firms depends on the degree of integration. ’High’ 
elasticity firms need to produce more output than the ’low’ elasticity firms in 
order to cover fixed costs, therefore they have a stronger incentive to make more 
sales. The higher is a, the lower is the mark-up over marginal cost and hence the 
higher is the quantity of output required to cover fixed costs. (See equations (13) 
and (14)). There are two opposing forces here: (i) With positive transport costs, 
there is a bigger cost of locating in the small country for ’high’ elasticity firms 
than for ’low’ elasticity firms. Since consumers must pay the transport cost on 
imports, ’high’ elasticity firms lose more on exports than Tow* elasticity firms. 
This market access effect provides a stronger incentive for ’high’ elasticity firms 
to locate in the large country; (ii) As price is a mark-up on marginal cost the 
price set in the large country is higher than the price set by firms in the same 
industry in the small country since w 7w < 1. ’High’ elasticity firms would lose 
more on sales than ’low’ elasticity firms by locating in the large country. This 
production cost difference provides a stronger incentive for ’high’ elasticity firms 
to locate in the small country.
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At integration levels close to the autarky and free trade level, where the wage 
difference between the two countries is not too large (see Figure 1), it is the first 
effect which dominates, therefore the large country produces relatively more 
’high’ elasticity goods. However, when the wage disparity is larger, it is the 
second effect which dominates. For some intermediate levels of integration, the 
large country produces relatively more ’low’ elasticity goods. Figure 6  is 
suggestive of how the pattern of industrial specialisation changes with transport 
costs.
If industry 1 goods were costless to transport, tx — 1, then the small country would 
be relatively more specialised in the production of ’high’ elasticity goods for all 
1 <  r2 <  oo. This is consistent with Krugman & Venables (1990) and Krugman 
(1991a) where the small country is a net exporter of a perfectly competitive good 
which is costless to transport. It is easy to see that we get this result even with 
two imperfectly competitive industries. If ’high’ elasticity firms’ goods are 
costless to transport, the market access effect for industry 1 does not exist, the 
production cost effect determines that the small country produces relatively more 
’high’ elastic goods.
Now that we have established the production patterns, we can deduce that at 
integration levels close to the autarky and free trade levels, if both types of goods 
are subject to transport costs, the large country is a net exporter of ’high’ 
elasticity goods and the small country is a net exporter of ’low’ elasticity goods; 
and the reverse trade pattern emerges for some intermediate range of integration. 
There will be no capital flows between the two countries as the relative factor 
intensities of both industries are identical.
4. CONCLUSIONS
As countries are becoming generally more open to trade across the world, 
incentives affecting firms’ decisions on where to locate are changing. Since a 
large amount of trade takes place between industrialised countries, where perhaps 
the most noticeable differences between the countries is size, it is of interest to 
know whether size alone can be a basis for international specialisation and inter­
industry trade. The main contribution of this Chapter is to demonstrate that this 
can be so and to determine the direction of inter-industry trade between two 
countries which only differ in size. With the insight gained from the new trade 
literature which shows that countries trade to take advantage of scale economies, 
and the geography and trade literature which shows that the large country has a 
higher wage than the small country, it is demonstrated that country size can be 
a determinant of the direction of trade flows, once there is some asymmetry 
between the two industries. I allow the industries to have different factor 
intensities, transport costs and demand elasticities.
When industries only differ with respect to factor intensities, the large country is 
a net exporter of capital intensive goods and the small country is a net exporter 
of labour intensive goods. Although the two countries are initially endowed with 
the same capital to labour ratios, when the countries are allowed to trade, capital 
has an incentive to flow to the large country. So comparative advantage arises 
endogenously and then the pattern of inter-industry trade is consistent with the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem.
When industries differ with respect to transport cost or demand elasticities, there 
are no capital movements. Even though capital to labour ratios remain the same, 
there is inter-industry trade between the two countries with the large country 
having net exports in the high transport cost goods and the small country in the
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low transport cost goods. When industries differ with respect to demand 
elasticities the pattern of trade is more complicated: the large country has
positive net exports of high elasticity goods when integration levels are close to 
autarky or free trade levels; it is a net importer of high elasticity goods at 
intermediate levels of integration.
In practice industries usually differ with respect to more than one characteristic. 
I show that if the labour intensive industry is subject to higher trade costs than the 
capital intensive industry, which may be due to the presence of a strong union 
resisting trade liberalisation, then the large country is a net exporter of labour 
intensive goods at high levels of trade cost and capital flows from the large 
country to the small country; this pattern is reversed at a low levels of trade costs, 
with the large country becoming a net exporter of capital intensive goods, and 
capital flowing from the small country to the large country. So we also have an 
explanation of why countries may change their pattern of specialisation.
If capital were also immobile between the two countries, and the two industries 
differed in terms of factor intensities and trade costs, then integration would still 
lead to some degree of specialisation and inter-industry trade. If the labour 
intensive industry is subject to higher trade costs, the large country would 
specialise and be a net exporter of labour intensive goods even though the 
endowment of capital to labour ratios is identical in both countries, and the wage 
to rental ratio would be higher in the large country compared to the small 
country.
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Figure 3: Home Country's Net Exports of Goods
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Figure 4: Home Country's Net Exports of Capital
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Figure 5: Relative Number of Firms
Different Factor Intensities & transport costs
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Figure 6: Relative Number of Firms
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APPENDIX 1
It will be useful for the proofs to rewrite the equilibrium equations. First, for 
convenience, define:
n* 8Jy.+ w * MC* k+w* / a i \f l .s _ L  p , = j J l  =___!_ U S K+W *=1 ,2 . (Al)
nt 8/y.+w MC. k+w
where MQ and MQ* are the marginal costs for industry i located in home and 
foreign respectively.
Take the ratio of the equilibrium product market conditions for industry i in the 
foreign country to the home country (equation 19), substitute in for Y and Y* 
(equation 2 ) and divide through by (k+w)(L)(MCi1‘°)(ni) and substitute in 0i9 p i5 
and cj:
, _ T + e p - \ xr - )  , _1 2  (A2)
Equation (A2) will form the basis of all the proofs. In all that follows, assume 
L*/L=X < 1. We impose ^=X ! in equation (A2) and find the relative wage in 
each industry i that will maintain this equality. If the relative wage is identical 
in both industries then 0j=X is an equilibrium allocation of firms. However, if 
the relative wages necessary to maintain 0 = \  are different in both industries, 
WiVwi ^  w 27w 2, then this is not an equilibrium distribution of firms. Since labour 
is mobile between industries within a country, the wages must be the same across
1 Since we fix the relative number of firms in all the proofs, we can 
disregard the factor market clearing conditions (equation 17).
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industries within a country.
Proposition 1
(a) If r=oo, then w 7w =l, njVn^X; and
(b) if r = l ,  then w*/w=l, and n /^nj are indeterminate.
Proof: (a) Show that if 7 = 0 0 , then w 7w =l.
If r= o o , equation (A2) reduces to w = p, written explicitly:
— ------— -----  -  — [k— -]=[fc— (] (=1,2. (A3)
k+w bjy.+w w y. Y,-
If k ^  8JYj, w 7 w = l . 2
Show that if w 7w = l, 0j=X is unique when 7 = oo.
Setting 7 = 0 0 , w 7 w = l, equation (A2) collapses to 0 j= \.
(b) Show that if 7 = 1 , then w 7w =l.
If 7 = 1 , equation (A2) reduces to:
P - V l V l ' ^  , , , *  (A4,
*e,p ,'" 1 * l» M i *e,p,'"')i)
Hence, p =  l which implies w7w=1.
2 In a fixed proportions model, if the industries differ with respect to factor 
intensities then k=K /L ^  8-Jy  ^ ^  8j/yr If the industries have identical factor 
intensities then K /L = 8 i/y 1 and w 7 w = l is trivial. That is, with identical factor 
intensities the model collapses to a one factor model which is internationally 
immobile. Hence, in autarky we need a numeraire for each country.
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Show that if w*/w=l, 0j=A is not unique when t = 1.
Setting r = l ,  w 7 w = l, equation (A2) collapses to 0 =dv □
For propositions 2 to 4, first we need to show that w7w< 1 for 1 < r <  oo. We 
proceed in two steps.
(i) Show that w7w ^  1  for 1  < r < oo.
Impose w 7w =l, and show that equation (A2) cannot hold for 1 < 7 < o o .  
Equation (A2) becomes:
This implies that 8l < \  and d2< \ ,  which is not possible if factor market 
equilibrium is to hold. Therefore, w7w^  1 for 1 < 7 < oo
(ii) Show that d(w7w)/dr > 0, evaluated at w 7w =l and r = l .
By totally differentiating equation (A2), we have:
So far, we have shown that for ^=X to hold, at 7 = oo and 7 = 1, w 7w =1, hence 
we have our two endpoints. We have also shown that for 1 <  7  <  oo, w7w ^ 1. 
But since d(w7 w)/d7 | w = w V = 1  < 0, and by appealing to continuity, w7w < 1 for
1=1,2. (A5)
d(w*/w)
(A6 )
all intermediate values of 7 . □
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Proposition 2
Given that w*/w < 1  for 1  < t  < oo, if gr=a2=a, t 1 = t 2 = t, > y2/52,
then n27n2* > nx/n2 .
Proof: (i) Show that the relative wages required to maintain 6 = \  is higher 
in industry 1  than industry 2  for intermediate values of r.
We rewrite equation (A2) for industries 1 and 2 to reflect that the industries are 
identical in all respects except industry 1 is more labour intensive than industry 
2, l\l&\ >  72^2- The different relative factor intensities only enter in the ratio 
of marginal costs, pr
 ^ T1'q(T1~qU p i~ g)+a)A(l+Xp}~gT1' 0) A^7J
p j(T1-°+A.p j-0)+pj x1_o0)A.(l +A.p
 ^ T1~O(T1~q+A.p2~q)+C0Ml+Xp2~qT1~°)
pJ(T1_0+A.p2"a)+p2i:1_0c»)A.(l+Xp2'0T1_0)
For 0j=X to be an equilibrium allocation of firms, both equations (A8 ) and (A9) 
must hold simultaneously for the same w, w \
By taking the second derivative of equation (A6 ) with respect to 7 /^ , we have:
^ Q V w )
d xd (y /b )
2 (l-a )(l-X 2)
W*=W,T=1 q2( y /b )2w  
1+y/b
> 0 (A9)
( 1 +2X + \2)
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Hence, w7w is higher for lower values of 7 /5, at r  close to 1. (The higher is 
7 /5 , the lower is the gradient).
(ii) Show that the relative wage required to maintain equation (A8 ) is 
different from the one required for equation (A8 ).
Notice that all the terms in equation (A8 ) are the same as those in equation (A9) 
except the p ’s. We set the p ’s equal and see if we can find a wage ratio, w7w, 
that is the same for both industries that will satisfy this.
Rewriting the p ’s in terms of relative wages, setting p2 =  Pi, w^/Wj =  w27w 2 =  
w7w and rearranging:
z l \ 6 2  - 6l 1
1-----
to
1
N
<
0
•
w y2w YiW y2w  YjW
Since w7w <  1 for all 1 <  r  <  00 , equation (A 10) cannot hold. Therefore, the 
relative wage required in industry 2  is lower than the one required in industry 1 
to maintain 0j=X, for all 1 < r  <  00 . The equilibrium wage ratio will lie 
somewhere in between. Hence the equilibrium allocation of firms will be such 
that nj7nj >  X and n27n2 <  X, which implies that n* ln 2*>n.i/n2. □
Corollory 1: For intermediate values of transport costs, the large country is 
a net importer of capital.
Proof: Show that the demand for capital in the large country is greater than 
its initial endowment and the demand for capital in the small country is less 
than its initial endowment.
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n 1* a o 5 1+/i2* a o 6 2<^T* n 1a o 5 1+7J2a o d 2>.K’ (A ll)
Taking the ratio of foreign to home demands for capital, substituting for l e v i e s ,  
and rearranging:
(A12)
^ 2  (Hj-Xrtj)
Taking the ratio of the labour market clearing in the foreign to the home country 
and rearranging we see that the right hand side of equation (A 12) is equal to 
7 1 /7 2- □
Proposition 3:
Given w*/w < 1  for 1  <  t, <  oo, i f  71/51=y2/52, ol =o1=o and t 1 > t 2, 
then n17n2*<n1/n2.
Proof: Show that the wage relativity required to maintain ^=X in industry 2 
is higher than in industry 1 , for all intermediate values of r.
Totally differentiate equation (A2):
dX w2
d(w'/w)____________(pw +w *)([p -1] +2A p1 -°[1 - t 1 -"])__________  > Q
• [(o - l)A p -0+(o-2)A 2p 1-0+ o p ° -1+ (o + l)A p ,’+2A2p t 1‘”]
5/y +w
(A13)
Take the second derivative of equation (A 13) with respect to t . Label the 
numerator of equation (A13) f(r) and the denominator g(r). Note that both are 
positive. The derivatives of f(r) and g(r) are as follows:
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/ ( t)= - 2 V - ° ( pw+w*)(1-0)t- ’>O * /(t)= -^ -2 X jp (1-<7)t-”<0 (AM)
— +W
Y
Therefore:
d2(w*/w) . /COgCO-yCTte'CT) > Q A^15)
dkdx
Hence, the higher the t , the higher the gradient which means that industry 2 
requires a higher wage relativity than industry 1 to maintain dt= \ .  The 
equilibrium wage ratio will lie somewhere in between. Hence, the equilibrium 
allocation of firms will be such that n^/nj <  X and n27n2 >  X which implies that 
nj7n2* < nxln2.
Proposition 4: Given that w7w < 1 for 1 < r < oo, if t1 = t 2 = t, 7 i/5 1 = 7 2/5 2, 
U\ > <r2, for t - * o o  and t-»1 , then nj7n2* < nx/n2 .
Proof: Show that the wage relativity required to maintain 0j=X in industry 
2 is higher than in industry 1 , for r close to oo and 1 .
Take the second derivative of equation (A6 ) with respect to a.
d2(w */w)
dxda
2 (1 -A.2) < Q
W*=W,T=1  (1+k + 2\)w
— + w  
Y
Hence, the higher is a, the higher is the gradient, at r  close to 1. Therefore, a 
higher relative wage, w7w, is required in industry 2  than industry 1 to maintain
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0i=X as an equilibrium. Similarly for t  close to oo.
d(w*/w) 
dx
> 0
W=W ,T-*» T W
6/y  +w
[ 2 o X - 2 X 2 + o A.2 + o ]
(A17)
d2(w */w)
dxda
2(X2 -1)(2A-A.2 +1) > 0
w =w,x-<» T W
6 /y +w
[2<j X - 2 X 2 + o X2 + o ] 2
(A18)
The equilibrium wage ratio will lie somewhere in between. Hence, the 
equilibrium allocation of firms will be such that V /n j <  X and n2Vn2 >  X which 
implies that n * < n xln2. □
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APPENDIX 2
All the simulations have the following parameter values: L=K =120;
L*=K*=100; a = 2 ; 0  = 1.
Figures 1, 2 and 3:
a1= a2= a= 3; t 1= t 2 = t;  7 j =2/3, 6 ^  1/3, 72 = l/3 , 62 =2/3.
Figure 4:
7i=72=-5, S1=S2= .5; 0’1=ct2 =<t=3; t ^ T j  +  .I.
Figure 5:
7i=72=-5, 81=52= .5; t 1= t2= t ; g x= 6 ,  a2 = 4;
Figure 6:
7i=2/3  72 = l/3 , = 1/3, S2 =2/3; a 1= a 2 = a= 3 ; t 2 =Tj +  .1;
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CHAPTER 2
REGIONAL SPECIALISATION 
AND TECHNOLOGICAL LEAPFROGGING
There are numerous historical episodes where a technological leader loses its 
dominant position after some technological breakthrough. One example concerns 
the nineteenth century Norwegian shipping industry. The port of Risor was a 
major centre of sail based shipping industry. The development of steam 
technology rendered sail technologically obsolete, but did not lead to the 
abandonment of the technology in Risor. Steam based shipping activity became 
centred on Bergen and sail technology continued in Risor for several decades 
before being driven out of business. Following the eventual demise of sail, Risor 
never recovered its status as a centre of shipping activity. Other examples 
provide evidence of centres of activity that have been overtaken by new 
technologies, but then managed to switch to the new. In 1850, Britain was 
regarded as the world’s only industrial economy. Yet by the first world war 
industrialisation had spread to other countries. Harley (1974) gives examples of 
British industries which were slow to adopt new techniques that were in use 
elsewhere. For instance Britain was slow to adopt capital using, labour saving 
techniques such as ring spindles in textiles and assembly line methods in the 
metal-working industries.
When a new technology becomes available, which is superior to and incompatible 
with an old technology, under what circumstances will the new technology be 
adopted? Will the new technology be adopted by the existing industrial leader or 
will it be adopted in a different location, another region or country? If the new 
technology is adopted in another location, will the new and old technologies
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co-exist or will the new technology drive out the old? Several papers have 
offered explanations of why there has been technological leapfrogging.1 Brezis, 
Krugman and Tsiddon’s (1993) explanation of technological leapfrogging among 
countries is based on non-pecuniary externalities. They assume that production 
is subject to external learning effects which are specific to each country and that 
when there is a major technological breakthrough, it yields a higher productivity 
than the old technology given the same amount of experience. So for the leading 
country which has extensive experience with the old technology and hence a 
higher wage, the new technology is initially inferior to the old. In contrast, the 
lagging country which has little experience with the old technology and hence a 
lower wage, can use its wage advantage to adopt the new technology. Over time, 
the lagging country gains more experience with the new technology and takes 
over as the leading country.
The mechanism in this Chapter is quite different being based on pecuniary 
externalities arising from transactions in the presence of imperfect competition.
I present a model with two regions, with labour immobile between the two 
regions, and two industries which are vertically linked. The upstream industry 
is a Cournot oligopoly producing homogenous components which are supplied to 
the downstream industry. The downstream industry is perfectly competitive 
producing homogenous final products which are supplied to the rest of the world. 
The vertical linkages between the two industries create forces for the 
agglomeration of the two industries in the one location as in Krugman and
1 The industrial organization literature offers an explanation of why there is 
leapfrogging among firms based on what is known as the ’replacement effect’. 
(See Tirole (1988)). The argument is that an existing monopolist has less 
incentive to innovate than a rival since it would be replacing itself. Gilbert and 
Newberry (1982) showed that a monopolist is still likely to innovate ahead of 
rivals in a world of perfect certainty; and Reinganum (1983) showed that in a 
world of uncertainty a monopolist is unlikely to innovate ahead of potential rivals.
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Venables (1995), Venables (1996a) and Venables (1996b). There are demand 
linkages as an increase in the scale of operation of the downstream industry 
benefits upstream firms. This has a feedback effect as the price of upstream 
goods is decreasing in the number of upstream firms, due to increased 
competition among upstream firms - cost linkages which benefit downstream 
firms. The interaction of these forces creates pecuniary externalities, encouraging 
regional specialisation.
Why couldn’t one upstream firm enter the other region with a low price and take 
advantage of the lower wage there? If a single upstream firm could commit not 
to act like a monopolist, it would attract downstream firms to enter which would 
in turn attract more upstream firms to enter, creating demand and cost linkages. 
It would be possible for an upstream firm to commit to a low price if the staging 
of the game were such that upstream firms made their quantity decisions before 
downstream firms made their entry decisions in which case regional specialisation 
would never be an equilibrium. However, it seems more realistic to suppose that 
entry decisions are taken before quantity decisions. With this staging of the 
game, a potential upstream entrant cannot commit not to act like a monopolist. 
Consequently, downstream firms will not enter unless the monopoly price is low 
enough to cover their fixed costs. The game theoretic interactions between the 
firms are crucial for regional specialisation in this model.2
When a new technology becomes available it does not benefit from the 
agglomeration of firms using the old technology since it is assumed that the two 
technologies are incompatible, like steam and sails. The new technology, which
2 Krugman and Venables (1995) and Venables (1996a) abstract from game 
theoretic interactions by employing the Dixit-Stiglitz framework. However, in 
Venables’ (1996b) Cournot oligopoly model the results about the effects of trade 
policy on industrial development are sensitive to the nature of the game.
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I assume to be labour augmenting, is therefore most likely to be adopted in the 
’lagging’ region where the wages are lower. I show that there is an equilibrium 
where the two technologies co-exist, as did steam and sails in Norway. So 
according to this model, Risor’s failure to introduce the new technology was 
because the existing agglomeration raised the prices of immobile factors (labour 
and also port space) in Risor relative to Bergen and its failure to switch was due 
to the benefits associated with the agglomeration of sail technology related 
activities.
The model is developed in Section 1 of this Chapter; Section 2 derives the 
conditions for regional specialisation; Section 3 analyses the circumstances under 
which the new technology will be adopted and where it will be adopted; Section 
4 concludes and briefly mentions some policy implications. Appendix 1 of this 
Chapter sets out some of the derivations of the model and Appendix 2 contains 
the parameter values of the simulations.
1. THE MODEL
I develop a model of two vertically linked industries where firms can locate in 
either of two regions. Firms must choose their location and their technology. 
Initially, only one technology is available but then there is an unanticipated 
technological breakthrough - a new superior technology, incompatible with the 
old, becomes available. Upstream firms require labour to produce components 
which they sell to downstream firms in their own region. And downstream firms 
use components and labour to produce a final, homogenous product which they 
sell to the rest of the world. Labour is immobile between the two regions. So 
the two regions are linked by their competition for final product demand from the 
rest of the world.
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1.1 Assumptions of the Model
Assumption 1 : Firms play a four stage game as follows: In stage 1, upstream  
firms choose whether to enter and in which region. To enter each upstream firm 
must pay a fixed cost, F, and choose its technology, 0k. There are two 
technologies available, indexed k=A,B. I set out the general model where both 
technologies are available. When solving for equilibria, I assume that initially 
only one technology is available, 6A. At some future date there is an exogenous 
shock where a new superior technology, incompatible with the old, becomes 
available, 0B. In stage 2, downstream firms choose whether to enter and in 
which region. To enter each downstream firm must pay a fixed cost, f, and 
choose its technology, 6k. In stage 3 upstream firms choose quantities, competing 
a la Cournot. In the final stage downstream firms are assumed to be price takers.
I assume that firms make their entry decisions before choosing quantities since 
setting up a firm takes more time than adjusting quantities. The fixed costs 
commit firms to a particular technology.
The game is solved through backward induction so that equilibrium is subgame- 
perfect.
Assumption 2: Demand for final products only comes from consumers in the rest 
of the world:
Y d=p~1' (1)
where Yd is the demand for final products, p is the price of final products and rj 
is the elasticity of demand. This functional form is chosen for simplicity.
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Assumption 3: The cost function for each downstream firm in region i is: 
ci=(wi0 * ) 1 ^ If+Wi+byf] i= l,2  a > 0  b > 0  ®
where Wj is the wage in region i, q; is the price of upstream components in region 
i, p  is the share of costs of components in the total cost of production, and y-t is 
output per downstream firm in region i.
A Cobb-Douglas technology is chosen for simplicity. The cost function gives U 
shaped average cost curves and upward sloping marginal cost curves ensuring that 
there is a unique level of equilibrium output for each firm.
Assumption 4 : The cost function for each upstream firm in region i is:
(3)
where Xj is the output per upstream firm in region i and /30Wj is marginal cost.
Assumption 5: Trade costs on components produced by upstream firms are so 
high that no trade in components takes place between the two regions.
Assumption 6: Labour is immobile between the two regions and each region has 
a perfectly competitive labour market with the labour supply function, Ljs, defined 
by:
L/ = 0  i f  w,<w0  (4)
L -= w x i f  Wjkw0
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If Wj is greater than or equal to the reservation wage, w0, the elasticity of labour 
supply is X. At a wage below w0, no labour is supplied to these industries - it is 
all employed in some other industry which is not explicitly modelled here. 
Again, this functional form is chosen for simplicity.
Assumption 7: The new technology is labour augmenting, thereby affecting the 
cost functions of upstream and downstream firms, and it is incompatible with the 
old technology. The way technology enters the model does not affect the results. 
For instance, the new technology could be modelled as a fall in upstream firms’ 
marginal cost and the results would still be the same. However, the 
incompatibility of the two technologies is important for the results.
1.2 Solving the model
STAGES 3 AND 4
I solve for prices and quantities for a given number of upstream firms, q , and a 
given number of downstream firms, m*, in each region i in three steps. First, I 
solve for prices and quantities in the downstream market. Second, I solve for 
prices and quantities in the upstream market. Finally, I determine the factor 
market clearing condition.
First, consider the behaviour of downstream firms. Each firm chooses how much 
to produce by taking the final price of goods as given. Setting price equal to 
marginal cost, the inverse supply function for each firm is:
(5)
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Demand for inputs is derived using Shephard’s lemma, where demand for 
components, X d, in region i is:
(6)
and demand for labour by downstream firms, L,d, in region i is:
The equilibrium price of final goods is determined by aggregating equation (5) 
across all firms in both regions and equating this aggregate supply function to the 
demand function given by equation (1). The equilibrium output for each firm is 
then determined by substituting the equilibrium price into equation (5).
Second, consider the behaviour of upstream firms. Each firm chooses quantity 
by setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost, taking as given the quantity 
of all other upstream firms, the number of upstream firms and the number of 
downstream firms. The first order condition for each upstream firm in region i 
is:
<7,(1—  )=e*pw( (8)n.e.
where ex is the absolute value of the elasticity of derived demand for components. 
It is calculated by differentiating equations (1), (5) with Yd= y imi+yjmj, and (6 ), 
with respect to yi5 p, qj and X d. The derivations are in Appendix 1.
e,=(l-n+_____________________________ } (?)
(f+aysbyflKa+i 1 +r\)2byt)mi+r\2bmjyj]
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The elasticity of derived demand can be decomposed into two effects: a 
substitution effect and an output effect. An increase in the price of components 
relative to the price of labour will lead firms to substitute labour for components. 
This effect is captured by the first term in equation (9), which is one minus the 
share of components in total costs, denoted by /x, multiplied by the elasticity of 
substitution which is equal to one for a Cobb-Douglas technology. The 
substitution effect is larger the smaller is the share of components in total costs; 
and the larger the elasticity of substitution between factors.
A change in the price of factors will also lead to an output effect. An increase 
in the price of components increases the cost of production and hence reduces the 
amount of output firms are willing to supply, which affects the price and demand 
for final products. The output effect is larger the larger is the share of 
components in total costs; and the larger is the elasticity of demand for final 
products, 77. The output effect is smaller in this model than in the ’usual’ case 
because the entry decisions of downstream firms have already taken place, the 
number of downstream firms is determined in stage 2  of the game.
Equilibrium in the upstream industry is given by equating demand for components 
(equation (6 )) to the supply of components:
Demand for labour by upstream firms, Lju, is derived by Shepard’s lemma:
Finally, labour market equilibrium is determined by equating the labour supply 
in each region to the sum of labour demand from upstream and downstream firms
(10)
(11)
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in each region:
w*=(l-ti)wj_,‘(6 *)1"l’9 1,,[/r+ayl+fo)iI2]m.+(F+pj:i)0 lni i f  w ^w 0 (12)
That completes stages 3 and 4 of the game. Equations (5), (8 ), (9), (10) and (12) 
solve for yi5 q , eif x,, and Wj for given m; and q .
ST A G E  2
Downstream firms decide whether to enter, and if so in which region and with 
which technology. There is free entry and exit into the industry so profits are 
driven to zero. Since each firm is so small relative to the whole industry we can 
ignore the integer problem. Therefore:
Substituting in for price equals marginal cost from equation (5) into equation (13), 
we see that the equilibrium level of output is unique and independent of prices 
and the number of firms. This is a direct consequence of the cost function.
KrPyrl(wPh)1~>‘‘liW+ayi+by?l=Q (13)
(14)
Substituting for y in equation (9), the absolute value of the elasticity of derived 
demand for components is:
V.t\(a+2by)\m t+ m \y
€^ =(1—11+-------------------------- -—  ------------ (15)
[(fl+ (l +x\)2by)mi+r\2bmjy][f+ay+by2]
Normalising so that a = b = f, the equilibrium level of y is equal to one. Then: 
3niie,=(l-u+---------- -— J-—) (16)
mi(3+2r\)+2r\ntj
The absolute value of the elasticity of derived demand for components, 6 2 , is 
greater than one if the absolute value of the elasticity of demand for final goods, 
77, is greater than Bm ^m j+nij), provided that /* is positive. If m2 =0, then -rj 
must be greater than 3 for 6 j >  1. Therefore -17 >  3 is sufficient for e;>  1. If the 
absolute value of e{ is less than or equal to one then if there were only one 
upstream firm it would want to set an infinite price, therefore downstream firms 
would not enter.
The number of downstream firms are determined by substituting in for a = b = f , 
and y = l  into equations (1), (5), and (12); and also substituting in for x> into 
equation ( 1 2 ) from equation ( 1 0 ).
p-''=(m1+mj (17)
AfCi=i4Ci=(wie*), -|*9!‘3 / (I8)
wf=(i -ii)w:,‘(e*)| -'‘?j'‘3>t,+|ip(et)2-'‘wj1' ( 19>
So equations (8 ), (16), (17), (18) and (19) solve for p, m*, q^ and Wj. We can 
see from equation (8 ) that if e = 1 , the price of upstream components, q, is equal
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to infinity if there is only one upstream firm and from equation (18) we see that 
average costs would also be infinity and hence no downstream firm would enter.
ST A G E  1
Upstream firms choose whether to enter or not, and if they enter they choose the 
region and the technology. There is free entry and exit so in equilibrium profits 
are non-negative.
n .= ^ .-(F + p jc .)0 Sv^O (2 0 )
2 . R E G IO N A L  SPE C IA L ISA T IO N
Initially, suppose that there is only one technology available denoted by 6A. I 
show that there is an equilibrium where firms only locate in one region. Since 
the regions are symmetrical, regional specialisation can take place in either 
region. For concreteness, suppose that it is region 1 and denote this equilibrium 
configuration by (A,0) which indicates that firms in region 1 are operating with 
technology A and there are no firms in region 2.
To show that (A,0) is an equilibrium, first we solve the model for one region in 
the same way as in Section 1 above, and then check that it is in fact an 
equilibrium. I drop the subscript i since only one region is operating.
Equilibrium price, quantity and number of firms in the downstream market are 
determined using equations (1), (5) and (13). Substituting for price equals 
marginal cost into equation (13) and normalising so that a = b = f, we saw that 
y = l .  Substituting for y and setting demand equals supply, Yd=m , we can
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determine the price of final goods, p, and the number of downstream firms, m: 
p=(yv&ly - '‘q 'l3 f  (21)
(22)
Equilibrium price and quantity for upstream firms are determined from equations 
(8 ), (16) and (10). The elasticity of derived demand is from equation (16) with 
m2 =0. The quantity produced by each upstream firms is determined by using 
equation (2 1 ) in equation (1 0 ):
q=0A$ w ( - - - )  where e = l-p +  (23)
ne-1 3+2q
(24)
qn
The zero profit condition determines the equilibrium number of upstream firms3. 
n = ^ -(F + p ^ )e AH'=o (25>
The equilibrium wage is given by equating labour supply to labour demand from 
upstream and downstream firms. Using equations (21), (24), (25) and y = l  in 
the labour market clearing condition (equation ( 1 2 )), the equilibrium wage is:
3 I solve the model for a continuous number of firms for simplicity - 1 then 
use integers in the numerical simulations.
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w=(pm) 1+x i f w z w Q
Substituting in for q, x and w from equations (23), (24) and (26) into the 
upstream zero profit condition (equation (25), the equilibrium number of firms is 
given by:
n= i^(pm)x+1 <27>
e & F
From equations (23) and (27) we can identify the pecuniary externalities which 
arise from the presence of vertical linkages between the two industries and get 
some intuition for the agglomeration forces present. From equation (27) we see 
that the number of upstream firms and the value of downstream output, pm, are 
positively related. The higher is the value of downstream output, the higher the 
profits of upstream firms which induces entry thereby increasing the number of 
upstream firms, which is referred to as the demand linkage. This has a feedback 
effect as the price of upstream goods, q, is decreasing in n (see equation (23)), 
which is the cost linkage. The price of upstream components falls due to the 
increased intensity of competition among upstream firms. A lower q reduces 
average costs of downstream firms increasing the equilibrium number of 
downstream firms and results in a higher value of output. Multiplying equations 
(2 1 ) and (2 2 ) and substituting in for wages, from equation (26), we see that the 
value of output in the downstream industry is decreasing in q:
</»m)8=[e1-|,9>,3 /r (''-I)(x*1) 5 =(X +1)+(r) - 1)(1 -(i)>0 t28)
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The configuration (A,0) is an equilibrium if the agglomeration benefits of all 
firms locating in the one region outweigh the wage cost advantage of region 2 . 
Two conditions must be satisfied: first, the equilibrium wage, w l5 must be
greater than the reservation wage, w0, otherwise no labour will be supplied. I set 
w0 so that this condition is met; second, no single upstream firm from region 1 
can enter region 2  and earn higher profits given the number of upstream firms is 
equal to n^-1 , where n*  is the number of upstream firms determined by the zero 
profit condition, equation (27),
1 1^ ! = ^ * ,  n2 = 0 ) >  n ^ n ^ n Z - l ,  n2 = l)  
and a new potential entrant cannot enter region 2  and make positive profits, 
n ^ n ^ n j* , n2 = l)  <  0 .
To calculate whether it is profitable to enter region 2, a potential ’deviating* 
upstream firm takes the number of upstream firms in region 1 as given since the 
number of upstream firms is determined in stage 1 of the game. If it is an 
existing firm from region 1 , then it takes the number of upstream firms in region 
1 equal to n ^ -l, and if it is a new entrant then it takes the number of firms in 
region 1 equal to n^. The potential deviant calculates its profits from entering 
region 2  by calculating the number of downstream firms (stage 2  of the game) and 
the new prices and quantities (stages 3 and 4 of the game) that would prevail if 
it were the only upstream firm to enter region 2  and for the given number of 
upstream firms in region 1. A firm from region 1 will enter region 2 if it can 
earn higher profits in region 2 ; and a potential new entrant will enter region 2  if 
it can earn non-negative profits. A profitable opportunity for an upstream firm 
to enter region 2  is possible only if downstream firms can cover their fixed costs 
in region 2  given there is only one upstream firm in region 2 .
To illustrate the candidate equilibrium (A,0) I reduce the model to two equations,
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which are plotted in Figure l4. First, the labour market clearing condition, 
equation (12) substituting in for ql5 ylt x l and mj from equations (8 ), (10), (14) 
and (2 2 ), which gives the labour market clearing wage for any given number of 
upstream firms in region 1 and n2 =0. The labour market clearing wage is 
increasing in the number of upstream firms. The higher the number of upstream 
firms, the higher the number of downstream firms, together increasing the 
demand for labour and bidding up the wage. Second, the zero profit condition, 
equation (25) substituting in for q1? y lf Xj and m1? which gives the maximum wage 
that upstream firms can afford to pay for any given number of upstream firms in 
region 1 and n2 =0. The zero profit function wage is decreasing in the number 
of upstream firms. The higher the number of firms, the more competition and 
the lower the price of upstream components and hence the lower the wage that 
upstream firms can afford to pay. At the intersection of the two functions, the 
wage which satisfies labour market clearing also satisfies the zero profit condition 
for upstream firms. However, taking into account the integer constraint on the 
number of upstream firms, the candidate equilibrium (A,0) is just to the left of 
this intersection at point E where labour demand equals labour supply at n,*= 6 . 
At point E, upstream firms are making positive profits since the zero profit 
function lies above the labour market clearing condition. But if one more firm 
were to enter all firms would make negative profits since the labour market 
clearing wage is above what upstream firms can afford to pay at nj=7.
The configuration (A,0) at point E in Figure 1 is an equilibrium if the two 
conditions above are satisfied. One, the reservation wage, w0, must be below the 
labour market clearing wage at point E. I set the reservation wage so that it is 
below point E. Two, there are no profitable opportunities for entry into region
4 The two equations are derived in Appendix 1 and the parameter values of 
the simulations are given in Appendix 2.
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2. The profits of a ’deviating’ upstream firm are calculated from equation (20) 
with nj=nj* and n2 = l ,  using equations (8 ), (16), (17), (18) and (19) to solve for 
p, Hij, qi, and Wj. Substituting for q2 and x2 into equation (20), 
r y n ^ n j* ,  n2 = l ) < 0  if
— -  2  t < FQAw2e2 (29)
(wij+mj) 11
For the parameter values underlying Figure 1, the profits of an upstream firm, for 
nj=nj* and n2 = l ,  are negative so condition 2 given in equation (29) is satisfied. 
This condition is also satisfied for n / - l  and n2 = l .  So for the parameter values 
underlying Figure 1, the configuration (A,0) is an equilibrium.
It should be noted that (A,0) is an equilibrium and not the only equilibrium. 
Since the two regions are symmetric (0,A) is also an equilibrium. Furthermore, 
(A,A) is an equilibrium with an equal number of firms in both regions but may 
be unstable.
Regional specialisation is an equilibrium only for certain parameter values. In 
particular, the elasticity of demand for final products must be ’low’, the share of 
costs of components in the total cost of production for downstream firms, /*, must 
be ’high’, and the elasticity of labour supply must be ’high’ for regional 
specialisation to be possible. Figure 2 shows that an increase in the elasticity of 
demand, 77, shifts the zero profit function to the right and the labour market 
clearing function to the left, resulting in a higher number of firms and a higher 
wage, from E to Ej. A higher r\ results in a higher elasticity of derived demand, 
e, and hence a lower price of components for any given wage. This leads to an 
increase in demand for components and a corresponding increase in supply of
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final products, which will only lead to a small decline in the price of final goods 
when r; is high. The increase in the supply of components and final goods leads 
to an increase in the demand for labour, hence an increase in the wage. Suppose 
that we are at point Ej in Figure 2. Is this an equilibrium? Calculating the 
profits of a ’deviating* upstream firm, we find that there is a profitable deviation - 
the profits of an upstream firm in region 2 , given n, = n t* and n2 = 1 , are positive. 
So condition 2 given in equation (29) is not satisfied for high values of 17. For 
high values of 77 the zero profit condition of downstream firms in region 2 
(equation 13) is satisfied for n Y= n *  and n2= 1. Although a higher rj means there 
is room for more firms in the market it also results in a higher wage which 
increases the size of the wage advantage in region 2. The higher is 77, the less 
likely that (A,0) is an equilibrium. For the parameter values underlying Figure 
2, regional specialisation is not an equilibrium. In this case the wage advantage 
of region 2 outweighs the agglomeration benefits of region 1. The unique 
equilibrium is (A,A), with an equal number of firms in each region.
Now, consider how a change in n  affects the candidate equilibrium (A,0), say a 
change from /a=0.6 to /*’ =0.4. A lower n  results in a lower number of upstream 
firms and a lower wage in Figure 1 so that point E’ would be to the left and 
below E in Figure 1. However at /x’ =0.4, (A,0) is not an equilibrium. Even 
though the wage is lower so that the wage advantage of region 2 is lower, the 
benefits of agglomeration are not as high now. So a ’deviating’ upstream firm 
will find it profitable to enter region 2 even though the wage gap is not so high. 
Again, condition 2 given in equation (29) is not satisfied, and the unique 
equilibrium is (A,A), with an equal number of firms in both regions.
Figure 3 shows that an increase in the elasticity of supply of labour, X, also 
increases the number of upstream firms in region 1 but leads to a fall in the wage, 
from E to Ej. Large increases in labour demand will only lead to small increases 
in wages if labour supply is very elastic. The higher is X the more likely that the
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configuration (A,0) is an equilibrium - condition 2 in equation (29) is satisfied. 
The more elastic the labour supply, the lower the equilibrium wage in region 1, 
therefore the smaller is the wage advantage in region 2.
If the elasticity of derived demand were less than one then (A,0) would always 
be an equilibrium since a potential upstream entrant into region 2 would want to 
set an infinite price. Anticipating this behaviour, downstream firms would choose 
not to enter region 2. The elasticity of derived demand is less than one if a= 0 , 
which means that the marginal cost curve of downstream firms goes through the 
origin; and if the elasticity of demand for final goods is very low.
In contrast, if the staging of the game were such that upstream firms chose their 
quantities before downstream firms made their entry decisions, then a potential 
upstream entrant into region 2 would set a price equal to the one in region 1 and 
take advantage of the low wage in region 2, that is it would be able to commit to 
a low price. Consequently (A,0) would not be an equilibrium. However that 
staging of the game is unrealistic since quantity decisions can be altered more 
quickly than entry decisions.
3 . N E W  T E C H N O L O G Y
Suppose that the parameter values are such that regional specialisation is an 
equilibrium and that the equilibrium configuration (A,0) is given by history. 
Then there is a technological breakthrough where a new technology becomes 
available, 0B< 0 A=1, which is superior to and incompatible with the old 
technology. Will the new technology be adopted? If so, in which region? What 
are the equilibrium configurations?
For the new technology to be adopted, an existing upstream firm from region 1
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must be able to make higher profits by entering either region 1 or region 2 with 
the new technology, given n / - l  upstream firms in region 1, or a new upstream 
entrant must be able to make non-negative profits by entering either region with 
the new technology, given n /  upstream firms in region 1. When calculating the 
profits of the ’deviating’ upstream firms, the number of other upstream firms is 
taken as given, as this is determined in stage 1 of the game, but the number of 
downstream firms, quantities and prices are re-calculated as these are determined 
in the subsequent stages of the game. I assume that the fixed cost is paid every 
period so that even if a firm continues to operate with the old technology it must 
pay the fixed cost again5.
The new technology is labour augmenting. If an upstream firm were to enter 
region 1 with the new technology, it does not derive any of the agglomeration 
benefits enjoyed by the firms operating with the old technology since the two 
technologies are assumed to be incompatible. The pecuniary externalities are the 
same in either region but the wage in region 2 is lower than in region 1. If an 
upstream firm were to enter region 2 with the new technology, it has the benefit 
of the new technology as well as the advantage of a lower wage in that region. 
So a profitable opportunity to enter region 2 with the new technology will arise 
before that of entering region 1 with the new technology. The lower is 0B relative 
to 6A, the more likely that there will be a profitable opportunity for a single 
upstream firm to enter region 2.
Figure 4 is a plot of the maximum wage a single upstream firm can afford to pay 
in region 2 and the labour market clearing wage in region 2 for different values 
of 6B, given there are n /  old technology firms operating in region 1. The number 
of upstream firms in region 1, n / ,  was determined by the zero profit condition
5 I discuss the implications of this assumption below.
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in equation (27) and illustrated in Figure 1 at point E. If an upstream firm enters 
region 2 with the new technology it must pay the wage given by the labour 
market clearing condition, equation (19), with p, nij, qj, and e{ for i=  1,2 
determined by equations (8), (16), (17) and (18) for n ^ n /  and n2= 1. The lower 
is 0B, the lower the average costs of downstream firms in region 2 which leads to 
more entry and a higher wage. So the labour market clearing function is 
increasing in w2, (1/0B) space. The zero profit function is equation (20), 
calculated for n ^ n / ,  n2= l ,  with p, m*, qi, and ^ for i = 1,2 also determined by 
equations (8), (16), (17) and (18). An upstream firm can make positive profits 
by entering region 2 if the zero profit function lies above the labour market 
clearing function - the maximum wage it can afford to pay is higher than the 
actual wage it would have to pay. At 0B*, which is given by the intersection of 
the two functions in Figure 4, a single upstream firm can enter region 2 with the 
new technology and make zero profits and downstream firms can cover their fixed 
costs, given n ^ n /  and n2= l .
At 0B\  the configuration (A,0) is no longer an equilibrium. There is a new 
equilibrium (A,B), where region 1 operates with the old technology and region 
2 operates with the new technology. A move from equilibrium (A,0) to (A,B) is 
what is referred to as technological leapfrogging - region 2 takes over as the 
industrial leader. It should be noted that there are multiple equilibria in this 
model. If (A,B) is an equilibrium so is (B,A).
Equilibrium (A,B) is determined by solving the two region model in section 1 for 
0k=0A in region 1, and 0k=0B in region 2. Simulating the model for 9A= 1 and 
for different values of 0B<  1, we see in Figure 5 that the lower is 0B, the higher 
the number of firms in region 2 and the lower the number of firms in region 1 
and Figure 6 shows that the wage in region 2 increases as 0s falls and the wage 
in region 1 falls with 0B. For any given number of firms, a lower 0B implies that
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each upstream firm can afford to pay a wage which is higher than the labour 
market clearing wage. Positive profits induce entry of upstream firms which 
leads to a lower price of components, which in turn leads to an increase in 
demand for labour by both upstream and downstream firms bidding up the wage. 
The increase in supply of final products in region 2 leads to a fall in the price of 
final goods which leads to a fall in demand for components in region 1 and the 
exit of upstream and downstream firms in region 1. The fall in demand for 
labour in region 1 leads to a fall in the wage in region 1.
Configuration (A,B) is an equilibrium if the following conditions are satisfied: 
first, the wages in region 1 and region 2 are above the reservation wage; second 
no existing upstream firm from region 1 or from region 2 can make higher profits 
by changing its behaviour. No upstream firm will want to enter region 2 with the 
old technology since it does not derive any benefits from the agglomeration of 
new technology firms and it would have to pay a higher wage in that region. We 
need to check that a single existing upstream firm located in region 1 or in region 
2 cannot enter region 1 with the new technology and earn higher profits, 11/,
n((n1(e4)=n1* - i ^ ( e B)=/i2*>»1(0B)= i) < 
n;(n1(e^)=n>2(6fl)=n2*-M1(e«)=l) < n2(n1(fr4)=n1*,n2(eB)=n2*)
Further, a potential entrant cannot enter region 1 with the new technology and 
earn positive profits given the number of upstream firms in region 1 operating 
with the old technology and the number of upstream firms in region 2 operating 
with the new technology. We also need to check that a positive number of old 
technology upstream firms in region 1 and a positive number of new technology 
upstream firms in region 2 are earning non-negative profits.
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The configuration (A,B) will be an equilibrium for certain parameter values. If 
0B is very low, the price of final goods will fall so low due to the increasing 
number of new technology firms operating in region 2 that firms in region 1 will 
not be able to continue to make non-negative profits and will exit.
After the introduction of the new technology, the new equilibrium configuration 
may be (A,B) or (B,A) where the two technologies co-exist. For very low values 
of 6B the equilibrium configuration may be (0,B) where the industry in region 1 
is completely wiped out and there is an agglomeration of new technology firms 
operating in region 2 or (B,0) with all the new technology firms agglomerated in 
region 1. Alternatively, the equilibrium configuration may be (B,B) where there 
is an equal number of firms in both regions operating with the new technology.
If the fixed cost for upstream and downstream firms is paid every period, we 
cannot say which equilibrium will be the equilibrium. All we can say is that 
these equilibria exist. However, if the fixed cost is an entry cost which is only 
paid once then we could say which is the equilibrium. Suppose that (A,0) is 
given to us by history so that there is only one technology available and all the 
firms are operating in region 1. Then a new technology becomes available which 
makes entry in region 2 profitable. A firm in region 1 would only exit if it could 
not cover its average variable cost. Consequently, the equilibrium configuration 
would be (A,B) and not (B,A) when 0B=0B*. As the new technology improves, 
technology A will be abandoned and the industry in region 1 will either disappear 
or adopt the new technology.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This Chapter suggests that at times of major technological breakthroughs a leading 
region may lose its dominant position to a lagging region if the new technology
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is incompatible with the old. The fact that it was a leading region implies higher 
wages which may prevent it from adopting the new superior technology. The 
leading region benefits from the agglomeration of firms arising from vertical 
linkages. When a new technology arrives, it does not benefit from the existing 
agglomeration since it is incompatible with the old technology. Consequently, it 
is more likely to be adopted in the lagging region which has lower wages. 
Furthermore, it is possible that the two technologies can co-exist. The new 
technology region has more firms operating and hence a higher wage. The old 
technology region has less firms operating so the agglomeration benefits are 
lower, but this is offset by a lower wage enabling it to continue to compete with 
the new technological leader.
These results raise policy questions for the A technology region. The government 
may want to consider a policy which would make it profitable for the new 
technology to be adopted as soon as it becomes available. Free entry into the 
industry means that profits of downstream firms are zero and at least close to zero 
for upstream firms. However, the wage is higher with the new technology so 
workers would certainly be better off. There are a number of different 
instruments that could achieve this objective. The government could target the 
co-ordination failure between the upstream firms or directly subsidise the new 
technology so that there is an immediate switch to the new technology. 
Alternatively, the government could provide tax credits or accelerated 
depreciation allowances on existing capital stock.
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APPENDIX 1
1. To calculate the elasticity of derived demand, equation (9), 
totally differentiate equations (1), (5) and (6), setting Yd= m 1y1+m 2y2 in equation 
(1):
(a d
4p=ja(w10)1"|A^ i1 l (a+2byl)dq1+(wlQ)1~ilq i2 b d y1 (^2)
dX l = (\i- l) \i(w lQ)l ~^iq^~2(f+ay1+byl)m1dq1+\i(wld)l ~ilq^~l(a+2bl)m ldyl (A3)
Substitute in for dp from equation (Al) into (A2) and then substitute in for d y1 in 
equation (A3) to get:
dXt q t |iq (a + 2 ^ i)2(mjy<+mv) (A4)
et= =(1 -p  +------------------------------------ —----------- )
dQt X i (f+ay.+byf) [(<z+(1 + q )2fry +q 2fcmjyj\
2. The two equations in Figure 1 are derived as follows:
Labour supply equals labour demand (equation (12)).
IV1 =(1 -  ^ ) w ■‘‘q l‘3/m +F%*n+§xQ*n (A5)
Substituting out for x, y, and q from equations (8), (10) and (14) we have:
8 8
w* =(1 -  n)w-‘‘e 1 +p ^ ji(weA)1-,‘3 > i ( - ^ ^ ) ' 1 *+F0*« (A6)
ne-1 ne-1
with the number of downstream firms given by setting equation (18) equal to p, 
with q substituted out using equation (8):
w=[(w»*)1~|1( ^*pwne/3 / |- i  (A7)
ne-1
Substituting in for m into equation (A6) gives us the labour supply equals labour 
demand function in Figure 1.
The maximum wage which gives zero profit to upstream firms is from equation 
(22):
(q-peAw)x=FeAw (A8)
Substituting out for q, x using equations (8) and (10), and using p = m (1/7?):
—  ,  , (A9)
pm 11 =Fnz(rwe
with m determined from equations (A6) and (A7), so the number of downstream 
firms is a function of the labour clearing wage. Equation (A9) gives the 
maximum wage upstream firms can afford to pay.
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APPENDIX 2
The simulations of the model have the following parameter values:
Figures 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6
fi = .6\ a= b = f= .0 5 ; F = .5 ; 0 = 1; 77=5; \= 5 ;  8A= 1;
Figure 2
A shift from rj=5 to rj*= 6 .
Figure 3
A shift from \ = 5  to \ ’= 6 .
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CHAPTER 3
SPECIALISATION PATTERNS IN EUROPE
Have specialisation patterns in the European Union (EU) changed? The process 
of dismantling trade barriers between member countries began in 1957 with the 
formation of the EU1 and has continued to date. It has involved removing tariffs 
on goods traded between member countries and reducing non-tariff barriers by 
harmonizing product standards and simplifying government formalities. 
According to all strands of trade theory, reducing trade costs should lead to an 
increase in the degree of specialisation. However, there are three strands of 
literature which have distinct predictions about specialisation patterns. First, the 
classical Heckscher-Ohlin theory determines each country will specialise in 
industries which are intensive in the factors which it is abundantly endowed. 
Second, the new trade theories show that each country will produce less product 
varieties within an industry to take advantage of increasing returns to scale, 
Krugman (1979). And third, the new economic geography theories show that 
vertical linkages between industries will result in the agglomeration of these 
industries in the one location, Krugman and Venables (1995) and 
Venables (1996a).
The purpose of this Chapter is to analyse whether specialisation has increased in
1 The European Union was formed in 1957. The first countries to form the 
EU were Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and Netherlands. The 
EU was expanded to include Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1973; 
Greece in 1981; and Spain and Portugal in 1986. Austria, Finland and Sweden 
joined in 1994 - these countries are not included in this study since the data ends 
in 1990.
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EU countries, and to determine whether specialisation patterns are consistent with 
trade theories. Analysing whether specialisation has increased is one way to 
ascertain whether expected gains from trade have been realised. These gains arise 
from allocating production according to comparative advantage and thereby 
achieving a more efficient allocation, by enabling firms to expand production to 
exploit economies of scale, and from the pecuniary externalities which arise from 
vertically linked industries locating close to each other. To see whether 
specialisation has increased in Europe, I construct country specialisation indices 
and geographical concentration indices. The movements in the country 
specialisation indices provide a picture of whether countries have become more 
different from each other in their industrial structures. The geographical 
concentration indices provide a picture of which industries are the most 
concentrated, which enables us to study the characteristics of these industries and 
hence determine whether the specialisation patterns are consistent with the trade 
theories.
I utilise production data to construct indices of specialisation for each EU country 
and for each manufacturing industry, and then see how these indices evolve over 
time. I regress the geographical concentration indices on three variables, each 
representing one of the three strands of trade theory: (i) a measure of the 
deviation of labour intensity from the average, to proxy the Heckscher-Ohlin 
theory; (ii) scale economies, to proxy the ’new’ trade theory; and (iii) the degree 
of intermediate goods in production, to proxy the economic geography theory. 
I draw from two data sets: one includes 65 manufacturing industries in Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom for the period 1976 to 1989; the 
second is more aggregated with 28 manufacturing industries but includes all of the 
EU countries except Luxembourg and it begins in 1968.
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Empirical studies on specialisation patterns in Europe have produced conflicting 
results. Aquino (1978) suggests that specialisation in Europe has fallen or 
remained constant over the period 1951 to 1974, and Sapir (1996) finds that 
specialisation remained constant over the period 1977 to 1992 in Germany, Italy 
and the United Kingdom, and increased in France since 1986. In contrast, Hine 
(1990) and Greenaway and Hine (1991) show that specialisation increased in 
Europe, at least during the period 1980 to 1985. These mixed results could be 
due to the different variable adopted, the level of aggregation or the differences 
in the measures of specialisation. Aquino (1978) and Sapir (1996) use exports, 
Hine (1990) uses production, and Greenaway and Hine (1991) use exports and 
production. All the studies include around 28 manufacturing industries except 
Sapir (1996) which has 100 industries. Increasing specialisation should be evident 
whether it is measured in terms of production or trade data. However, in practice 
the link between trade and production may not be as direct as in theory. An 
advantage of the present study is that it has the highest level of disaggregation for 
production data.
These empirical studies have raised a number of measurement issues. In 
particular, which data sources should we use, national or trade data?; which level 
of aggregation?; and how should we measure specialisation? In section 1 of this 
Chapter, I discuss these measurement issues and I propose a new index of 
specialisation which overcomes some of the problems inherent in existing 
measures. In section 2 , 1 show that there is evidence of increasing specialisation 
in some of the EU countries. In section 3, I identity which industries became 
more geographically concentrated and show that there is some support for all 
three strands of the trade theories, but only weak support for the Heckscher-Ohlin 
theory. Section 4 concludes. The full results are contained in the Appendix.
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1. MEASURING SPECIALISATION
International trade theories predict that reducing trade costs will increase trade 
volumes, providing a vehicle for countries to move resources into industries in 
which they have a comparative advantage, thereby increasing the volume of world 
production. So a reduction in trade costs should lead each country to become 
more different from its trading partners in terms of their industrial structures - 
different industries become more geographically concentrated in different 
countries. If the country specialisation indices increase, we should also expect to 
see an increase in some of the geographical concentration indices as the two are 
obviously related. The issues relating to measuring country specialisation also 
apply to measuring geographical concentration since both are constructed in the 
same way. The only difference in their construction is that we aggregate across 
industries to get a measure of country specialisation and aggregate across 
countries to get a measure of geographical concentration. Therefore, I will 
discuss the measurement issues in relation to the country specialisation index and 
only make reference to the geographical concentration index as required.
In theory, an increase in specialisation should be evident whether it is measured 
by export or production data. However, in practice exports may increase without 
any change in the volume of production due to a fall in domestic consumption. 
Sapir (1996) uses export data to measure specialisation because that data set is 
more complete. However, it seems worthwhile to go to the direct source of our 
interest, that is production, even at the cost of excluding industries for which the 
data set is incomplete. The EUROSTAT data set in my study covers 65% of the 
manufacturing sector. The level of aggregation and the way industries are 
classified is usually dictated by the availability of data, and the problems this 
raises are well known. (See for example Aquino (1978)). The more aggregated 
the data the less information we are likely to obtain. Therefore, even if the
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specialisation index remains unchanged, we cannot rule out that changes may have 
occurred which would only be obvious at a more disaggregated level.2
Various indices have been used to measure specialisation. Sapir (1996) uses the 
Herfindahl index to measure country specialisation, which is defined as:
HrT, OP2 0)
where Sy is industry i’s share in total exports (or production) of country j. A 
value close to one implies almost complete specialisation in one industry and a 
value close to zero implies a high degree of diversification.
I will refer to the Hj index as a measure of ’absolute specialisation’ since it 
indicates how different the distribution of production shares is from a uniform 
distribution. This index could change for reasons unrelated to changes in trade 
costs. For instance, consumer preferences may change or there may be a 
technological shock in a particular industry which affects all countries in the same 
way. If there were a technological shock in electronics and this industry had a 
low production share before the shock then the Hj index would fall indicating a 
fall in specialisation whereas if it had a high production share before the shock 
then the Hj index would increase indicating an increase in specialisation. But a 
skewed distribution towards one industry is also consistent with autarky and may 
have nothing to do with the level of trade costs. Trade theories predict that a fall 
in trade costs will lead to each country becoming more different from its trading
2 Note that the main focus of many of the empirical papers is to distinguish 
between the extent of inter and intra-industry trade specialisation. I will not 
categorise specialisation in this way. To do so would require a higher level of 
disaggregation of the data (which is not available for production) and then a 
categorisation according to an economic definition of an industry.
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partners. Therefore, to see whether the European experience is consistent with 
the trade hypothesis, it is preferable to construct an index of what I call ’relative 
specialisation’, which measures how different a country’s distribution of 
production shares is from its trading partners’ distribution of shares.
Various measures of relative specialisation have been utilised in empirical studies, 
each differing in their construction and, in particular, on the weighting assigned 
to countries and industries. I discuss some of the commonly used measures of 
relative specialisation and show how the weights assigned to countries and 
industries can bias the movements in the indices. Special care needs to be taken 
to ensure that changes in the index are not unduly driven by movements in the 
smallest countries or the smallest industries in the sample.
A popular index of relative specialisation is the Finger-Kreinin index (F-K), 
defined as:
(2)
where the subscripts k and j refer to two different countries. The index ranges 
between zero and one: if the distribution of shares in both countries is identical 
then the index is equal to one and if the countries have completely disjoint 
production patterns then the index is equal to 0.3 Interpreting changes in the 
F-K index is straightforward when there are only two countries in the sample.
3 The F-K index is also known as the Michaely index. The F-K index is a 
transformation of the Krugman (1991b) index, where the Krugman index is equal 
to E | |  Sjj -sik | and the F-K index is equal to I-V2 E * I sy -slk | . The Krugman index 
lies between 0 and 2. Krugman (1991b) compares the degree of specialisation in 
four EU countries with similarly sized American regions using employment data 
and found that the EU countries were less specialised than American regions.
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But suppose there are three countries and the index falls from one period to the 
next for country j compared to country k but increases for country j compared to 
country s. Can we then conclude that specialisation in country j has increased? 
The answer is that we do not know. Unless the index for country j compared to 
all the countries in the sample moves in the same direction we cannot say what 
has happened to the degree of specialisation in country j.
Hine (1990) and Greenaway and Hine (1991) obtain a summary measure of the 
F-K index by taking the mean of the bilateral comparisons in a sample of 21 
OECD countries. Greenaway and Hine (1991) take the mean of the bilateral 
comparisons between country j with all other countries in the sample and report 
a summary measure for each country. Since the mean of each country’s index 
fell in the early 1980’s, Greenaway and Hine (1991) conclude that there has been 
greater inter-industry specialisation in production during this period. Hine (1990) 
averages bilateral comparisons between groups of countries and concludes that 
inter-industry specialisation increased in the EU countries, which include 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and the UK. The mean 
of the F-K index is not a satisfactory summary measure of specialisation as large 
variations in small countries’ production shares could easily drive the value of the 
index. To illustrate, suppose there are three countries with two industries which 
have the following production patterns:
t = l : industry output industry shares mean
F-K
1 2 total 1 2
country 1 5 5 10 .5 .5 .9
2 60 40 100 .6 .4 .85
3 80 120 200 .4 .6 .85
total 145 165 310 .47 .53
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t=2:  industry output
1 2 total
country 1 0 10 10
2 50 50 100
3 100 100 200
total 150 160 310
industry shares mea:
1 2
F-K
0 1 .5
.5 .5 .75
.5 .5 .75
.48 .52
It seems clear that in period 2 relative specialisation increased in country 1, and 
decreased in countries 2 and 3 as they are closer to the average distribution of 
shares. Yet according to the mean of the F-K index specialisation increased in 
all countries. (The lower the index the higher the degree of specialisation).
Other popular specialisation indices aggregate the Balassa (1965) index in various 
ways. The Balassa index, originally designed to measure a country’s ’revealed’ 
comparative advantage using export data, is defined as:
where Sy is industry i’s share in total production of country j, and Wj is the share 
of industry i in the world’s total manufacturing production (or in our study, in the 
EU). If a country’s production structure matches that of the average of all other 
countries then the index is equal to one. An index greater than one reflects 
specialisation in that industry. The Balassa index has no upper bound and the 
lower limit is zero. A ratio of shares is likely to result in high values for 
industries which account for small shares of world production, small w /s.4
4 Kol and Mennes (1986) discuss some problems with the Balassa index as 
a measure of similarity of trade patterns.
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Hence, variations in small industries can unduly affect a summary measure using 
the Balassa index. An alternative to taking the ratio of the shares is to subtract 
the denominator from the numerator of the Balassa index, thus giving less weight 
to the small industries. But we still need some satisfactory way to aggregate 
across the industries (or across countries for geographical concentration indices) 
in order to provide a summary measure of relative specialisation.
An approach, borrowed from the inequality literature, is to calculate the Gini.5 
For the country specialisation Gini, first construct a Lorenz curve as follows: 
rank the Balassa index in descending order; plot the cumulative of the numerator 
on the vertical axis against the cumulative of the denominator on the horizontal 
axis. The Gini is equal to twice the area between a 45 degree line and the Lorenz 
curve. If the industrial structure of country j matches the industrial structure of 
the average of Europe, the Gini will equal zero. The higher the Gini, the more 
specialised is the country. (Analogously, we can construct a Gini for each 
industry to measure geographical concentration by rewriting the Balassa index as 
Bij=pij/Wj where py is country j ’s production of industry i as a proportion of total 
European production of industry i, and Wj is country j ’s share of manufacturing 
in total European manufacturing). The Gini places implicit relative value on 
changes in the middle parts of the distribution, so a transfer from a big industry 
to a small industry has a much greater effect on the country Gini if the two
5 Krugman (1991b) uses the Gini to determine the degree of geographical 
concentration of industries in the United States. Brulhart and Torstensson (1996) 
use the Gini in a study of 18 industries in 11 EU countries and found that 
geographical concentration has increased between 1980 and 1990. Helg et al 
(1995) use the Gini to measure geographical concentration of industries and 
country specialisation in the EU. In their country specialisation measure they 
only use shares (the numerator of the Balassa index) which means they are 
comparing the distribution of shares to a uniform distribution and not to the 
distribution of the average of the countries, which is a measure of absolute 
specialisation.
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industries are near the middle rather than at either end of the distribution. (See 
Cowell (1995) for a discussion of problems related to the Gini). This means that 
movements between industries which are the closest to the European average will 
get the most weight in the country Gini. As these industries may vary from year 
to year, the weighting of industries will also vary and we do not know whether 
these will be the big or small industries.
An alternative approach to constructing a summary measure of specialisation is 
to calculate the standard deviation of the Balassa index. The use of the standard 
deviation (or the variance) as a measure of changes in distribution is common in 
the inequality and the economic growth convergence literature. Aquino (1978) 
calculates the standard deviation of the Balassa index weighted by industry shares 
to get a measure of country specialisation, op and the standard deviation weighted 
by country shares to get a measure of industry specialisation, or  An increase in 
the standard deviation indicates an increase in specialisation. Aquino (1978) 
concludes that inter-industry specialisation in 26 OECD countries has been limited 
over the period 1951 to 1974 with a tendency towards a further reduction in inter­
industry specialisation. The weighted standard deviation helps to reduce the small 
country and small industry influence inherent in the Balassa index. In the country 
specialisation index, an equal transfer from one industry to another, dsj =-ds2 =ds, 
with the weights constant, would change the index as follows:
da i s. s~ / a\- r S = ( — - — ) (4)
as J Wj w2
Even with this weighting, it is clear that transfers among industries with the 
smallest W;’s are likely to have the biggest influence. To reduce this bias, I 
construct an index similar to a standard deviation:
100
s.= — (s'.-w)27 ^ (5)
Equation (5) subtracts the denominator from the numerator of the Balassa index 
thus avoiding the problem of giving too much weight to small industries. 
Squaring ensures all the industries get a positive weight in the measure, with 
those industries furthest away from the European average receiving the most 
weight. A transfer from industry 2 to industry 1, assuming the weights remained 
unchanged, would affect the index in the following way:
= - [ ( * ! - W , ) - ( S 2 - W 2) ]  ( 6 )
as 1 n
In sum, the F-K may be an unsuitable measure of specialisation if the changes in 
bilateral comparisons do not move in the same direction; the Gini could give too 
much weight to the ’wrong’ industries; a weighted standard deviation goes some 
way in giving the ’correct’ weights; and the Sj index is an alternative way of 
ensuring that small industries or countries are not weighted too heavily.
2. SPECIALISATION IN THE EU COUNTRIES
I utilise two databases to investigate whether the degree of specialisation has 
increased in EU countries. I construct measures of specialisation for each country 
using the Sj5 Hj, oj, Gj and F-Kj indices with production data. I also construct 
indices using employment data to check for consistency. According to trade 
theories an increase in the degree of specialisation should be evident whether 
measured by production or employment.
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DATA
The first data set is from EUROSTAT: It consists of 65 manufacturing industries 
classified according to NACE3, for Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the UK. 
The other manufacturing industries and countries in the database were not 
included due to too many missing values. The data set represents approximately 
65% of the total manufacturing output in these five countries. It is annual data 
covering the period 1976 to 1989. This was the most disaggregated production 
and employment data available.
In order to study specialisation patterns over a longer period and in more of the 
EU countries we turn to the UNIDO data set. It consists of only 28 
manufacturing industries, classified according to ISIC3, for 11 European Union 
countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. It is annual data covering 
the period 1968 to 1990.
From Figures 1 and 2 we can get an indication of the relative size of the 
countries. Figures la  and lb are a plot of the value of manufacturing production 
for each country as a proportion of the total manufacturing production in the EU 
and Figures 2a and 2b are a plot of the employment shares in manufacturing. In 
terms of production value, Germany has the largest manufacturing share (more 
than 30 per cent), followed by France, UK, and Italy, with a rise in Italy’s share 
and a fall in the UK’s share; Belgium, Spain and Netherlands are next with 
Spain’s share increasing, and Belgium’s and Netherlands’ falling; and the smallest 
countries are Denmark, Portugal, Greece and Ireland with each having shares less 
than .02 per cent. The ordering changes when we rank the countries according to 
employment shares. Germany is still the largest, with an increasing share over 
the period, followed by UK with a falling share, and then France, and Italy with
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relatively constant shares. The value of production in manufacturing increased 
in all five countries whereas employment fell in all of the countries.
EUROSTAT
The relative specialisation indices6 using the EUROSTAT data set with 
production and employment are listed in Tables 1(a) to l(j) of the Appendix.7 
They all indicate an increase in specialisation in all of the five countries over the 
period 1976 to 1989, except the increase in the Gini with employment for Italy 
was not significant at the five per cent level. In fact, the F-Kj fell for all bilateral 
comparisons, except for Italy and Germany with employment data, indicating an 
increase in specialisation. I regressed the log of each index on a time trend to 
determine the growth rate of the indices. The Sj index is given in Table 1 below, 
showing an average annual increase of two per cent.
TABLE 1: Sj index - production
1976 1980 1982 1984 1986 1989 beta t value
UK 0.40 0.54 0.57 0.57 0.59 0.62 0.03 6.10
Bel 0.76 0.93 0.99 1.00 0.93 1.04 0.02 5.48
Ita 0.54 0.63 0.64 0.58 0.62 0.65 0.01 3.08
Fra 0.62 0.64 0.66 0.67 0.75 0.77 0.02 10.82
Ger 0.45 0.42 0.46 0.50 0.56 0.57 0.02 8.74
The correlation between the measures is given in Table 2 below. It is not 
surprising that the correlation between the Herfindahl index and all the other
6 All the indices are multiplied by 100.
7 The UK reclassified its manufacturing industries in 1979. To check that 
the reclassification is not driving the results, I re-calculated all the indices 
excluding the UK and found that specialisation increased in the remaining four 
countries.
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measures is low since the Hj index is a measure of absolute specialisation and all 
the others are measures of relative specialisation. The correlations between all 
of the measures of relative specialisation are quite high.
TABLE 2: CORRELATION BETWEEN DIFFERENT MEASURES
F-K, Gj Sj
Hi .47 .57 .54 .61
F-Kj
o00 .81
00
Gj .99 .97
.94
UNIDO
With the UNIDO data, the results vary with the index and the variable.8 All of 
the values of the indices, with the beta and t values, are reported in Tables 2(a) 
to 2(j) of the Appendix to this Chapter and some of the Sj values are reported in 
Tables 3(a) and 3(b) below. According to the Sj index using production, 
specialisation increased in Belgium, Denmark, Greece and Italy; decreased in 
France, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the UK; and remained unchanged in 
Germany and Netherlands. The Sj index with employment data shows that 
specialisation increased in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece and 
Netherlands; decreased in Ireland and Spain; and there was no significant change 
in Italy, Portugal and UK. The Gini shows the same pattern as the Sj index.
8 I re-calculated the indices without the UK and found the results did not 
change.
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Table 3a: Sj index with Production
1968 1975 1978 1981 1984 1990 beta t value
Bel 1.65 1.71 1.80 1.84 1.84 2.18 0.01 8.14
Den 2.94 3.06 4.05 3.92 4.04 3.73 0.01 5.45
Fra 0.98 0.80 0.74 0.66 0.70 0.64 -0.02 -7.22
Ger 1.12 1.23 1.17 1.13 1.25 1.26 0.00 1.94
Gre 2.90 2.92 3.05 3.18 3.36 3.58 0.01 13.95
Ire 4.65 5.59 5.37 4.60 4.24 4.43 -0.01 -2.34
Ita 0.94 0.86 0.98 1.09 1.16 1.29 0.02 9.52
Net 2.54 2.61 2.88 2.84 2.78 2.54 0.00 1.05
Por 3.50 3.23 2.72 2.79 2.85 3.16 -0.01 -2.49
Spa 1.67 1.93 1.29 1.28 1.51 1.55 -0.01 -2.86
UK 0.92 0.66 0.60 0.56 0.40 0.54 -0.02 -6.07
Table 3b: Sj index with Employment
Bel 1.46 1.53 1.44 1.44 1.55 1.58 0.003 2.05
Den 1.79 2.02 2.30 2.39 2.33 2.27 0.01 8.00
Fra 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.50 0.61 0.67 0.01 3.64
Ger 1.31 1.43 1.28 1.27 1.37 1.54 0.01 3.73
Gre 3.30 3.30 3.30 3.39 3.49 3.70 0.001 9.71
Ire 3.90 3.84 3.50 3.18 3.13 2.72 -0.02 -19.99
Ita 1.28 0.98 0.98 1.05 1.12 1.29 0.003 0.97
Net 1.56 1.72 1.95 2.04 2.06 1.92 0.01 6.92
Por 4.99 3.90 3.70 3.76 3.86 4.24 -0.005 -1.95
Spa 2.06 2.01 1.55 1.47 1.49 1.74 -0.01 -4.29
UK 0.65 0.59 0.53 0.59 0.57 0.61 -0.002 -1.52
From Tables 4a and 4b below, we see that the weighted standard deviation of the 
Balassa index with production and employment data also indicates that there was 
a significant fall in specialisation in Ireland, Spain and the UK, and additionally 
in Belgium.
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Table 4a: Oj index with Production
1968 1975 1978 1981 1984 1990 beta t value
Bel 37.95 35.61 35.95 33.86 34.79 35.20 -0.004 -4.64
Den 40.32 44.27 49.73 50.01 52.29 48.03 0.01 5.42
Fra 27.27 25.03 27.03 25.49 26.03 27.98 0.00 0.36
Ger 38.72 42.74 43.09 41.37 42.43 44.42 0.004 4.06
Gre 51.78 53.88 59.38 57.85 65.48 67.63 0.02 12.61
Ire 66.48 72.77 65.81 60.98 61.66 60.70 -0.01 -5.08
Ita 37.68 36.09 39.58 40.69 40.37 44.01 0.01 8.17
Net 33.93 38.39 41.11 45.13 43.99 41.68 0.01 7.47
Por 60.29 52.81 48.75 54.16 52.37 57.78 0.00 0.52
Spa 38.45 44.89 25.47 23.77 26.78 29.30 -0.03 -4.26
UK 37.26 30.33 31.22 29.40 25.27 29.49 -0.01 -5.03
Table 4b: index with employment
1968 1975 1978 1981 1984 1990 beta t value
Bel 34.92 34.39 34.04 32.05 33.66 32.41 -0.01 -7.41
Den 37.05 39.04 40.61 41.91 41.88 43.69 0.01 13.38
Fra 28.03 28.32 27.41 25.51 27.39 28.01 0.00 -1.88
Ger 48.22 48.69 45.42 44.87 46.09 50.21 0.00 0.62
Gre 56.19 49.38 51.63 55.31 58.19 65.25 0.01 6.43
Ire 58.44 58.87 52.07 47.33 49.40 44.95 -0.01 -11.12
Ita 32.48 33.01 34.32 34.87 36.25 38.85 0.01 15.30
Net 32.50 34.99 40.97 43.84 45.08 43.51 0.02 10.64
Por 76.39 66.14 63.24 67.29 72.20 82.98 0.005 1.84
Spa 33.89 37.80 25.41 24.84 24.74 26.10 -0.02 -5.36
UK 35.11 29.39 28.20 26.68 24.13 23.39 -0.02 -22.8
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Table 5 summarises the change in each index from 1968 to 1990 with UNIDO 
data, where P denotes production data, L denotes employment data, (+ )  indicates 
a significant increase in the index, (-) a significant decrease in the index, and (0)
indicates that there has been no significant change. Table 6 reports the
correlation between the indices.
TABLE 5: 1968 to 1990
UNIDO
FK: G: (Tj Sj Hj
P L  P L  P L  P L  P L
Bel + -  + 0  - - + +  + 0
Fra + 0  - + 0 0  - +  0 +
Ger + + + +  + 0  0 +  + +
Ita + + + + + + + 0 - +
UK Q - - - - - - 0 + 0
Den + + + + + + + + + +
Gre + +  + +  + +  + +  0 +
Ire 0 -  - -  - - - -  0 +
Net + +  + +  + +  0 +  0 -
Por 0 0  0 0  0 0  - 0  - -
Spa - -  - -  - - - - + 0
TABLE 6: CORRELATION BETWEEN DIFFERENT MEASURES
F-Kj Gj *j Sj
Hj .02 .64 .72 .63
F-Kj .02 .01 .01
Gj .90 .96
.86
The bilateral comparisons for each country using the F-Kj do not move in the 
same direction using the UNIDO data so it is not a reliable measure of 
specialisation. This shows up in the low correlation between the F-Kj and the 
other indices. The Hj also has a fairly low correlation with the other indices
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which is not surprising since it is measuring absolute rather than relative 
specialisation. Consequently I will focus on the results of the other three 
measures: the Sj, Gj and oy
At least two of the three measures, with production and employment, indicate that 
specialisation increased in Denmark, Greece, Germany, Italy and Netherlands. 
And all three measures indicate that specialisation fell in Ireland, Spain and UK, 
and that there was no significant change in Portugal. Why might the degree of 
specialisation in a country fall? One possible explanation is that before joining 
the EU, the countries may have had high trade barriers protecting industries in 
which they did not have a comparative advantage. The elimination of trade 
barriers within the EU increased competitive pressures to increase production in 
the industries in which each country has a comparative advantage. All of these 
countries are late joiners to the EU and even though specialisation fell when 
comparing 1968 to 1990, there is an upward trend starting in the late 1970’s and 
early 1980’s in Portugal, Spain and UK. This becomes clear for the UK when 
we compare the results from EUROSTAT and UNIDO for the same period in 
Table 7 below. We see that both data sets indicate an increase in specialisation 
in the UK between 1976 and 1989.
TABLE 7: 1976 to 1989
EUROSTAT UNIDO
FKj Gj Uj Sj Hj FKj Gj Oj Sj Hj
P L  P L  P L  P L  P L  P L  P L  P L  P L  P
Bel + + + + + + + + + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + +
Fra + + + + + + + + + - + + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 +
Ger + + + + + + + + - + + + + + + + + + + +
Ita + + + 0 + + + + - - + + + + + + + + 0 +
UK + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 0
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Even if the specialisation indices with the UNIDO data have not increased, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that specialisation has increased but is only obvious 
with more disaggregated data. This is clear in the case of France where all the 
measures of relative specialisation using the EUROSTAT data indicate an increase 
in specialisation for all countries whereas some of the measures using the UNIDO 
data indicate that there has been no significant change in specialisation.
3. GEOGRAPHICAL CONCENTRATION OF INDUSTRIES IN THE 
EU COUNTRIES
We saw that specialisation has increased in some EU countries since 1968. This 
means that some industries must have become more geographically concentrated 
in some countries. We can identify these industries by constructing geographical 
concentration indices. The Si index is defined as:
s.= Iy'(p..-W.)2 (7)
^ C j  3
where c is the number of countries, py is country j ’s production of industry i as 
a proportion of total European production of industry i, and Wj is country j ’s share 
of manufacturing in total European manufacturing. An increase in §  indicates 
that industry i has become more geographically concentrated which means that 
some countries have increased their production of industry i more than the 
increase in their total manufacturing, relative to the rest of Europe.
Tables 3a and 3b of the Appendix list the Sj index with production data from 
EUROSTAT and UNIDO, ranked in descending order based on the first years 
observations. The industries with the highest Sj index in the EUROSTAT set are:
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toys and sports, bread and flour, and paint, wood and wool industries; and those 
with the lowest index are iron and steel, and processing of plastics. The 
industries with the highest S4 index in the UNIDO set are: miscellaneous 
petroleum and coal products, pottery, china and earthenware, and tobacco; and 
those with the lowest are paper and products; and fabricated metal products.
From Tables 4a and 4b in the Appendix we can see which industries experienced 
the highest growth in specialisation. The tables list the Sj geographical 
concentration indices with production data from EUROSTAT and UNIDO, 
grouped according to the following categories: positive significant growth;
negative significant growth; and no significant change in the indices.9 
According to the EUROSTAT data, 31 industries recorded an increase in 
geographical concentration between 1976 and 1989, ranging between 1 and 12 per 
cent growth annually (cocoa, chocolate and sugar, textile finishing, knitting, and 
working of stone recorded the biggest increases); 11 industries recorded a fall in 
geographical concentration, ranging between 1 and 13 per cent (manufacturing of 
concrete for construction recorded the biggest fall); and there was no significant 
change in geographical concentration in 23 industries. According to the UNIDO 
data, 10 industries recorded a significant increase in geographical concentration 
between 1968 and 1990, ranging between 1 and 7 per cent (textiles recorded the 
biggest increase); 10 recorded a fall, ranging between 1 and 6 per cent (plastic 
products recorded the biggest fall); and no significant change in 8 industries. 
(Since there is a 98 per cent correlation between the S4 and the Gj indices, I only 
report the Sj indices). We see that there is some evidence of increasing 
specialisation and this is more obvious with the disaggregated EUROSTAT data.
9 Without the UK, the groupings with the UNIDO data remain unchanged 
however with the EUROSTAT data 6 out of the positive and significant growth 
industries were not significant when UK was excluded and manufacturing of 
agricultural machinery changed sign.
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Although all trade theories predict that a reduction in trade barriers leads to an 
increase in specialisation, there are three strands of trade theories which have 
distinct predictions about the pattern of specialisation. I regress the geographical 
concentration indices on three variables which are meant to proxy the three 
strands of trade theories.
According to the new trade theories, reducing trade barriers leads to an increase 
in specialisation in industries which are subject to economies of scale. Krugman 
(1979) shows that when countries move from autarky to free trade the number of 
varieties of goods in each country falls, enabling firms to slide down their average 
cost curves. So there are gains from trade due to the lower unit cost of 
production and consumers have access to more varieties through trade. In order 
to try to capture this effect, I construct a variable, Xlit, to proxy scale economies. 
Xlit is defined as labour divided by the number of enterprises. So we would 
expect that industries which are subject to high scale economies to be more 
geographically concentrated.
The Heckscher-Ohlin theory predicts that countries will specialise in industries 
which are intensive in the factors which they are relatively abundant. Hence, 
labour abundant countries will specialise in labour intensive industries and capital 
abundant countries will specialise in capital intensive industries. Since the 
geographical concentration index is not specific to each country, I construct a 
variable which is the deviation of factor intensities from the mean. X2it is 
defined as labour costs divided by value added, at factor cost, less the mean of 
total labour costs as a proportion of the mean of the value added at factor cost10, 
all squared.
10 I dropped the following three industries as they had negative value added: 
4110 manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats; 4130 manufacture of 
dairy products; and 4240 spirit distilling.
I l l
According to the theory, those industries which have ’high’ factor intensities 
should be the most geographically concentrated. Since the theory does not imply 
that capital intensive industries will be more geographically concentrated than 
labour intensive industries, or vice versa, the deviations of labour intensity from 
the mean is squared. So we would expect that those industries which differ a lot 
from the mean should be the most geographically concentrated.
According to the economic geography literature, as trade barriers are reduced 
vertically linked industries are likely to agglomerate in a limited number of 
locations. Krugman and Venables (1995) and Venables (1996a) show that a large 
number of downstream firms attracts a large number of upstream firms due to a 
’demand linkages’, and the more upstream firms in the one location the more 
intense is the competition thereby reducing the price of upstream goods providing 
a feedback effect which is referred to as a ’cost linkage.’ This feedback effect 
may also come from downstream firms having access to a bigger variety of 
differentiated inputs. These demand and cost linkages are stronger the higher is 
the proportion of intermediate goods in production of final goods. X3it is a proxy 
for intermediate good intensity, defined as production less value added, divided 
by production, at market prices. So we should expect that the higher the 
proportion of intermediate goods, the higher the geographical concentration.
I estimate the following equation with the EUROSTAT data set11 to see whether 
the pattern of specialisation in the EU is consistent with any of the three strands 
of trade theory.
11 It was not possible to estimate this equation with the UNIDO data set since 
value added is measured in factor prices for some countries and market prices for 
others.
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S#=Po+Pl*l»+P2X2fl+p3*3ir+“i+V ei< (8)
where subscript i denotes industry i and subscript t denotes time, represents 
industry dummies and vt represents time dummies. The time dummies are relative 
to 1976 and the industry dummies are relative to iron and steel. The industry 
dummies represent fixed industry effects which are unobservable and the time 
dummies represent fixed time effects which are not explained by the model. The 
time dummies may capture reductions in trade barriers such as the harmonisation 
of product standards and the reduction of government formalities in trade.
The mean and standard deviation of each variable are listed in Table 7a below, 
and the correlations between the explanatory variables in Table 7b. I estimate 
four versions of equation (8) using ordinary least squares. The Sit index is 
replaced by the Git index as the explanatory variable to check that the results are 
not sensitive to the geographical concentration index. The variables are 
transformed into logs so that the f t’s can be interpreted as elasticities. The 
disadvantage of the log specification is that adding a constant to any of the 
variables would change the elasticity so the results could be sensitive to the way 
the variables are constructed. To avoid this problem, I also estimate the equation 
with the variables standardised to have zero mean and standard deviation equal 
to one. An additional advantage of the standardised equation is that it gives us 
an indication of the relative importance of each variable in explaining the 
variation in the geographical concentration index. The ft2’s can be interpreted as 
an approximation to the percentage of variation in the specialisation index each 
variable explains. However, it is only an approximation since the correlations 
between the explanatory variables, although quite low, are not equal to zero. The 
full results are provided in Tables 5a and 5b of the Appendix and are summarised 
in Table 8 below.
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TABLE 7a: TABLE 7b: Correlations
mean standard
deviation x 2 x 3
Sit 0.02 0.01 0.18 0.11
Git 0.18 0.09 x 2 0.13
Xlit 178.5 166.69
ooX
0.02
X3it 0.62 0.09
TABLE 8:
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
dependent variable: Si In®) Gi M G )
independent variables:
X, 0.19
(2.54)
0.35
(3.16)
0.22
(2.96)
0.39
(3.8)
i
x 2 0.05
(2.04)
1.16
(1.25)
0.06
(2.69)
1.40
(1.64)
X3 0.32
(4.29)
1.11
(3.85)
0.25
(3.59)
0.92
(3.43)
industry dummies yes yes yes yes
time dummies yes yes yes yes
adjusted R squared 0.84 0.82 0.86 0.83
number of 
observations 868 868 868 868
All the coefficients are positive and significant12 in the standardised equation, (i) 
and (iii), whereas /32 is not significant in the log specification in the equations 
with Sijt and Gijt. All the specifications indicate that changes in Xl5 which is the 
proxy for scale economies, and X3, which is a proxy for the economic geography 
theory, have the biggest effect on geographical concentration. According to the 
log specification (equations (ii) and (iv)) a one per cent increase in the proportion 
of intermediate goods in production leads to approximately one per cent increase 
in geographical concentration; and a one per cent increase in X! leads to an 
increase in geographical concentration of a third of a per cent. In the 
standardised equations an increase in X3 by one standard deviation increases Sj by 
.3 standard deviations, which means that X3 explains approximately 10% of the 
variation in Sj (equation (i)); X3 explains approximately 6% of the variation in 
Gj; and X2 explains around 4% of the variation in geographical concentration.
The main difference in the results of the log and standardised specifications is that 
02 is significant in the standardised specification. Even though it is significant, 
the size of the coefficient is low. An increase of one standard deviation in factor 
intensities increases geographical concentration by .05 of a standard deviation, 
which means that approximately .25 per cent of the variation in the specialisation 
index can be explained by factor intensity differences. Hence there is only little 
support for the Heckscher-Ohlin theory. This is not surprising since the five 
countries in the sample are very similar in terms of their relative factor 
endowments. The Heckscher-Ohlin theory relies on differences in relative factor 
endowments for trade and specialisation to take place. See Learner and Levinsohn
(1995) for a review of tests of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory.
12 I re-estimated all four equations excluding the UK, and then including all 
countries for a shorter sample period from 1980. I found that the signs of the 
coefficients remain the same but only X3 is significant.
115
Kim (1996) conducts a similar study of the determinants of geographical 
concentration in the United States using the Gini. He finds support for the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory and the new trade theories but does not test for the new 
economic geography theory. The support the study claims for the Heckscher- 
Ohlin theory is questionable. The explanatory variable used in Kim (1996) to test 
for the Heckscher-Ohlin theory is a measure of raw material intensity and is 
defined as the cost of raw materials divided by value added. But the Heckscher- 
Ohlin theory does not claim that resource intensive industries will be more 
geographically concentrated than other factor intensive industries. Instead, it 
predicts that countries will specialise in industries which are intensive in the 
factors which they are relatively abundant. The explanatory variable used in Kim
(1996) to test for the new trade theory is constructed in the same way as in this 
Chapter.
Brulhart and Torstensson (1996) also find support for the new trade theories based 
on scale economies, using the Spearman rank correlation test. They use the Gini 
to rank the 18 industries in their sample of EU countries and find a high 
correlation with the ranking of industries according to scale economies based on 
’products and production runs’ and ’size of establishments’. Scherer (1980) 
distinguishes between three different types of economies of scale in production: 
product specific, plant specific and multi-plant economies. Plant size will only 
capture certain aspects of scale economies.
Nearly all of the industry dummies are positive and significant indicating that 
there are unobserved fixed industry effects. Therefore, all of the industries are 
more geographically concentrated than iron and steel, holding everything else 
constant. The time dummies show an increasing trend beginning in the early 
1980’s.
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If the explanatory variables are considered to be good proxies for each strand of 
trade theory, then we could conclude that there is some support for the new trade 
theory based on scale economies and the economic geography theory based on 
vertical linkages; and only little support for the Heckscher-Ohlin theory which is 
based on factor proportions.
4 . C O N C L U SIO N S
This Chapter has shown that there is evidence of increasing specialisation in EU 
countries between 1968 and 1990. International trade theories predict that the 
industrial structure of each country should become more different from its trading 
partners as trade costs fall. To determine whether the European experience is 
consistent with this trade hypothesis, I propose an index of specialisation which 
is analogous to a standard deviation which measures how different the distribution 
of production shares in each country is from its trading partners in Europe.
The disaggregated EUROSTAT data set shows that specialisation increased in all 
five countries between 1976 to 1989: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and UK. 
The UNIDO data set shows that there is increasing specialisation in some EU 
countries over the period 1968 to 1990. According to at least two out of the 
following three different measures of specialisation using production and 
employment data - the new index I constructed, the Gini and the weighted 
standard deviation - there was an increase in specialisation in Denmark, Greece, 
Germany, Italy and Netherlands and fall in Ireland, Spain and UK, and that there 
was no significant change in Portugal. Specialisation may fall in countries which 
had high trade barriers to protect industries in which they did not have a 
comparative advantage. The elimination of trade barriers within the EU would 
increase competitive pressures to increase production in the industries in which 
each country has a comparative advantage. This may explain why late joiners to
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the EU such as Portugal, Spain and UK, although experienced a fall in 
specialisation when comparing 1968 to 1990, have an upward trend in 
specialisation starting in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. This is clear for the 
UK which has positive significant growth in specialisation for the period 1976 to 
1989 according to both data sets.
The geographical concentration indices show an increase in concentration in 
approximately half the industries and the econometric analysis provides some 
support for the economic geography theories based on vertical linkages and the 
new trade theories based on scale economies. There was only weak support for 
the Heckscher-Ohlin theory. This is not surprising since the five countries in the 
sample are very similar in terms of their relative factor endowments. The 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory relies on differences in relative factor endowments for 
trade and specialisation to take place.
This Chapter has only shown that the EU experience is consistent with trade 
theories. In order to test the theories we need a proper measure of the level of 
trade costs, preferably for each country and for each industry.
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APPENDIX
Table 1a
Sj with production
Bel Fra Ger Ita UK
1976 0.76 0.62 0.45 0.54 0.40
1977 0.73 0.57 0.41 0.54 0.40
1978 0.82 0.60 0.44 0.57 0.40
1979 0.83 0.61 0.46 0.64 0.49
1980 0.93 0.64 0.42 0.63 0.54
1981 0.90 0.65 0.46 0.63 0.54
1982 0.99 0.66 0.46 0.64 0.57
1983 0.99 0.65 0.48 0.62 0.56
1984 1.00 0.67 0.50 0.58 0.57
1985 0.99 0.70 0.53 0.62 0.57
1986 0.93 0.75 0.56 0.62 0.59
1987 0.93 0.74 0.55 0.63 0.57
1988 1.03 0.74 0.57 0.63 0.58
1989 1.04 0.77 0.57 0.65 0.62
P 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03
t  value 5.48 10.82 8.74 3.08 6.10
Table 1b
Sj with em ploym ent
Bel Fra Ger Ita UK
1976 0.85 0.50 0.52 0.65 0.42
1977 0.85 0.54 0.50 0.64 0.42
1978 0.84 0.54 0.49 0.63 0.41
1979 0.87 0.54 0.49 0.69 0.49
1980 0.88 0.62 0.47 0.71 0.55
1981 0.89 0.61 0.50 0.72 0.59
1982 1.05 0.63 0.53 0.70 0.64
1983 0.93 0.61 0.55 0.70 0.65
1984 0.94 0.60 0.57 0.67 0.65
1985 0.95 0.63 0.59 0.68 0.64
1986 0.89 0.66 0.60 0.66 0.62
1987 0.87 0.66 0.62 0.70 0.62
1988 0.92 0.69 0.63 0.72 0.62
1989 0.92 0.70 0.62 0.77 0.62
P 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03
t value 1.85 9.35 7.43 2.90 5.07
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Table 1c
gini with production
UK Bel Ita Fra Ger
1976 14.01 24.12 18.18 17.26 13.71
1977 13.89 24.48 18.61 16.80 12.65
1978 13.59 25.84 19.07 17.39 13.05
1979 14.76 26.13 20.62 17.26 13.18
1980 16.06 27.65 20.98 18.18 12.92
1981 16.25 27.45 21.17 18.19 13.89
1982 16.89 30.49 20.87 18.17 13.83
1983 17.47 29.99 20.45 17.90 13.99
1984 17.25 29.49 19.44 18.52 14.55
1985 17.24 29.36 20.38 19.13 15.52
1986 17.92 29.35 19.88 20.28 16.02
1987 17.47 30.25 20.19 20.40 16.02
1988 17.66 31.41 20.28 20.50 16.28
1989 18.08 31.32 20.71 21.01 16.56
P 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
t value 7.89 8.28 1.95 10.63 8.67
Table id
gini with em ploym ent
Bel Fra Ger Ita UK
1976 26.46 17.19 16.22 20.86 13.67
1977 26.53 17.88 15.33 20.65 13.77
1978 26.81 17.95 15.05 20.34 13.61
1979 26.97 17.86 14.97 21.71 15.06
1980 27.63 19.40 14.69 22.06 16.21
1981 27.84 19.42 15.22 22.36 17.52
1982 31.30 19.62 15.81 21.68 18.41
1983 28.95 19.11 16.22 21.26 19.40
1984 29.02 19.01 16.75 20.65 19.07
1985 29.51 19.72 17.23 20.94 18.93
1986 29.39 20.36 17.39 20.55 18.56
1987 29.39 20.59 17.85 21.48 18.61
1988 30.50 21.27 18.10 22.03 18.76
1989 30.55 21.69 17.89 23.01 18.64
P 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03
t  value 5.70 9.90 5.65 1.50 5.90
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Table 1e
oj with production
Bel Fra
1976 45.76 31.59
1977 48.06 30.42
1978 51.04 31.28
1979 49.37 31.38
1980 54.33 32.87
1981 55.09 32.98
1982 64.09 32.96
1983 59.28 32.46
1984 59.07 33.65
1985 57.90 34.99
1986 59.05 36.65
1987 64.97 37.11
1988 66.14 37.56
1989 66.94 38.62
P 0.03 0.02
t  value 8.24 10.52
Table i f
oj with em ploym ent
Bel Fra
1976 50.12 31.26
1977 50.48 32.41
1978 51.49 32.27
1979 51.63 33.05
1980 54.05 35.64
1981 55.12 35.70
1982 67.17 35.83
1983 57.74 34.90
1984 58.98 34.64
1985 60.09 35.96
1986 59.30 37.00
1987 60.00 37.40
1988 63.47 39.16
1989 65.73 39.73
P 0.02 0.02
t  value 5.60 9.11
Ger Ita UK
25.19 34.18 28.13
23.10 35.37 27.55
23.46 35.42 27.58
23.94 38.34 29.60
23.22 38.57 30.93
24.86 39.37 32.63
24.77 39.06 32.91
25.13 39.09 34.62
26.06 38.02 34.46
27.83 40.24 34.64
28.61 38.60 36.00
28.61 39.20 34.97
29.12 39.70 35.03
29.70 40.90 36.11
0.02 0.01 0.02
7.31 4.95 9.12
Ger Ita UK
29.26 38.25 26.99
27.57 37.47 26.74
26.91 36.83 26.54
26.79 38.91 27.96
26.22 39.29 29.83
27.22 39.91 32.85
28.29 39.11 33.93
28.87 38.44 35.99
29.74 37.89 35.44
30.57 38.41 35.02
30.91 37.63 34.15
31.67 38.96 34.15
32.18 40.25 34.14
32.02 42.37 34.20
0.01 0.01 0.02
5.18 2.29 5.36
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Table 1g
hirf with production
Bel Fra Ger Ita UK
1976 3.59 2.97 3.37 3.10 2.98
1977 3.41 2.90 3.27 2.95 2.86
1978 3.58 2.87 3.20 3.00 2.76
1979 3.83 2.94 3.48 3.08 2.73
1980 3.84 2.85 3.19 2.96 2.77
1981 3.92 2.96 3.28 3.02 2.83
1982 3.75 2.97 3.27 2.96 2.86
1983 3.83 3.02 3.31 2.75 2.91
1984 4.01 3.18 3.46 2.88 2.96
1985 4.00 3.16 3.49 2.79 3.00
1986 3.51 3.09 3.30 2.62 2.91
1987 3.36 3.14 3.24 2.64 2.95
1988 3.43 3.18 3.30 2.66 2.98
1989 3.74 3.18 3.35 2.68 3.03
P 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01
t value -0.16 6.05 0.47 -6.99 2.74
Table 1h
hirf with em ploym ent 
Bel Fra Ger Ita UK
1976 3.26 2.76 3.05 2.87 2.72
1977 3.21 2.75 3.00 2.86 2.71
1978 3.13 2.74 2.98 2.89 2.67
1979 3.14 2.75 2.99 2.89 2.75
1980 3.04 2.71 2.95 2.86 2.83
1981 3.05 2.67 2.96 2.84 2.79
1982 3.03 2.67 2.98 2.77 2.89
1983 3.02 2.71 2.92 2.82 2.92
1984 2.97 2.73 2.98 2.77 2.95
1985 2.95 2.74 3.01 2.75 3.01
1986 2.84 2.76 3.08 2.74 3.00
1987 2.79 2.80 3.07 2.81 2.99
1988 2.77 2.82 3.11 2.80 3.03
1989 2.76 2.82 3.16 2.83 3.07
P -0.010 0.002 0.003 -0.003 0.010
t value -17.37 1.93 2.67 -3.18 12.65
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Table 1i
fk with production
Bel Fra
1976 79.22 81.17
1977 79.36 81.46
1978 78.58 80.88
1979 77.69 80.30
1980 76.42 79.23
1981 76.67 79.25
1982 74.92 79.08
1983 74.49 79.27
1984 74.86 79.02
1985 74.83 78.42
1986 74.81 77.76
1987 74.28 77.61
1988 73.40 77.50
1989 73.22 76.68
P 0.006 0.004
t  value 11.01 14.58
Table 1j
fk with em ploym ent
Bel Fra
1976 77.53 81.04
1977 77.47 80.71
1978 77.51 80.78
1979 76.98 80.25
1980 76.21 79.07
1981 76.11 78.90
1982 74.20 78.60
1983 75.04 78.40
1984 75.47 78.84
1985 75.07 78.41
1986 75.28 78.19
1987 75.08 77.84
1988 74.19 77.16
1989 73.97 76.95
P 0.003 0.004
t  value 6.86 12.20
Ger Ita UK
80.86 81.79 82.82
81.55 81.83 82.60
80.66 81.33 82.03
80.36 79.66 80.54
80.55 78.76 79.13
79.89 78.61 78.85
79.64 78.46 78.00
79.51 77.48 78.37
79.52 78.22 78.47
79.00 78.04 78.30
78.01 77.88 78.29
78.10 77.38 78.84
77.57 77.29 78.45
77.80 76.71 77.73
0.003 0.005 0.004
13.23 8.14 5.30
Ger Ita UK
78.95 79.51 80.29
79.39 79.66 80.16
79.37 79.94 80.28
79.06 78.85 79.05
78.59 78.50 77.99
77.81 78.04 77.21
76.96 78.16 76.12
77.21 77.54 76.13
76.93 78.31 76.84
76.23 78.26 76.81
75.78 78.46 77.38
75.43 77.71 77.42
74.90 76.89 77.02
74.93 76.20 76.58
0.005 0.003 0.003
16.02 6.05 4.19
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Table 2a
Sj index with production
Bel Den Fra Ger
1968 1.65 2.94 0.98 1.12
1969 1.72 2.73 1.02 1.25
1970 1.76 3.14 0.93 1.22
1971 1.75 2.97 0.95 1.28
1972 1.76 2.96 0.93 1.24
1973 1.69 3.40 0.82 1.24
1974 1.66 3.20 0.76 1.20
1975 1.71 3.06 0.80 1.23
1976 1.70 3.11 0.82 1.23
1977 1.70 3.95 0.81 1.16
1978 1.80 4.05 0.74 1.17
1979 1.71 3.82 0.71 1.15
1980 1.87 3.82 0.61 1.07
1981 1.84 3.92 0.66 1.13
1982 1.85 4.07 0.58 1.14
1983 1.82 4.13 0.69 1.21
1984 1.84 4.04 0.70 1.25
1985 1.89 3.84 0.72 1.34
1986 2.11 3.78 0.70 1.37
1987 2.10 3.68 0.68 1.42
1988 2.11 3.68 0.68 1.29
1989 2.15 3.82 0.67 1.27
1990 2.18 3.73 0.64 1.26
0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.00
te 8.14 5.45 -7.22 1.94
Gre Ire Ita Net Por S pa UK
2.90 4.65 0.94 2.54 3.50 1.67 0.92
2.82 4.66 0.93 2.66 3.45 1.69 0.84
2.85 4.76 0.94 2.79 3.48 1.90 0.78
2.82 4.56 0.83 . 2.68 3.39 2.01 0.72
2.82 5.06 0.90 2.65 3.13 2.06 0.69
2.73 5.15 0.90 2.88 3.28 1.98 0.69
2.85 5.24 0.90 2.42 3.18 1.93 0.73
2.92 5.59 0.86 2.61 3.23 1.93 0.66
2.92 5.26 0.92 2.64 3.10 1.94 0.55
3.07 5.61 0.99 2.78 2.85 1.96 0.53
3.05 5.37 0.98 2.88 2.72 1.29 0.60
3.04 5.34 1.13 2.80 2.79 1.29 0.58
3.10 4.95 1.27 2.72 2.72 1.25 0.56
3.18 4.60 1.09 2.84 2.79 1.28 0.56
3.32 4.67 1.19 2.80 2.64 1.29 0.55
3.37 4.39 1.13 2.86 2.88 1.48 0.43
3.36 4.24 1.16 2.78 2.85 1.51 0.40
3.54 4.41 1.33 2.79 3.02 1.53 0.49
3.48 4.64 1.31 2.64 3.13 1.50 0.55
3.66 4.73 1.33 2.79 3.09 1.55 0.50
3.56 4.54 1.28 2.78 3.09 1.66 0.55
3.48 4.40 1.35 2.71 3.14 1.55 0.57
3.58 4.43 1.29 2.54 3.16 1.55 0.54
0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
13.95 -2.34 9.52 1.05 -2.49 -2.86 -6.07
Table 2b
Sj with em ploym ent
Bel Den Fra Ger
1968 1.46 1.79 0.52 1.31
1969 1.44 1.76 0.54 1.32
1970 1.41 1.88 0.58 1.34
1971 1.40 1.99 0.56 1.30
1972 1.41 1.98 0.55 1.32
1973 1.63 1.96 0.56 1.34
1974 1.59 1.99 0.54 1.40
1975 1.53 2.02 0.53 1.43
1976 1.49 2.01 0.56 1.41
1977 1.47 2.26 0.55 1.30
1978 1.44 2.30 0.52 1.28
1979 1.34 2.36 0.52 1.29
1980 1.40 2.36 0.52 1.23
1981 1.44 2.39 0.50 1.27
1982 1.50 2.32 0.49 1.31
1983 1.52 2.37 0.54 1.36
1984 1.55 2.33 0.61 1.37
1985 1.60 2.28 0.64 1.41
1986 1.59 2.34 0.65 1.48
1987 1.51 2.39 0.65 1.53
1988 1.50 2.39 0.65 1.54
1989 1.52 2.34 0.65 1.54
1990 1.58 2.27 0.67 1.54
P 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
t  value 2.05 8.00 3.64 3.73
Gre Ire Ita Net Por S pa UK
3.30 3.90 1.28 1.56 4.99 2.06 0.65
3.25 3.85 1.27 1.69 4.84 2.05 0.63
3.14 3.89 1.30 1.74 4.98 2.09 0.60
3.09 3.86 1.08 1.75 4.44 2.10 0.57
3.01 3.70 1.01 1.74 4.09 2.00 0.58
3.02 3.65 0.99 1.73 4.07 2.00 0.59
3.17 3.70 0.98 1.69 4.05 2.02 0.57
3.30 3.84 0.98 1.72 3.90 2.01 0.59
3.29 3.65 0.96 1.76 3.65 1.95 0.58
3.27 3.52 1.00 1.90 3.65 1.91 0.54
3.30 3.50 0.98 1.95 3.70 1.55 0.53
3.32 3.40 0.99 2.01 3.68 1.57 0.52
3.40 3.27 1.01 2.05 3.72 1.49 0.56
3.39 3.18 1.05 2.04 3.76 1.47 0.59
3.48 3.13 1.05 2.06 3.71 1.41 0.55
3.50 3.13 1.11 2.06 3.76 1.43 0.54
3.49 3.13 1.12 2.06 3.86 1.49 0.57
3.58 3.10 1.12 2.05 3.99 1.60 0.56
3.67 3.08 1.15 2.03 4.11 1.67 0.56
3.71 3.01 1.18 2.04 4.20 1.67 0.58
3.65 2.90 1.22 2.02 4.16 1.73 0.57
3.72 2.76 1.25 1.96 4.21 1.73 0.59
3.70 2.72 1.29 1.92 4.24 1.74 0.61
0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
9.71 -19.99 0.97 6.92 -1.95 -4.29 -1.52
Table 2c
gini with production
Bel Den Fra Ger
1968 20.59 27.47 11.48 11.91
1969 21.05 26.47 11.35 12.84
1970 21.59 29.66 11.04 12.68
1971 21.65 28.00 11.31 12.71
1972 21.62 28.59 11.40 12.74
1973 21.25 30.77 10.19 12.82
1974 21.24 30.93 9.68 13.23
1975 21.50 29.63 9.85 13.52
1976 21.50 30.03 10.01 13.35
1977 21.81 33.07 10.09 12.70
1978 22.02 33.22 9.63 12.51
1979 21.29 33.04 9.07 12.48
1980 22.11 33.21 8.19 11.68
1981 22.13 31.89 8.78 12.23
1982 22.17 32.71 7.81 12.06
1983 21.97 33.31 8.90 13.02
1984 22.49 33.76 9.04 13.44
1985 22.13 33.88 9.18 14.54
1986 23.21 34.31 9.35 14.27
1987 23.30 33.95 9.24 14.97
1988 23.27 33.69 9.01 13.81
1989 23.60 34.35 8.81 13.64
1990 23.83 33.07 8.49 13.42
P 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01
t  value 9.92 8.47 -6.36 2.93
Gre Ire Ita Net Por Spa UK
35.18 43.85 13.89 22.94 38.96 21.26 11.35
33.96 44.23 14.01 24.24 39.02 21.47 10.69
34.38 45.67 14.01 25.67 39.10 23.14 10.01
33.68 43.84 12.67 24.76 38.74 24.22 9.58
33.10 44.59 13.38 24.15 35.74 24.64 9.63
32.34 45.16 12.60 25.84 37.09 23.70 9.51
33.15 45.18 12.44 24.22 36.12 22.16 9.49
34.91 45.69 12.32 25.26 36.27 22.57 8.54
35.14 44.22 12.89 25.84 35.92 23.01 8.16
36.87 44.46 13.78 27.59 34.44 23.17 8.03
37.44 43.04 13.26 27.81 32.65 16.37 8.31
37.42 42.71 15.03 28.09 33.90 16.46 8.06
37.55 40.77 17.15 27.60 33.29 15.68 7.47
37.54 40.70 15.08 29.09 34.33 16.08 7.27
39.05 40.93 15.56 28.32 32.96 15.72 7.51
40.00 39.74 15.50 29.43 35.10 17.41 6.34
40.61 40.08 15.72 29.02 35.73 17.93 5.82
41.56 41.31 17.21 29.20 37.69 18.05 6.90
42.04 41.41 16.53 27.38 39.16 17.61 7.59
43.41 41.80 17.01 29.37 38.58 17.88 7.10
43.32 41.47 17.03 29.54 38.32 18.92 7.79
41.82 41.32 18.38 29.75 39.11 17.70 8.32
43.62 40.59 17.23 27.85 38.62 18.05 7.48
0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02
12.74 -6.23 7.01 8.39 0.01 -4.35 -6.04
Table 2d
gini with employment
to
VO
Bel Den Fra Ger
1968 19.57 24.00 7.57 14.28
1969 19.73 23.94 7.62 14.26
1970 19.41 25.18 7.74 14.48
1971 19.40 25.47 7.44 14.16
1972 19.80 25.31 7.49 14.31
1973 21.33 25.15 7.60 14.60
1974 21.22 25.18 7.44 15.35
1975 20.05 25.20 7.34 15.77
1976 19.98 25.07 7.40 15.65
1977 19.66 26.62 7.41 14.80
1978 19.55 27.05 7.12 14.63
1979 18.46 27.69 7.22 14.76
1980 18.64 27.52 7.24 14.31
1981 18.95 27.17 7.05 14.58
1982 19.63 26.51 7.04 15.08
1983 19.85 27.13 7.32 15.47
1984 20.24 27.05 8.22 15.58
1985 20.36 26.74 8.57 15.88
1986 20.17 27.41 8.76 16.43
1987 19.24 28.03 8.81 16.90
1988 19.28 28.03 9.04 17.00
1989 19.41 27.56 9.17 17.02
1990 19.63 26.84 9.35 17.06
0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
le -0.79 7.74 4.04 6.81
Gre
40.04 
39.19 
38.50
37.31
35.90 
35.43 
36.61 
37.78 
37.76 
37.87 
38.14
38.36 
39.40 
39.56 
40.33
40.31
40.37 
40.98
41.90
42.04
41.89 
42.81
42.89 
0.01 
5.84
Ire
41.87
41.56 
41.85 
41.37
39.42 
37.97 
38.18 
39.48 
37.68
36.42
36.63
35.56
34.57 
34.16
33.63 
33.72 
33.54 
33.94 
34.08 
33.44 
32.14 
31.23 
31.40 
- 0.01
-19.36
Ita
15.58 
15.71 
16.05 
13.75 
13.04 
12.89
12.85
12.85 
12.69 
13.27 
13.15 
13.34
13.58 
14.07 
14.11
15.53
15.53 
15.61
15.95 
16.20
16.53
16.96 
17.57
0.01
2.92
Net
19.88
21.64
22.08
22.20
21.86
21.71
21.23
21.86
22.51
23.76
24.40 
25.09 
25.33 
25.62
25.77 
25.53 
25.67 
25.60 
25.30
25.41 
24.81 
24.22 
23.90
0.01
6.30
Por
47.49
47.33
48.12
46.59
42.98
41.88
42.01
41.29
38.81 
39.17 
39.25
38.82 
38.85 
39.04
38.74 
39.19 
40.11 
41.76 
42.81
43.74
42.91 
43.43
43.92 
0.00 
-1.73
Spa
25.15
25.06
25.57 
25.43 
24.59
24.57 
24.68
24.82 
24.28 
23.75 
19.99
20.09 
19.25 
18.74 
17.71 
17.51 
18.12
19.10
19.82
19.82 
20.22 
19.98 
20.21 
- 0.02 
-6.29
UK
8.87 
8.66 
8.31
8.29 
8.26 
8.25 
8.23 
8.37
8.30
7.88
7.89
7.82
7.74 
8.06 
7.67 
7.59 
8.16
7.95
7.75
7.83
7.95 
8.04 
8.14 
0.00 
-4.17
Table 2e
oj with production
Bel Den Fra Ger
1968 37.95 40.32 27.27 38.72
1969 37.90 39.39 26.17 41.76
1970 36.34 43.95 27.56 42.71
1971 35.94 42.07 27.74 42.56
1972 35.57 42.64 27.44 41.41
1973 35.10 46.50 25.52 42.47
1974 36.56 47.25 23.22 41.84
1975 35.61 44.27 25.03 42.74
1976 35.55 44.03 26.48 42.41
1977 37.07 50.40 27.41 42.73
1978 35.95 49.73 27.03 43.09
1979 35.91 49.27 25.61 42.63
1980 33.91 50.02 24.87 40.92
1981 33.86 50.01 25.49 41.37
1982 33.54 51.52 24.51 41.00
1983 33.32 52.89 25.36 42.17
1984 34.79 52.29 26.03 42.43
1985 33.69 51.93 25.78 45.27
1986 34.51 50.57 27.19 45.78
1987 34.17 48.39 27.99 47.51
1988 34.53 48.12 27.18 44.73
1989 34.88 49.59 26.63 44.24
1990 35.20 48.03 27.98 44.42
0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
le -4.64 5.42 0.36 4.06
Gre
51.78
47.35
46.77
47.09
48.54 
48.15 
49.08 
53.88 
54.69
59.54 
59.38
59.23
59.24
57.85 
62.17
62.85 
65.48 
65.52 
66.71
68.93
68.93 
63.80 
67.63
0.02
12.61
Ire
66.48
69.04 
70.35 
65.91
68.32
68.72
70.72 
72.77 
70.28 
70.01 
65.81
66.05 
62.52 
60.98
62.17
61.17 
61.66 
63.97 
63.13
64.33 
63.59 
62.46 
60.70 
- 0.01 
-5.08
Ita
37.68
36.10 
37.44 
34.80
36.01 
34.97 
36.07 
36.09
35.69
38.11 
39.58 
40.55 
43.15
40.69 
42.05 
40.94 
40.37
42.36
41.70
41.37
42.37 
46.33
44.01 
0.01 
8.17
Net
33.93
35.17
38.19 
36.54 
36.71 
40.16 
38.66 
38.39
41.13 
41.80 
41.11 
43.30 
42.26
45.13
43.07 
44.65 
43.99
44.08
41.19 
44.69 
44.62 
45.07 
41.68
0.01
7.47
Por
60.29
59.56
59.39
55.03 
52.45
58.05
58.03
52.81
51.73 
50.98 
48.75
54.73 
54.87 
54.16
50.05 
53.58 
52.37
58.74
61.81 
61.55 
58.97 
58.96 
57.78
0.00
0.52
Spa
38.45
39.38
41.34 
44.28 
47.83
45.74
44.34 
44.89
45.27 
46.87 
25.47
24.77
22.34
23.77 
24.05
26.27
26.78
26.79 
26.81
29.74 
30.64 
29.08 
29.30 
-0.03 
-4.26
UK
37.26 
35.93 
35.17 
33.10 
31.06 
30.43 
29.58
30.33 
29.57 
29.82
31.22 
29.90
29.33 
29.40
28.34 
27.05
25.27 
28.30
29.23 
28.88 
28.96 
29.67 
29.49 
- 0.01 
-5.03
Table 2f
oj with employment
Bel Den Fra Ger Gre
1968 34.92 37.05 28.03 48.22 56.19
1969 36.05 37.76 28.11 48.46 53.01
1970 36.10 38.67 28.50 49.23 52.45
1971 36.73 38.68 28.67 48.33 48.95
1972 36.85 37.91 28.08 46.87 46.26
1973 35.64 38.20 28.57 47.17 45.65
1974 36.10 39.48 28.30 48.25 48.09
1975 34.39 39.04 28.32 48.69 49.38
1976 34.11 37.84 28.45 47.85 49.77
1977 34.28 40.11 28.33 45.81 51.17
1978 34.04 40.61 27.41 45.42 51.63
1979 32.20 41.99 26.56 45.32 52.31
1980 32.02 42.26 25.79 44.53 54.45
1981 32.05 41.91 25.51 44.87 55.31
1982 32.80 40.67 25.24 45.69 56.99
1983 33.15 41.67 26.10 45.85 57.91
1984 33.66 41.88 27.39 46.09 58.19
1985 33.10 42.08 27.86 47.32 58.65
1986 33.35 43.18 27.79 48.96 60.62
1987 31.35 43.90 27.51 49.78 61.26
1988 31.45 44.57 27.61 49.90 62.22
1989 31.94 44.36 27.65 49.92 64.58
1990 32.41 43.69 28.01 50.21 65.25
P -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
t  value -7.41 13.38 -1.88 0.62 6.43
Ire Ita Net
58.44 32.48 32.50
57.67 32.54 31.78
58.29 32.97 33.36
56.89 32.52 33.19
54.91 32.04 33.06
54.62 32.84 33.25
55.57 32.45 33.45
58.87 33.01 34.99
55.23 32.84 36.52
52.40 33.81 39.77
52.07 34.32 40.97
49.66 34.70 42.43
48.12 34.50 42.86
47.33 34.87 43.84
47.13 34.77 44.57
49.19 37.18 44.72
49.40 36.25 45.08
49.20 36.42 45.32
49.52 37.25 45.21
48.36 37.31 46.01
46.14 37.83 44.29
44.82 38.44 43.56
44.95 38.85 43.51
-0.01 0.01 0.02
-11.12 15.30 10.64
Por S pa UK
76.39 33.89 35.11
74.38 33.24 34.73
77.68 34.21 34.01
73.55 35.15 32.85
68.52 35.52 30.51
67.73 36.36 29.92
68.74 36.99 29.42
66.14 37.80 29.39
62.03 37.31 28.51
62.50 36.61 28.32
63.24 25.41 28.20
64.47 25.32 27.65
65.66 25.08 27.57
67.29 24.84 26.68
67.24 23.04 25.12
69.15 23.57 24.32
72.20 24.74 24.13
74.12 25.23 24.15
77.19 26.13 23.00
79.72 26.46 22.19
79.82 25.81 22.16
81.89 26.25 22.39
82.98 26.10 23.39
0.01 -0.02 -0.02
1.84 -5.36 -22.80
Table 2g
hirf index with production
Bel Den Fra Ger
1968 7.58 10.66 7.50 6.19
1969 7.67 9.86 7.40 6.42
1970 7.62 10.61 7.31 6.63
1971 7.51 10.49 7.35 6.55
1972 7.56 10.49 7.31 6.51
1973 7.61 11.72 7.13 6.53
1974 7.56 10.52 6.88 6.58
1975 7.60 10.90 7.27 6.70
1976 7.63 10.82 7.26 6.71
1977 7.54 13.69 7.40 6.84
1978 7.91 14.18 7.36 6.85
1979 7.82 13.02 7.20 6.74
1980 8.11 12.87 7.19 6.73
1981 8.17 13.60 7.43 6.88
1982 8.22 14.21 7.45 7.09
1983 8.05 14.45 7.43 7.14
1984 7.95 13.97 7.40 7.15
1985 8.13 13.03 7.32 7.39
1986 8.72 12.97 7.28 7.58
1987 8.43 12.28 7.23 7.80
1988 8.32 12.21 7.20 7.66
1989 8.23 12.47 7.26 7.74
1990 8.34 12.44 7.29 7.75
0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
le 8.39 4.14 -0.19 15.06
Gre Ire Ita Net Por Spa UK
8.49 15.06 6.43 10.23 10.45 6.97 6.50
8.08 14.49 6.29 10.16 9.89 6.88 6.54
7.82 14.34 6.32 10.30 9.44 6.94 6.59
7.93 13.88 6.46 10.19 9.83 6.76 6.63
7.93 16.13 6.43 10.28 9.36 6.80 6.60
7.63 16.34 6.27 10.74 9.24 6.92 6.39
7.93 16.03 6.33 9.57 8.77 7.08 6.33
7.83 18.24 6.51 10.27 9.54 6.94 6.50
7.80 16.76 6.40 10.20 9.12 7.04 6.45
7.94 18.71 6.37 10.65 8.45 7.02 6.60
7.78 18.18 6.48 11.03 8.30 6.87 6.55
7.93 17.73 6.24 10.77 8.01 6.82 6.54
8.21 16.08 6.19 10.56 7.93 6.75 6.65
8.89 14.91 6.12 11.15 8.44 6.87 6.77
8.86 15.43 6.18 11.12 8.20 7.15 6.83
8.78 14.88 6.16 11.17 8.60 7.26 6.79
8.61 14.46 6.25 11.11 8.75 7.29 6.90
8.97 14.80 5.79 10.88 8.50 7.25 6.88
8.27 15.84 5.90 10.44 8.29 7.21 6.96
8.39 15.97 5.83 10.40 7.95 7.54 6.86
7.82 15.36 6.35 10.02 8.03 7.62 6.87
7.94 14.71 6.43 9.66 7.94 7.60 6.91
8.01 14.72 6.39 9.43 8.14 7.40 6.97
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00
1.61 -0.46 -2.34 0.05 -7.28 5.82 7.04
Table 2h
hirf with employment
Bel Den Fra Ger
1968 6.41 6.82 6.38 7.11
1969 6.45 6.85 6.42 7.25
1970 6.52 6.91 6.49 7.42
1971 6.55 7.01 6.55 7.45
1972 6.54 6.98 6.54 7.38
1973 6.40 7.05 6.59 7.45
1974 6.35 7.26 6.61 7.63
1975 6.35 7.28 6.66 7.67
1976 6.35 7.15 6.70 7.65
1977 6.30 7.57 6.71 7.65
1978 6.26 7.64 6.73 7.67
1979 6.31 7.73 6.74 7.71
1980 6.35 7.90 6.75 7.71
1981 6.35 8.12 6.80 7.82
1982 6.36 8.13 6.88 7.94
1983 6.40 8.19 6.94 8.16
1984 6.41 8.16 6.98 8.18
1985 6.47 8.27 7.00 8.38
1986 6.52 8.28 6.95 8.60
1987 6.48 8.27 6.92 8.70
1988 6.48 8.33 6.90 8.72
1989 6.50 8.34 6.88 8.79
1990 6.52 8.36 6.92 8.88
0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
le 0.70 18.35 13.24 17.45
Gre Ire Ita Net Por Spa UK
7.94 9.61 6.07 7.08 12.99 6.42 6.91
7.83 9.41 6.10 6.95 12.14 6.40 6.93
7.53 9.35 6.11 7.03 12.35 6.28 6.92
7.61 9.17 6.15 7.06 10.51 6.16 6.89
7.61 8.87 6.18 7.04 9.59 6.06 6.83
7.71 8.84 6.20 7.04 9.54 6.09 6.93
7.74 8.87 6.21 7.05 9.36 6.05 6.93
7.91 9.10 6.25 7.17 9.01 6.05 6.94
8.03 8.77 6.24 7.20 8.62 6.08 6.92
7.87 8.55 6.26 7.53 8.50 6.03 6.95
7.90 8.48 6.31 7.58 8.62 6.05 6.96
7.89 8.38 6.40 7.65 8.53 6.07 6.96
7.90 8.15 6.43 7.69 8.51 6.03 7.12
7.93 8.05 6.42 7.77 8.56 6.02 7.16
7.89 8.07 6.45 7.82 8.44 6.15 7.11
7.89 8.18 6.45 7.84 8.48 6.20 7.09
7.89 8.39 6.42 7.89 8.52 6.20 7.02
8.03 8.34 6.47 7.84 8.61 6.30 7.02
8.14 8.28 6.63 7.82 8.83 6.27 6.95
8.24 8.25 6.59 8.06 8.93 6.31 6.91
8.15 8.27 6.64 7.91 8.92 6.39 6.84
8.20 8.07 6.65 7.84 8.89 6.40 6.81
8.07 7.97 6.69 7.89 8.87 6.41 6.92
0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
5.72 -9.53 25.65 12.34 -4.54 1.38 0.66
Table 2i
f-k index with production
Bel Den Fra Ger Gre
1968 78.26 76.88 80.75 77.32 74.46
1969 78.28 76.99 80.96 76.41 75.08
1970 78.25 75.63 80.40 75.91 75.34
1971 78.00 76.51 80.38 76.23 75.71
1972 77.66 75.89 80.45 76.59 75.25
1973 77.30 74.60 80.65 76.17 74.82
1974 77.03 74.54 80.83 76.32 74.89
1975 76.97 75.29 80.49 75.63 73.29
1976 77.05 75.37 80.13 75.56 73.36
1977 76.51 73.32 79.90 75.39 72.55
1978 77.41 73.96 80.70 75.92 72.12
1979 77.39 73.85 80.78 76.04 71.82
1980 77.57 73.90 81.20 76.79 71.61
1981 77.80 74.47 81.02 76.28 72.27
1982 77.60 73.73 81.26 76.30 70.99
1983 77.16 73.23 80.35 75.44 70.51
1984 76.96 72.67 79.83 74.99 69.34
1985 76.49 72.14 79.30 73.97 68.84
1986 76.34 72.72 79.34 74.05 69.22
1987 76.21 73.09 79.07 73.45 68.44
1988 76.04 73.38 79.03 74.22 67.92
1989 76.17 73.12 78.89 74.23 69.14
1990 76.29 73.89 79.11 74.57 67.71
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
ie 6.46 7.59 4.34 6.06 17.62
Ire Ita
69.93 78.31
69.51 78.72
68.67 77.95
70.13 78.56
68.89 78.35
67.89 78.35
67.53 78.30
66.60 78.03
67.21 77.83
67.26 77.25
68.68 77.74
68.96 77.06
70.25 76.50
69.87 77.26
69.46 76.92
69.43 76.72
68.44 76.33
67.32 75.46
67.95 75.59
67.77 75.36
67.81 74.80
67.89 74.04
69.10 75.06
0.00 0.00
0.96 12.93
Net Por
78.47 71.38
77.98 71.44
76.92 71.57
77.70 72.52
77.20 73.70
75.74 72.39
75.70 73.33
75.69 73.39
75.08 73.64
74.26 73.76
74.84 75.04
74.16 73.88
74.69 74.23
73.78 73.94
74.32 74.46
73.30 73.13
73.61 72.53
73.51 71.24
74.82 70.62
73.89 71.06
73.94 70.61
73.98 70.27
74.88 70.66
0.00 0.00
6.90 1.63
Spa UK
77.94 77.88
77.54 78.22
76.74 78.11
76.61 78.95
75.85 79.47
75.73 79.32
76.15 79.50
75.76 79.28
75.79 79.28
75.22 79.19
80.52 79.21
80.28 79.31
81.04 79.96
80.79 79.70
80.55 79.96
79.45 79.97
79.24 79.80
78.62 78.87
78.81 78.85
78.14 78.77
77.93 78.55
78.26 78.32
78.14 78.88
0.00 0.00
-2.40 -0.81
Table 2j
fk with employment
Bel Den Fra Ger Gre
1968 77.44 77.73 80.02 74.71 72.43
1969 77.26 77.73 80.04 74.58 73.02
1970 77.07 77.33 79.69 74.21 73.66
1971 77.21 77.57 79.88 74.97 74.76
1972 77.37 78.05 80.43 75.68 75.37
1973 77.75 77.96 80.49 75.50 75.71
1974 77.53 77.35 80.34 74.83 74.43
1975 77.93 77.35 80.18 74.63 73.38
1976 78.44 78.04 80.29 75.07 73.75
1977 78.42 77.32 80.28 75.63 73.38
1978 78.59 77.31 80.65 75.85 73.41
1979 79.14 76.89 80.89 75.88 73.26
1980 79.03 76.92 81.21 76.27 72.60
1981 78.99 77.00 81.33 76.10 72.42
1982 78.83 77.25 81.47 75.73 71.79
1983 78.56 76.70 81.11 75.18 71.42
1984 78.27 76.38 80.42 74.73 71.20
1985 78.11 76.08 80.06 74.14 70.84
1986 77.95 75.48 79.90 73.39 70.21
1987 78.37 75.21 79.91 73.01 69.77
1988 78.66 75.25 79.96 72.95 69.77
1989 78.57 75.45 80.03 73.02 69.14
1990 78.53 75.88 80.04 72.94 69.28
P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
t  value -4.29 8.78 -0.41 2.73 7.78
Ire Ita
71.14 78.48
71.40 78.51
71.31 78.22
71.95 78.79
73.19 79.32
73.76 79.16
73.49 79.03
72.61 78.79
73.71 79.24
74.24 78.98
73.78 79.01
74.67 78.81
75.31 78.85
75.32 78.73
75.56 78.71
74.88 78.12
74.43 77.93
74.10 77.70
73.90 77.19
74.16 76.88
74.84 76.98
75.22 76.80
75.03 76.62
0.00 0.00
-6.20 5.47
Net Por
78.49 66.57
78.74 66.96
78.28 66.67
78.45 68.17
79.08 70.27
79.16 70.94
78.73 70.75
78.01 71.18
77.92 72.57
77.01 72.09
76.89 71.99
76.58 71.87
76.51 71.81
76.31 71.41
76.20 71.45
76.07 70.73
75.64 69.70
75.66 68.90
75.62 68.13
75.10 67.47
75.85 68.07
76.09 67.66
76.21 67.57
0.00 0.00
9.87 0.20
Spa UK
78.07 77.98
78.33 78.08
78.01 78.19
78.28 78.74
78.75 79.58
78.94 79.71
78.39 79.66
77.96 79.53
78.51 79.86
78.44 79.86
80.60 80.11
80.68 80.34
80.90 80.39
80.90 80.62
81.14 81.16
80.85 81.05
80.24 80.95
79.90 80.69
79.45 80.71
79.28 80.71
79.68 80.87
79.58 80.95
79.60 80.90
0.00 0.00
-3.50 -9.70
Table 3a: Sjt index with production (EUROSTAT)
industry t=1976 t-1989
4940 toys & sports goods 4.62 2.31
4950 miscellaneous industries 3.64 3.90
4190 bread & flour confectionary 3.63 2.45
2550 manuf of paint 3.53 3.10
4650 other wood manufactures 3.48 3.76
4310 wool industry 3.42 4.12
3270 other machinery: specific industry 2.99 3.93
4380 carpets & other floor coverings 2.89 3.60
4140 processing of fruit & vegetables 2.85 1.69
4270 brewing & malting 2.84 3.39
3620 railway & tramway rolling stock 2.77 3.47
4510 mass-produced footwear 2.72 4.53
4120 slaughtering & preparing meat 2.67 2.94
4220 aminal & poultry foods 2.64 2.29
4910 jewellery 2.59 4.07
3710 measuring instruments 2.51 3.04
4230 other food products 2.47 1.79
4240 spirit distilling & compounding 2.42 2.36
4610 sawing & processing of wood 2.34 1.88
4130 manuf of dairy products 2.31 2.53
4620 semi-finished wood products 2.19 1.51
3150 boilermaking 2.18 2.78
4660 plaiting materials 2.15 1.16
3280 manuf of other machinery 2.11 1.55
3230 manuf of textile machinery 2.10 3.56
2410 manuf of clay products 2.08 2.18
3260 manuf of transmission equipment 2.04 2.17
4670 wooden furniture 2.03 0.98
4150 processing of fish & seafoods 1.97 3.68
3130 secondary transform of metals 1.97 2.44
3220 manuf of tools 1.96 3.11
2480 manuf of ceramic goods 1.96 2.77
2450 working of stone 1.83 4.84
4160 grain milling 1.79 2.73
3140 manuf of structural metals 1.77 1.17
2420 cement, lime & plaster 1.67 1.56
4630 carpentry & joinery components 1.63 0.86
2430 manuf of concrete for construction 1.46 0.42
4730 printing & allied industries 1.38 3.06
3240 manuf food & chemical machinery 1.34 2.08
2570 manuf of pharmaceutical products 1.32 1.62
4720 processing of paper & board 1.27 1.30
2230 drawing & cold rolling 1.22 0.86
4360 knitting industry 1.16 3.00
2470 manuf of glass & glassware 1.11 0.95
3250 manuf of plant for mines 1.07 1.09
4320 cotton industry 1.06 1.86
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able  3a continued t=1976 t=1989
4390 miscellaneous textile industries 1.05 1.17
4810 rubber products 1.05 0.87
3160 manuf of tools 1.02 2.17
2510 manuf of basic industrial chemicals 0.99 1.42
3110 foundaries 0.87 0.84
3610 shipbuilding 0.83 1.58
4280 manuf of soft drinks 0.81 1.49
2580 manuf of soap & toilet preparations 0.81 1.40
4370 textile finishing 0.80 3.45
4710 pulp, paper & baord 0.76 0.59
2240 processing of non-ferrous metals 0.73 0.67
3210 manuf of agricultural machinery 0.68 1.89
4530 ready made clothing 0.63 2.24
4110 vegetable & animal oils 0.60 1.27
4210 cocoa, chocolate & sugar confection 0.59 1.85
4560 furs & fur goods 0.56 3.58
2210 iron & steel 0.52 0.88
4830 processing of plastics 0.48 0.50
able 3b: Sjt index with production (UNIDO)
industry t=1968 t=1990
354 misc. petroleum & coal products 5.63 4.17
361 poettery, china, earthenware 3.61 6.60
314 tobacco 3.36 3.70
390 other manufactured products 3.12 3.56
353 petroleum refineries 3.12 1.16
385 professional & scientific equip 2.65 2.22
311 food products 2.35 2.33
342 printing & publishing 2.12 3.38
313 beverages 2.02 1.52
372 non-ferrous metals 1.96 0.94
331 wood products 1.95 1.20
352 other chemicals 1.90 1.49
356 plastic products 1.88 0.62
332 furniture 1.85 1.43
383 machinery electric 1.77 1.63
351 industrial chemicals 1.69 1.58
355 rubber products 1.61 0.93
384 transport equipment 1.43 1.56
362 glass & products 1.42 0.95
382 machinery, except electrical 1.39 1.68
324 footwear 1.39 5.87
371 iron & steel 1.32 1.53
323 leather products 1.32 5.37
321 textiles 1.08 3.09
322 wearing apparel 1.03 3.07
369 other non-metallic mineral prod 1.01 1.92
341 paper & products 0.68 0.89
381 fabricated metal products 0.60 1.22
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Table 4a
Changes in Si index with NACE production
p t value
industries with positive & significant growth
2450 working of stone 0.09 6.68
2510 manuf basic industrial chemicals 0.02 4.38
2570 manuf of pharmaceutical products 0.02 4.18
2580 manuf soap & toilet preparations 0.05 6.91
3150 boilermaking 0.01 2.74
3160 manuf of tools 0.06 10.28
3210 manuf of agricultural machinery 0.03 2.30
3220 manuf of machine tools 0.04 9.30
3230 manuf of textile machinery 0.04 4.50
3240 manuf food & chemical machinery 0.03 2.99
3270 other machinery:specific industry 0.03 10.07
3610 shipbuilding 0.03 2.18
4110 vegetable & animal oils 0.06 4.78
4120 slaughtering & preparing meats 0.02 4.35
4130 manuf of dairy products 0.02 3.30
4150 processing of fish & sea foods 0.06 2.68
4160 grain milling 0.02 7.24
4210 cocoa, chocolate & sugar 0.12 5.63
4270 brewing & malting 0.01 6.21
4280 manuf of soft drinks 0.03 2.11
4310 wool industry 0.01 4.79
4320 cotton industry 0.03 4.63
4360 knitting industry 0.09 13.74
4370 textile finishing 0.12 8.96
4380 carpets & other floor coverings 0.03 5.85
4510 mass-produced footwear 0.04 9.01
4530 ready made clothing 0.10 10.93
4560 furs & fur goods 0.06 2.73
4730 printing & allied industries 0.05 7.48
4830 processing of plastics 0.03 2.05
4910 jewellery 0.03 4.48
industries with negative significant growth
2430 manuf concrete for construction -0.13 -4.37
3280 manuf of other machinery -0.02 -4.91
4140 processing of fruit & vegetables -0.04 -2.90
4190 bread & flour confectionary -0.02 -6.14
4220 animal & poultry foods -0.01 -2.39
4620 semi-finished wood products -0.03 -10.00
4630 carpentry & joinery components -0.09 -3.86
4660 plaiting materials -0.03 -2.42
4670 wooden furniture -0.05 -5.15
4710 pulp, paper & board -0.03 -3.62
4810 rubber products -0.03 -2.76
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Table 4a continued
P t value
industries with no significant change 
2210 iron & steel 0.01 0.35
2230 Drawing & cold rolling 0.00 -0.37
2240 processing of non ferrous metal -0.01 -1.30
2410 manuf of clay products 0.00 -0.24
2420 manuf of cement, lime & plaster -0.01 -1.07
2470 manuf of glass & glassware -0.01 -1.23
2480 manuf of ceramic goods 0.01 1.84
2550 manuf of paint 0.00 0.61
3110 foundaries 0.01 1.40
3130 secondary transform of metals 0.01 1.08
3140 manuf of structural metals -0.02 -1.22
3250 manuf plant for mines 0.03 1.71
3260 manuf of transmission equipment 0.01 1.83
3620 railway & tramway rolling stock 0.00 0.22
3710 meausuring instruments 0.00 0.10
4230 other food products -0.01 -1.44
4240 spirit distilling & compounding -0.01 -1.27
4390 miscellaneous textile industries 0.00 0.14
4610 sawing & processing of wood 0.01 0.95
4650 other wood manufactures 0.01 1.40
4720 processing of paper & board -0.01 -1.16
4940 toys & sports -0.02 -1.44
4950 miscellaneous 0.01 1.50
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Table 4b
Si index with UNIDO production
P t value
industries with positive & significant growth
321 textiles 0.05 16.45
322 wearing apparel 0.07 12.49
323 leather products 0.05 13.65
324 footwear 0.05 10.73
342 printing & publishing 0.02 13.56
361 pottery, china, earthenware 0.04 9.19
369 other non-metalic mineral products 0.03 6.61
371 iron & steel 0.01 2.17
381 fabricated metal products 0.03 2.73
384 transport equipment 0.02 4.16
industries with negative significant growth
313 beverages -0.01 -3.42
332 furniture -0.02 -5.97
352 other chemicals -0.03 -2.83
353 petroleum refineries -0.05 -7.11
354 misc. petroleum & coal products -0.01 -2.28
355 rubber products -0.01 -3.96
356 plastic products -0.06 -13.91
362 glass & products -0.01 -2.14
372 non-ferrous metals -0.03 -5.57
383 electrical machinery -0.01 -3.21
industries with no significant change
311 food products 0.00 -1.48
314 tobacco 0.00 1.66
331 wood products -0.01 -1.69
341 paper & products 0.00 -0.64
351 industrial chemicals 0.00 0.86
382 machinery 0.00 0.62
385 professional & scientific equip -0.01 -2.13
390 other manufactured products 0.00 1.91
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Table 5a
D ependent variable Si In Si
P t value P t  value
constant -2.82 -5.87 -7.00 -8.82
X1 0.19 2.54 0.35 3.16
X2 0.05 2.04 1.16 1.25
X3 0.32 4.29 1.11 3.85
industry  dum m ies:
Drawing & cold rolling 1.31 2.70 0.83 3.46
processing of non ferrous metal 0.80 1.95 0.35 2.10
manuf of clay products 3.36 6.01 2.29 6.80
manuf of cement, lime & plaster 2.42 5.27 1.54 7.41
manuf concrete for construction 1.48 2.80 0.76 2.41
working of stone 4.64 8.58 2.70 7.76
manuf of glass & glassware 2.12 4.39 1.26 5.62
manuf of ceramic goods 3.48 6.70 2.12 8.15
manuf basic industrial chemicals 1.09 3.74 0.61 5.36
manuf of paint 3.57 7.25 2.09 8.61
manuf of pharmaceutical products 2.06 4.68 1.24 6.58
manuf soap & toilet preparations 1.35 3.09 0.74 4.00
founaries 1.91 3.73 1.15 4.38
secondary transform of metals 3.73 6.61 2.50 7.01
manuf of structural metals 1.93 3.65 1.39 4.46
boilermaking 3.44 6.62 2.17 7.72
manuf of tools 2.39 4.56 1.61 5.66
manuf of agricultural machinery 1.93 4.01 1.27 5.48
manuf of machine tools 3.77 6.96 2.35 7.78
manuf of textile machinery 3.97 7.97 2.23 9.26
manuf food & chemical machinery 2.55 4.89 1.69 6.15
manuf plant for mines 1.78 3.64 1.10 4.59
manuf of transmission equipment 3.12 6.16 1.90 7.81
other machinery.specific industry 4.36 8.38 2.48 9.07
manuf of other machinery 2.52 5.07 1.62 6.65
shipbuilding 1.99 4.78 1.23 7.01
railway & tramway rolling stock 3.60 10.01 1.89 12.69
meausuring instruments 4.18 7.74 2.46 8.63
slaughtering & preparing meats 2.66 5.24 1.80 6.77
processing of fruit & vegetables 2.17 4.42 1.50 6.11
processing of fish & sea foods 3.14 6.46 1.86 7.81
grain milling 2.23 4.26 1.79 5.72
bread & flour confectionary 3.70 7.26 2.20 8.37
cocoa, chocolate & sugar 1.67 3.89 0.93 5.24
animal & poultry foods 2.17 4.21 1.72 5.81
other food products 2.09 4.60 1.40 6.84
brewing & malting 4.33 8.16 2.48 9.13
manuf of soft drinks 1.59 3.18 1.04 3.95
wool industry 4.31 8.57 2.36 8.99
cotton industry 1.97 4.16 1.27 5.76
knitting industry 2.95 5.67 1.90 6.70
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Table 5a continued
D ependent variable Si In Si
P t  value P t value
industry  dum m ies
textile finishing 3.22 6.02 2.02 6.60
carpets & other floor coverings 3.61 7.68 2.01 9.28
miscellaneous textile industries 2.09 3.91 1.51 4.79
mass-produced footwear 4.45 8.50 2.52 8.61
ready made clothing 2.13 4.05 1.46 4.83
furs & fur goods 3.05 5.62 2.21 5.97
sawing & processing of wood 2.56 4.76 2.01 5.54
semi-finished wood products 2.50 4.91 1.74 6.30
carpentry & joinery components 2.06 3.86 1.49 4.52
other wood manufactures 4.82 8.84 2.80 8.12
plaiting materials 2.70 4.96 1.95 5.80
wooden furniture 1.96 3.68 1.39 4.38
pulp, paper & board 0.90 2.09 0.21 1.20
processing of paper & board 2.05 4.02 1.42 5.27
printing & allied industries 3.60 6.57 2.33 7.28
rubber products 1.72 4.02 0.89 4.82
processing of plastics 1.28 2.46 0.50 1.72
jewellery 4.04 7.60 2.56 7.30
toys & sports 3.44 6.49 2.15 7.34
miscellaneous 4.77 8.74 2.74 8.46
tim e 1977 -0.02 -0.22 0.00 0.09
dum m ies 1978 -0.04 -0.59 0.00 0.01
1979 0.03 0.49 0.06 1.39
1980 0.04 0.58 0.07 1.64
1981 0.13 1.86 0.12 2.65
1982 0.11 1.48 0.09 2.10
1983 0.16 2.14 0.14 3.15
1984 0.13 1.69 0.12 2.56
1985 0.19 2.38 0.11 2.29
1986 0.19 2.45 0.13 2.81
1987 0.24 3.23 0.15 3.29
1988 0.29 3.85 0.19 3.97
1989 0.28 3.54 0.18 3.59
Adjusted R squared 0.84 0.83
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Table 5b
D ependent variable Gi In Gi
P t  value P t  value
constant -2.74 -6.12 -5.03 -6.87
X1 0.22 2.96 0.39 3.84
X2 0.06 2.69 1.41 1.64
X3 0.25 3.59 0.91 3.43
industry  dum m ies:
Drawing & cold rolling 1.46 3.20 0.93 4.19
processing of non ferrous metal 0.93 2.44 0.43 2.83
manuf of clay products 3.21 6.16 2.18 6.99
manuf of cement, lime & plaster 2.25 5.23 1.39 7.19
manuf concrete for construction 1.33 2.69 0.65 2.25
working of stone 4.31 8.54 2.55 7.93
manuf of glass & glassware 1.99 4.41 1.15 5.57
manuf of ceramic goods 3.24 6.68 1.93 8.04
manuf basic industrial chemicals 0.86 3.14 0.37 3.48
manuf of paint 3.28 7.13 1.90 8.47
manuf of pharmaceutical products 1.85 4.51 1.05 6.05
manuf soap & toilet preparations 1.23 3.01 0.60 3.53
founaries 1.82 3.79 1.11 4.58
secondary transform of metals 3.68 6.99 2.43 7.37
manuf of structural metals 1.91 3.87 1.38 4.78
boilermaking 3.57 7.36 2.14 8.23
manuf of tools 2.11 4.32 1.41 5.35
manuf of agricultural machinery 1.91 4.25 1.21 5.66
manuf of machine tools 3.47 6.87 2.16 7.75
manuf of textile machinery 3.76 8.07 2.06 9.25
manuf food & chemical machinery 2.44 5.01 1.58 6.26
manuf plant for mines 1.56 3.42 0.91 4.13
manuf of transmission equipment 2.81 5.97 1.68 7.48
other machinery:specific industry 4.10 8.44 2.26 9.09
manuf of other machinery 2.30 4.95 1.44 6.41
shipbuilding 1.75 4.51 1.02 6.33
railway & tramway rolling stock 3.53 10.51 1.72 12.50
meausuring instruments 4.15 8.24 2.34 8.89
slaughtering & preparing meats 2.50 5.27 1.65 6.72
processing of fruit & vegetables 2.10 4.58 1.40 6.15
processing of fish & sea foods 2.96 6.53 1.72 7.81
grain milling 2.30 4.69 1.74 6.05
bread & flour confectionary 3.15 6.63 1.91 7.88
cocoa, chocolate & sugar 1.58 3.97 0.79 4.84
animal & poultry foods 2.16 4.49 1.64 6.02
other food products 2.11 4.95 1.31 6.96
brewing & malting 4.45 8.99 2.39 9.51
manuf of soft drinks 1.44 3.09 0.94 3.85
wool industry 4.09 8.72 2.21 9.11
cotton industry 2.01 4.55 1.25 6.12
knitting industry 2.92 6.03 1.85 7.04
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Table 5b continued
D ependent variable Gi In Gi
P t value P t  value
industry  dum m ies
textile finishing 2.88 5.77 1.83 6.48
carpets & other floor coverings 4.30 9.82 2.10 10.49
miscellaneous textile industries 1.98 3.97 1.43 4.91
mass-produced footwear 4.49 9.17 2.44 9.03
ready made clothing 1.94 3.95 1.34 4.80
furs & fur goods 3.01 5.94 2.15 6.30
sawing & processing of wood 2.63 5.24 2.02 6.04
semi-finished wood products 2.50 5.27 1.68 6.61
carpentry & joinery components 2.05 4.12 1.49 4.91
other wood manufactures 4.27 8.39 2.58 8.08
plaiting materials 2.64 5.20 1.91 6.13
wooden furniture 1.80 3.62 1.29 4.40
pulp, paper & board 0.82 2.05 0.14 0.86
processing of paper & board 1.99 4.18 1.34 5.40
printing & allied industries 3.55 6.94 2.24 7.59
rubber products 1.67 4.17 0.86 5.07
processing of plastics 1.14 2.34 0.42 1.56
jewellery 4.34 8.75 2.58 7.99
toys & sports 3.28 6.63 2.03 7.48
miscellaneous 4.54 8.91 2.58 8.65
tim e 1977 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.24
dum m ies 1978 -0.03 -0.42 0.00 0.09
1979 0.04 0.61 0.05 1.37
1980 0.07 0.97 0.08 1.89
1981 0.16 2.39 0.12 3.01
1982 0.15 2.19 0.11 2.58
1983 0.21 2.99 0.16 3.83
1984 0.19 2.61 0.14 3.25
1985 0.22 3.06 0.13 2.90
1986 0.21 2.92 0.14 3.28
1987 0.27 3.90 0.17 3.93
1988 0.32 4.55 0.20 4.57
1989 0.33 4.42 0.20 4.30
Adjusted R squared 0.86 0.84
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CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this Thesis was to study the determinants and patterns of trade 
and specialisation in the manufacturing sectors of industrialised countries. Since 
many of these countries do not differ much in their technologies, relative factor 
endowments and preferences, I assume that countries are in fact the same in all 
of these respects in both of the theoretical Chapters. In Chapter 1 ,1 assume that 
the countries only differ in size and analyse the relationship between the size of 
the country and the characteristics of the manufacturing goods it produces and 
trades. In Chapter 2, there are no differences between the two countries. I 
suppose that the agglomeration of two vertically linked industries in one location 
is given by history and then analyse what happens to the location of these 
industries when a new technology, incompatible with the old, becomes available. 
Chapter 3 is an empirical study of specialisation patterns in the manufacturing 
sector of EU countries. The purpose of this concluding Chapter is to review what 
we have learnt and to suggest directions for future research.
Chapter 1 showed that country size alone can be a basis for inter-industry trade 
in manufactures. I allowed the industries to have different factor intensities, 
transport costs and demand elasticities and then determined the pattern of 
specialisation and trade for each case in turn. When industries differ with respect 
to factor intensities, the large country is a net exporter of capital intensive goods 
and the small country is a net exporter of labour intensive goods, with capital 
flowing from the small country to the large country. When industries differ with 
respect to transport cost or demand elasticities, there are no capital movements. 
Even though the endowments of capital to labour remain the same there is inter­
industry trade between the two countries with the large country a net exporter of 
high transport cost goods and the small country a net exporter of low transport
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cost goods. When industries differ with respect to demand elasticities the large 
country has positive net exports of high elasticity goods when integration levels 
are close to autarky or free trade levels; and it is a net importer of high elasticity 
goods at intermediate levels of integration.
In practice industries usually differ with respect to more than one characteristic. 
If the labour intensive industry is subject to higher trade costs than the capital 
intensive industry, then the large country is a net exporter of labour intensive 
goods at high levels of trade cost and capital flows from the large country to the 
small country; and this pattern is reversed at low levels of trade costs, with the 
large country a net exporter of capital intensive goods, and capital flowing from 
the small country to the large country. So we also have an explanation of why 
countries may change their pattern of specialisation.
Chapter 2 provides an explanation of why it is that at times of major technological 
breakthroughs a leading region may lose its dominant position to a lagging region. 
It draws on the insights from the economic geography literature to illustrate why 
two vertically linked imperfectly competitive industries might agglomerate in the 
one location. When a new technology arrives, it does not benefit from the 
existing agglomeration since it is assumed to be incompatible with the old 
technology. Consequently, it is more likely to be adopted in the lagging region 
which has lower wages. We also saw that it is possible that the two technologies 
can co-exist. The new technology region has more firms operating and hence a 
higher wage. The old technology region has less firms operating so the 
agglomeration benefits are lower, but this is offset by a lower wage enabling it 
to continue to compete with the new technological leader. These results raise 
policy questions for the region with the old technolgy. The government of that 
region could explore various options to ensure that the new technology is adopted 
immediately.
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Chapter 3 showed that the degree of specialisation in the manufacturing sectors 
of some EU countries has increased between 1968 and 1990 and that the 
specialisation patterns have been consistent with the new trade theories based on 
scale economies, and the new economic geography theories based on vertical 
linkages between industries. There was only weak support for the Heckscher- 
Ohlin theory which was unsurprising since the five countries in the sample are 
fairly similar in terms of their relative factor endowments.
The insights and tools developed in the new trade theory and economic geography 
literature have been the main building blocks in both of the theoretical Chapters. 
Since the late 1970’s, the trade theory literature has relied heavily on the use of 
Dixit-Stiglitz preferences which simplifies the analyses considerably and enables 
us to address questions which we were unable to before. One limitation of this 
modelling is that the firm’s scale of operation is constant so we do not see the 
benefits of economies of scale. Chapter 1 would certainly benefit from a model 
which allowed the industries to differ in terms of their scale economies so that we 
can determine whether large countries will be net exporters of goods which are 
subject to large economies of scale.
Moreover, most of the trade literature has continued in its tradition of working 
with static models. Again, a lot is gained by keeping models simple but it is 
worth investigating what we could gain from adding dynamics. It is clear that a 
dynamic model would be a useful extension to Chapter 2. Within the static 
framework, Chapter 2 showed that there is an equilibrium with the original 
leading region operating with the old technology and the original lagging region 
operating with the new technology. But it did not show that this is the 
equilbrium. To do this we need a link between the two periods, that is we need 
to move from a static model to a dynamic one. This would certainly complicate 
the analysis but would be useful in identifying the circumstances in which
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technological leapfrogging will take place.
As well as the development of new theoretical tools, we also need to subject our 
models to rigorous testing. Although a rich trade data set is available the same 
cnnot be said for national data sets of many countries. Trade theories make 
predictions about production and trade so we also require disaggregated national 
data. Ideally, this would be disaggregated enough so we can reclassify industries 
in terms of economic definitions of industries instead of using the statisticians 
definition. Chapter 3 contains the most disaggregated national data set for the 
European Union countries but this was at the cost of only including five countries 
and a proportion of the manufacturing sector. Most other European Union 
empirical studies have relied exclusively on trade data or more aggregated 
groupings of industries.
Once we have a disaggregated national data set for European Union countries, we 
need to develop a good proxy of trade barriers, preferably for each country and 
each industry. Many trade theories relate the pattern of trade and specialisation 
to the level of trade barriers. In order to test these trade theories we need to 
know what the size of these trade barriers are. Chapter 3 was only able to show 
that the EU experience is consistent with trade theories.
So there is still a lot of work to be done in the development of tools and data 
reporting. Yet even with the tools and data at hand we are in a position to 
address important questions, as demonstrated in this Thesis. Chapter 1 has 
provided a start in determining the relationship between the size of a country and 
the characteristics of the goods it produces and trades. Even within the static 
framework, Chapter 2 showed that technological leapfrogging can occur just as 
a result of market interactions arising from pecuniary externalities. And finally, 
Chapter 3 showed that patterns of specialisation in some EU countries were
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consistent with what trade theories predict.
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